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GOVERNMENT EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY
By DAVID RIESMAN

SHORT-WAVE LISTENING IN THE UNITED STATES
By HARWOOD L. CHILDS

TREATMENT OF WAR THEMES IN MAGAZINE FICTION
By VERNON McKEENE

JOHN L. LEWIS AND THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE C.I.O.
By IRVING BERNSTEIN

PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS AND THE SCIENCE OF DEMOCRACY
By BRUCE LANNES SMITH

LISTENER REACTIONS TO SHORT-WAVE BROADCASTS
By EDGAR A. SCHULER AND WAYNE C. EUBANK

STUDY OF NEGRO POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN DETROIT
By EDWARD H. LITCHFIELD

PUBLIC RELATIONS OF THE U.S. ARMY
By JAMES R. MOCK AND CEDRIC LARSON

BOOK REVIEWS

SURVEYS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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GOVERNMENT EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

BY DAVID RIESMAN

An educative program of democratic meetings, conducted by the government, is frankly urged as a strategic offensive against anti-democratic forces at home and abroad. In the author's opinion, the Administration alone has the personnel and resources to educate and lead its public. The substance of this article was presented at the December meeting of the American Political Science Association. Mr. Riesman is Professor of Law at the University of Buffalo.

SO APPARENT is the threat to democracy's future that the establishment of a government office in Washington to inaugurate a program of education for democracy seems to be an immediately necessary step. Only the energies of the federal government, co-ordinated with existing private efforts, have a chance of being adequate for the creation of a critical and active public opinion.

Many persons, who believe that the establishment of anything like a government propaganda bureau would be a mistake, point to the futility of the Creel Committee's efforts to aid the winning of the last war, the failure of the peace that followed its refusal to distinguish between Huns and Germans, and the fatal cynicism about democracy that resulted from the Committee's smug assurance that democracy was already here, and needed only saving.

Versailles, however, did not spring from Creel and Northcliffe in any appreciable degree. Nazism did not spring in fact from the political and economic injustices, usually exaggerated, of Versailles. But the fact is not as important as the belief, and it is the belief which intimidates us when revival of the Creel Committee is suggested. For experience is the most dangerous of teachers. It teaches no lessons all by itself and must always be interpreted; interpretation which experience renders plausible is not easily forgotten or unlearned, and yet may be irrelevant.

Our experiences of the last war, as traumatically interpreted, are one of the greatest handicaps to our essential task of understanding this one. We fear our emotions will drag us down the road to war—and do not realize that absence of emotion may leave

us prey to Fascist terror that would be worse than war. We fear British propaganda—and are closed to advice from a source whose self-interests and idealisms overlap with ours. Most of all, we fear our own propaganda, out of guilt for last time—and so are paralyzed against our enemies. The underlying assumption is the analogy between this war and the last. Analogies are where you find them. The last war, with civil overtones, was chiefly a war between nations: it bore the heritage of nationalism that stemmed from the French Revolution. This war, despite nationalist overtones, is chiefly a civil—or, if you will, religious—war: its legacy from 1789 is in some measure the sesquicentennial battle between democracy and absolutism.

IDENTIFYING THE ENEMY

It took no Creel Committee to tell Americans that the Central Powers were their enemy in 1917; it was the Central Powers who sank our ships or British ships carrying our goods and nationals; who intrigued with Mexico against us; who threatened to overrun our debtor-friends. By 1917, there was no doubt in the country as to who was to be fought and how. Since it was an international war, international law prevailed, and we were at war when we said so, and not before. Today, the common man is only dimly aware that he is actually at war—in a war that started, if one needs a recent date, with the Franco Rebellion. In the United States at present the war is being fought with pressure and persuasion, but the adrenal reactions have been trained to respond only to the symbol “war.”

How, then, is the common man to learn today who his enemies are? Are “Germans” his enemies—Hitler’s first foes and first victims? Is “France” his enemy—the France of René de Chambrun or of Genevieve Tabouis? Is “England” his friend—the England of Margesson and Linlithgow or of Morrisson and Laski? How about Camacho and Almazan and Vargas and Arias?

On a University of Chicago Round Table last year, Education Commissioner Studebaker said he thought defense required only technical training—training of mechanics, machinists, and the like. President Hutchins asked him how the driver of a tank would know whom to shoot. His superiors would tell him, Studebaker

answered. That was all right for 1917; but did it do for Frenchmen at Oran whose leaders were the men of Vichy?

In this international civil war, foreign and domestic policy cannot be disentangled; the common man must relate his friends and enemies abroad to his friends and enemies at home. Both these latter appeal to him in the name of democracy; both may talk of the need for defense, of the dangers of fifth columns, of the menace of dictatorship. Are Lindbergh and Ford and John Lewis his friends? Lewis Douglas or Verne Marshall? Generals Wood and Johnson or Secretaries Knox and Hull?

The young men and women who will fight our wars and control our future policies search for the answers in bewilderment. In the defense industries, young men, bitter, uncomprehending, living in shacks and trailers, fearful of speedups, are talking about defense as a Wall Street racket. Yet defense training schools, hastily organized, are teaching trades and not ideas to cynical kids looking for draft-exempt jobs. And in the colleges and graduate schools, the alert, idealistic students are suspicious of the motives of their Aid-to-Britain instructors, and, though not patriots nor eager for the South American imperialism which is the probable outcome of isolationist-interventionist tension, many join the America First Committee. Admonition cannot dispel suspicion and confusion among the vital groups of interchanging youth, in defense plants, or training schools, or in the army. How is democracy to be taught to them and to the community of which they are a part?

BACKGROUND FOR CYNICISM

We do not start from scratch. The anxieties engendered by advertising and competition, the false attitudes towards life of slicks and pulps, movies and soap-operas—day in, day out, these sap our vigor and destroy our sense of values. The movies and the D.A.R. give us an episodic, meaningless history, and as for death and the future, the churches have abandoned eschatology, leaving the field to a minor fringe of communists and cranks. We cannot base democracy on the interpretations of the common man's experience which all the talents of advertising agents, public relations counsellors, and popular magazine writers would

wheedle us into accepting. And revolt from these pervading patterns is likely to resemble adolescent cynicism, in the absence of positive alternatives.

The psychological materials for a Fascist crusade lie here at hand, although the anti-democrats have not yet begun the campaign which would tie them all into one ideological framework: Ku Klux, Associated Farmers and Harry Bennett violence; Coughlinite and McWilliams contempt; Townsend Plan magic for the frustrated, middle-aged and middle-class; Buchmanite and like occultisms (another, usually upper-class, form of magical escape into sentimental solidarity); and all the other well-known hatreds, insecurities, and isolations of our society.

Moreover, the cynicism of revolt and the fear of propaganda have created a large number of citizens who don't believe what they read in the papers, and who feel surrounded by conspiracies and lies. Without critical and ethical training enabling them to separate good from bad in what they are told, they wish to escape from the unbearable freedom of disbelief into the comforting security of a party line. These people cannot be captured by the present forms of leadership in the community. Their school teachers, who first told them about democracy, were often life-starved women, timid in the face of dictatorial principals, school boards, local pressure groups. Their teachers' (and parents') hypocrisy about sex and society early helped to stimulate a powerful cynicism concerning the established centers of authority. Churchmen, leaders of the bar, university professors, are now subject to a like derogation.

Americans are not a reading nation; they play by ear. Press and print consequently are not very effective for organizing them, either for or against democracy. But they can be organized. They can be organized in mass meetings. (The movies are of course a form of meeting.) The Nazis have found that the solidarity of the crowd at a meeting and the charisma of the speaker can make great lies come true; but, on the other hand, critical democracy at a meeting can also make great truths come true. The radio, though more effective than print, isolates its audience. Only in meeting with their fellowmen for the attainment of some social

purpose, can these human beings fill their vacuum of disbelief and their vacuum of leadership.

THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE

In *The State of the Masses* Emil Lederer has described the significance for totalitarianism of the creation and maintenance of fluid, active masses, while spontaneous and traditional democratic groupings are demolished. The mass was created by the Nazis by crowd participation in purposive meetings which used violence as symbol and technique. The violence we may expect in these violent United States may be the beating up of dissenters. Or it may take the verbal form of contempt: contempt for democracy and its elected leaders, contempt for the accredited ways.

Great lies are another form of violence. Father Divine says "I am God," as Hitler does more subtly; in both cases the powerful and daring lie is impressive for its very extravagance and is, therefore, all the more firmly believed by those who are anxious to dominate and to submit to domination. These sadistic-masochistic characters are probably beyond hope of democratic redemption; like other types of environmentally-conditioned criminals, they must be forced to go along with democracy or go to jail. The majority, however, falls into an ambivalent category; we can be carried along by either camp. We must be defended against the anxieties and arguments which would turn up the Fascist within us, defended by a cultivated strength and daring which is critical and creative rather than sadistic and authoritarian. For democratic ends, we must take the strategic initiative and use the vigor and the emotion of which the anti-democrats have elsewhere been monopolists.

A policy which relies for salvation simply on the written or broadcast analysis and "exposure" of foreign and domestic anti-democratic propaganda is bound to fail. Such a policy is too intellectual: it assumes that people will not believe what is demonstrated to be inconsistent and contrary to "fact." Even if propaganda analysis and exposure could teach people to be on guard for the lies that have been told, it can never anticipate the future. Goebbels and his crew will not tell the same lies tomorrow that they told today. Today, for example, life-long socialists, immune to lies

about Jews, are being confused by Hitler's new lie about freeing the world's workers from the capitalist oligarchs.

Huey Long said that when Fascism came to America it would be called anti-Fascism. We can surmise the general outlines of the possible Fascist or Stalinist propagandas that we will see in the United States, but we cannot foresee their many disguising stunts or symbols. Moreover, the tactic of propaganda exposure often breaks down resistance, where it seeks to build it up. Its effect is to inculcate a general suspicion, an unconquerable cynicism, and a moral defeatism—just the attitudes which, by atomization of people, make democracy unworkable and prepare for the enforced cohesion of dictatorship. Consequently, we must drown out, rather than expose or even repress, the anti-democratic chorus. Only in that way can a body of public opinion be created which will be proof against what new and as yet unexposed lies are in store for us. The only secure defense against them is for democracy to take the offensive, too. The remedy for their propaganda is our propaganda, and for their lies, our truth.

AMERICANS CAN LEARN

Blake wrote: "When I tell any Truth it is not for the sake of Convincing those who do not know it, but for the sake of defending those that do." Without faith that the many know democracy, at least in some Platonic sense, there can be no democratic faith. Democracy works in the interest of the common man; else he could never be convinced permanently of its value—not by the slickest of pro-democracy campaigns. Nevertheless, the creative and critical powers of the common man which let him see his interest and how to advance it, are not automatic. It is hard to know one's own interest; it is doubly hard to relate that interest to the policies of a complex community. Hence it is obvious that the common man cannot be trusted without leadership and education, and without a clear demarcation of the types of issues which voters can decide and those which they must delegate to experts under safeguards.

Some have thought that issues of foreign policy must be left entirely to experts. Diplomats, preternaturally aware of the complexities and risks of foreign policy, have been afraid of

democratizing it, and have been driven underground as an alternative to demagogery. Since education and leadership are absent, the diplomats so far are right. It is essential, however, that the remaining alternative be tried: educating, leading the common man to interpret the events which have in fact shattered the possibility of his isolation, foreign or domestic. Matters of foreign policy are not more technical than the matters of labor policy or budget policy or government ownership policy to which they are inextricably tied. But Americans have had less interpretable experience with foreign than domestic issues, and in addition their European origins and religious ties have tended to create passionate loyalties and hates which tug and pull on levels almost too deep for education. Yet Americans can learn the significance of Thailand or Bucharest or Dakar for the democratic revolution, as many have learned the national significance of Southern sharecroppers and Western migrants. For democrats are involved in all mankind, in a series of concentric circles which are administrative rather than parochial.

MEETINGS FOR DEMOCRACY

The question remains: how is the democratic campaign to be organized? President Roosevelt has shown himself a great educator for democracy—to my mind, his chief asset. In a speech at Cleveland last fall, for example, he showed his audience the direction in which democracy was going and the enemies it faced. He invited his audience to be critical and concrete; he was emotional without being evangelical or sadistic. This, then, was a democratic meeting. But, after election day, there are no more meetings; the class in democracy is dismissed, to meet again in four years. The common man's need and desire for continuous participation cannot be so sporadically satisfied. One cannot be a Christian on Sundays only; one cannot be a democrat on election day if one's life is not a democratic life. Widespread, repeated meetings are essential: in every town and village, schoolhouse and church and union and hall—meetings at which a critical, democratic spirit is fostered by leadership, and sustained by solidarity and accomplishment. A large order: can private groups do it?

Private groups should certainly do what they can. But they have limitations which seem to indicate that the government should also act, utilizing private groups where it can, going on its own where it must. In the private field, the loudest voice is apt to reflect the longest pocketbook. We have no assurance that the pocketbook is on our side: *vide* Hearst or McCormick. (In the abstract, of course, we have no assurance that the government is on our side either; but I am talking about here and now; and if neither public nor private authorities are with us, as may be the case, there is no democratic hope for the immediate future.)

If the private group is not well financed, it will be ineffective. If it wants to hold meetings, it will have trouble getting halls. Other private groups may break up its meetings. Only the government can penetrate everywhere; doors cannot be closed in the face of the President of the United States or of other federal officials, much as the local reactionary groups might like to keep a closed shop on ideas. The government alone can penetrate with teachings of democracy into the new army camps. Police protection is easier to secure for meetings under government auspices than for meetings of private groups; if necessary federal police or army could be used to prevent intimidation. But such a display of force would in all probability not be required.

The Nazis use their economic power as a wedge for their political ideas, whereas the democracies have generally separated finance from ideology (except capitalist ideology), making loans to an ally without using the loan as a means of establishing a democratic fifth column. As a result, the loans are apt to strengthen an actual enemy, to persuade him that the democracies are weak and fear him. What was true of loans and food for Mussolini and will be true of loans and food for Franco is no less true in the domestic field. Grants-in-aid to reactionary state and local administrations, fat government contracts to Ford and Weir and Girdler simply strengthen the anti-democratic forces. These financial devices could and should afford a leverage for extending the democratic assemblages to company towns, to Dearborn and Weirton, to Kern County, and to irrigation districts in the Imperial Valley. Enforcement of the Wagner Act will help to build private opposi-

tion to other private oligarchies, and thus indirectly give an opportunity for the growth of critical democracy. But labor unions also can stultify criticism, and the workman may need government help to free him from racketeering or communist leadership.

GOVERNMENT ACTION ESSENTIAL

There is a further reason for a government program which springs out of the special situation in which we find ourselves. The anti-democratic forces do not attack with equal venom all the pluralistic forces of our national life; they single out the government itself—its form, its personnel, its welter of conflicting voices—for particular ridicule and contempt. If the government does not answer them, and go beyond answer to assertion, the impression is created that it is timid, afraid of giving offense, afraid of injuring that "unity" which can be obtained only by doing what the other fellow wants. Thus the contempt and apparent daring of the anti-democratic groups appear in even stronger contrast to the alleged weaknesses of the democratic government. Since that weakness is the very point at issue, the strength of private groups will not suffice and the government itself must act.

The easy form of democratic militancy is repression or censorship, and many—goaded or scared by anti-democrats—will call for that. But repression without a positive program is likely either to be futile, driving the anti-democrats under ground but not impairing their contempt, or if tough enough not to fail, democracy looking for its headstone will substitute one brand of Fascism for the fear of another, utilizing aggression in Central and South America as a drain for the sores of the repressive system. A positive program for democratic education, conducted by the government, would meet the fears and tensions that would otherwise demand repression and aggression, and render repression unnecessary or, at most, a minor corollary. Finally, the government alone can take political action in coordination with its meetings for democracy. The evils brought out at a meeting are almost all problems for governmental action and only rarely for private: local unemployment, housing, graft, price-fixing, Wagner Act violations—these furnish a chance for the "propaganda of

the deed," interpreted as to direction and critique by the speakers at the local meetings.

To an even greater extent, action and information in the field of foreign policy lie in the government's hands. Alsop and Kintner in *American White Paper* indicate that the Administration saw the dangers of Fascist aggression long before it even dared to reveal them in view of the state of public opinion. Lacking channels for contemporaneous public education, the Administration proceeded by half-measures, insufficient to do what was necessary, but enough to render many people suspicious. Then, to appease suspicion, more backing and filling, or more concealment. Lagging public opinion, bewildered and incredulous, means that government policy will inevitably thus either lag disastrously itself, or manipulate dishonestly to achieve results thought vital by those in a position to know. Either road—following public opinion, reckless of necessities, with ear-to-ground opportunism, or disingenuously doing what events require without adequate disclosure—spells the end of traditional democracy. But democratic leadership and education need not be either feeble or manipulative. The Administration, which is responsible for policy, alone has the personnel and resources to educate and lead its public.

LOCAL ADAPTATIONS

It is easier to visualize the need for and aims of a government program than to indicate in advance a blueprint for its organization and technique. The critical attitude and sense of participation and direction which are the foci of democratic teaching will naturally be conveyed differently to different groups. The teacher will find it easier to build on the working and other life experiences of the particular group, and, where possible, to organize groups according to extant community patterns. Farm meetings will relate themselves, in part, to the county agent's participative democracy of soil conservation committees and 4-H clubs; starting from there, they might, for instance, turn to criticism of the high prices of farm implements or the inefficiencies of milk distribution.

Meetings of urban workers will have nothing comparable to the county agent and county committee system on which to build;

among the unorganized, at any rate, the teaching of critical habits will be enormously difficult. Working conditions, local graft, housing: these may be the eye-openers based on this group's interests. What is vital is that the inarticulate, non-participating enclaves be brought to democratic life; sampling techniques of opinion-survey may indicate groups and areas needing to be reached. And, no matter what the leverage used to concretize criticism on local experienced conditions, all groups are to learn to broaden the range of their implications: farmers' meetings must break down rural isolationism; defense workers' meetings must discuss the possibilities and methods for avoidance of inflation.

Through their experience in changing, first themselves, and then their surroundings, these "ordinary" people can learn that their opinions count. Then responsibility and criticism need no longer resentfully be focused on an anonymous "they": "the bosses," "the Administration," etc., who are deemed to control the fate of the passive. An educative program which showed that "they" cared about the views and the feelings of the meeting, rather than, as usual, simply its votes for candidates or goods, would by that very demonstration help people to see their own share in the democratic process, and to realize themselves as part of the controlling "they."

All federal officials, from Roosevelt down, now equipped to go on circuit, should be released from their duties pro tem to do this all-important work. Others would be drafted into government service—men like Ralph Ingersoll or Samuel Grafton who see the problem and can teach what they see. However, since the skill required is exceptional, it will probably be necessary to establish a training school to teach techniques and make democrats out of the selected teachers. These men on circuit are not to give five-minute Liberty Loan talks; they are to improvise the job of democratic education our schools and other agencies have half done, not done at all, or betrayed. Entertainment—movies, sports, vaudeville, a revived Federal Theatre—could probably be utilized where necessary to attract the passive audience, to turn it eventually into an active meeting. But this is a new job, and we must learn how to do it as we proceed.

Certainly the meetings are not to whip up a love of war; the disillusionment with war should be one permanent gain of 1914-1918. Men will fight without glory, without millennial illusions: they will fight for brotherhood, for freedom to make the future, and against terror and injustice. Thus the program is not to aim at "morale" for its own sake; that would repeat the error of the Creel Committee. "Morale" in those terms connotes the "helle-fare" of a paternalistic employer, who has no faith in his workers, or of an efficiency expert who is concerned with cheap incentives. The program is to go to the common man in all good faith, with the objective of putting the future of democracy into his hands, and not of obtaining a fleeting contentment with the status quo in the army, or in the factories, or in the country. Morale is a by-product of democracy. By-product morale is enduring. It cannot be shattered by bombs or terror or the bribery of appeasement or the go-getting success of a competing system.

ANTICIPATING THE OPPOSITION

The dangers and difficulties of a government program are obvious enough. Yet Roosevelt, like Wilson, has raised great hopes for democracy, at home and abroad. If his promises are to be sabotaged, as Wilson's were, by the Lodges and Hearsts, the Lloyd Georges and Pétains, the cumulative disillusion of the common man would probably last for generations. Roosevelt has now gone, or been pushed, too far to prevent the raising of hopes and the making of promises; he has therefore no choice but to build up the machinery to permit him to perform.

The attack upon democracy is in part an attack on its symbolization in the Roosevelt Administration. An educative program of democratic meetings would meet this attack with a new, strategic offensive. The very opposition to the program would give the Administration an opportunity to show that it cannot be deflected or intimidated from the course on which it starts: in other words, it can show its strength—as it must to capture the masses—in the very process of becoming strong. Conversely, if the Administration is not prepared to carry through its program in the face of opposition, if it is to throw it to the congressional and Peglerian wolves (as was done with the Federal Theatre,

the only comparable educative program) it had better not embark at all upon this task. Withdrawal, not attack, is what fatally rouses the contempt and daring of the anti-democratic forces, quick to discover that appeasement, discredited abroad, has been reintroduced at home.

The danger of confusion is one of the obstacles to action by private groups. The conflicting claims of the private agencies sometimes cancel each other out; befuddlement is another form, in this crisis, of erroneous decision. I realize, however, that a government program is likewise not sure to be fully unified, or efficiently coordinated. Leaving Congress aside, even within the high administration are many different voices reflecting, though not as in a glass, the pressures and politics of the community. Each faction would struggle for control, or for a piece of the educative agency. The practical hope for clarity rests on the fact that this is an area in which Roosevelt is himself an expert, and where he would start with a clean slate, without holdovers; he could centralize control in a single trusted person and protect him from intra-administration sniping.

Again, if the program is to bog down in confusion, it had better not be begun; this is not an "experiment" but a necessity. For the chief danger of a government effort is that it would discredit the government if it failed, and thereby defeat one of its major purposes. It is true also that its success would discredit the effort in the minds of a good many people, not reactionary, who would feel that, at certain levels, the program was cheap or demagogic and "in bad taste," or, generally, that mass adult education is not a proper function of an American federal government. These aesthetic or historically-conditioned reactions are, I am inclined to think, too intellectual or sophisticated to count with the masses; if the program is strong, effective, dramatic, it will take hold.

The most important objection (with which I wholly agree) is that we should not be conditioned to turn to Washington, to the deified "state," for everything the country needs, that local, spontaneous, pluralistic private action gives the citizen vigor and responsibility. Where local programs are or reasonably can be effective, government need not waste its resources; it must hit

where the need is. In areas, however, where local programs are absent or anti-democratic, I do not think that Washington should wait hopefully for better local action; to do so may be to imitate the cruel error of waiting for local and private groups to cope with relief and unemployment after 1929. In parts of the South and the West Coast, for instance, outside force has to free the common man from his local despots.

The Army is quite a different matter. There is no attempt at teaching ideology there and educators have been fobbed off with the argument that they have had these boys now for twenty years, and if they have not learned democracy yet, how can they hope to in one year of intensive soldiering? But just as the Red Army is the nucleus of Soviet teaching, so our Army offers an opportunity for democratic teaching: here failure would be inexcusable. Then, if our Army must go abroad, it can carry ideas as weapons; indeed, the entire domestic educative program is bound to have repercussions in strengthening democracy in Europe and Asia.

Of course, government education, like government charity, should act so as to make itself unnecessary: by building up and then protecting against counter-revolution the private forces for democracy which I am sure exist almost everywhere in the United States, as in the world. For, once outside restraints are removed by the government, once democratic spirits have been excavated by criticism of anti-democratic ways, the meetings can serve the two-way need of give-and-take between the government and the community. Then, but only then, can the government freely learn as well as teach. And in that case the future of democracy will be safe in the hands of self-reliant men and women who, having known restraint, will know how to value freedom.

THE RELUCTANT LIBERAL

In the economic field, thoughtful people have abandoned *laissez faire*, though often with nostalgia. But our civil liberty tradition makes these same people shy away from planning in the realm of education and ideas. I have been as reluctant as most liberals to embark on government planning and prevision in the ideological order. I have felt that the nature of democracy required

a free market for ideas, without governmental intervention, save such as might be connoted by a Pure Food and Drug Act for expressions of opinion. I have feared the dangers of abuse, more serious even in the psychological than in the economic field. I have had the usual fear of liberals, historically justified, that the weapons forged by them would be used against them.

I have come to believe, however, that the ideological order is almost as unfree as the economic and that in both conjointly the government must plan for freedom, not only by avoiding forcible and fraudulent private restraints but also, since we do not start from scratch, by positively coping with the crippling effect of previous restraints. As the agricultural program has moved in the last twenty years from the prevention of manipulation in commodities to a positive program of soil conservation and betterment, in which local farm committees have an important share, so the ideological program must progress from the laws against libel and slander to an educative program that would save and improve, where possible, the spiritual soil where fear and lies have taken root. "There are," wrote Tawney in *The Acquisitive Society*, "times which are not ordinary, and in such times it is not enough to follow the road. It is necessary to know where it leads, and, if it leads nowhere, to follow another. . . . And the practical thing for a nation which has stumbled upon one of the turning-points of history is not to behave as though nothing very important were involved, as if it did not matter whether it turned to the right or to the left, went up hill or down dale, provided that it continued doing with a little more energy what it has done hitherto; but to consider whether what it has done hitherto is wise, and, if it is not wise, to alter it. When the broken ends of its industry, its politics, its social organization, have to be pieced together after a catastrophe, it must make a decision; for it makes a decision even if it refuses to decide. If it is to make a decision which will wear, it must travel beyond the philosophy momentarily in favor with the proprietors of its newspapers. Unless it is to move with the energetic futility of a squirrel in a revolving cage, it must have a clear apprehension both of the deficiency of what is, and of the character of what ought to be."

SHORT-WAVE LISTENING IN THE UNITED STATES

By HARWOOD L. CHILDS

Who, in the United States, listens to short-wave broadcasts from Europe? What types of people listen most? Why do they listen? What programs do they prefer? The answers to these questions are discussed in this article on the basis of surveys to date. Dr. Childs has been a member of the executive committee of the Princeton Listening Center since its establishment in 1939 and director of research since May 1940.

IT IS A curious fact that, in spite of the generally recognized importance of propaganda by short wave, very few studies have been made to date analyzing the impact of such propaganda on American public opinion. The principal studies of this nature are: (1) a nation-wide, sampling survey made for the Columbia Broadcasting System in 1940, herein referred to as the Gill survey after the name of the chief investigator; (2) a local survey of telephone subscribers in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, by Edgar A. Schuler and Wayne C. Eubank reported elsewhere in this issue of the *QUARTERLY*, and referred to as the Schuler survey; (3) a local survey of telephone subscribers in Princeton, New Jersey, by Paul M. Douglas; and (4) a study of selected listeners in Erie County, Ohio, by Paul Lazarsfeld and Hazel Gaudet. The Douglas and Lazarsfeld studies were made at the suggestion of the writer and constitute part of a program of local studies which also includes projects in progress by Herman C. Beyle in Syracuse, New York, and by Harold F. Gosnell in Chicago, Illinois.

That the belligerents abroad are using radio as a new weapon of warfare to influence the thinking of people in the United States is well known. Since the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, the Princeton Listening Center has been systematically monitoring these short-wave broadcasts from Europe, recording and analyzing them. More recently Stanford University has also established a listening center for the purpose of monitoring and studying short-wave broadcasts from the Far East. In April 1941

the Federal Communications Commission expanded its own domestic monitoring activities to undertake a comprehensive study of all short-wave broadcasts from abroad. No one, however, has been able to answer the questions: Who listens to these broadcasts? Is the number of short-wave listeners large or small? Why do they listen? What effect, if any, does this listening have on public attitudes and opinions?

NEW SURVEY OF LISTENERS

In January 1941 the Princeton Listening Center, with funds supplied by the Rockefeller Foundation, launched a series of studies designed to throw light on the answers to these questions. The first project undertaken was a nation-wide survey, the primary purpose of which was to ascertain the number of short-wave listeners in the United States and their distribution within different age, sex, geographical, economic, nationality, and educational groups. This survey was conducted for the Princeton Listening Center by the American Institute of Public Opinion during the last week in January 1941.

The questions relating to short-wave listening were included as a part of the regular Institute survey made that week by 194 specially selected interviewers. The sample used by the Institute was constructed in the same way in which all Institute samples are constructed, except that a special effort was made to include a sufficient proportion of aliens. The sample consisted of 3125 persons so selected as to give as true a cross section as possible of the adult population of the United States, exclusive of Southern Negroes, in terms of such factors as age, sex, economic status, urban-rural, sectional, and political distribution. Of these 3125 persons interviewed 143 were aliens, a proportion approximating the proportion of aliens in the country as a whole.

Three questions were used to identify the potential and actual listening audience.

- (1) Have you a radio in your home which can get short-wave broadcasts DIRECT from countries in Europe—not rebroadcasts of European broadcasts, or broadcasts from Europe on American stations?

- (2) If "No" or "Don't know" have you ever seen a set anywhere else, in someone's home or in a club, that could get short-wave broadcasts DIRECT from Europe?
- (3) If "Yes" on either of the above questions, during the past month have you happened to hear any of these short-wave programs DIRECT from any European country?

There were 975 persons in the sample who claimed they had a radio in their home which could get short-wave broadcasts from Europe. An additional 676 said they had seen a set during the preceding month which could get such broadcasts; and 337, or 10.8 per cent of the total sample, stated that they had actually listened at least once during the month in question to European short-wave programs.

It is very probable that this percentage of short-wave listeners is too high. Careful scrutiny of the replies showed that in some cases the persons interviewed obviously confused direct short wave and re-broadcasts. There was also the possibility that a few interviewers inadvertently biased the results by selecting persons for questioning because of their known interest in short-wave reception. To check the accuracy of the returns the Institute addressed a personal letter to the alleged listeners in April 1941, only to find that about 50 per cent of those who had previously claimed they listened in January now stated that they had *not* actually listened to a single short-wave program direct from Europe at any time since the preceding Christmas. This check-up, however, cannot be taken at its full face value because less than 50 per cent of those to whom letters were sent actually replied; because of the lapse of time; and because the check-up itself may have influenced the frankness of the answers.

The upshot of the matter is that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain absolute precision in the matter. The best answer to the question seems to be that between five and ten per cent of the adult population in the United States probably listen at least once to a European short-wave broadcast during the course of a month. Translated into numbers this would mean a listening audience of between 3,000,000 and 7,000,000 people. This is a sizable audience and justifies the efforts made to study the effects of short-wave propaganda on their attitudes and opinions.

COMPARISON WITH OTHER SURVEYS

Although the results of the other short-wave surveys referred to are by no means strictly comparable with the Institute's figures, either because they were obtained at a different time, or because of the publics surveyed, it will be of some interest to compare them with the results of this survey. The results of the Gill nationwide survey made in 1940 showed that 45 per cent of those interviewed had a radio which could tune short-wave programs; that 38 per cent of these people listened to short-wave programs at least once a week, or 17 per cent of the total sample. It is very doubtful whether this last percentage would stand the tests of refinement to which the Institute figures were subjected.

Schuler's 1940 survey of telephone subscribers in Baton Rouge revealed that 15.6 per cent of this group were current or recent listeners. Douglas, in reporting the results of his 1941 study of short-wave listening among telephone subscribers in Princeton stated: "Although 23.3 per cent of the telephone owners interviewed claimed to be short-wave listeners, only 17.1 per cent could be considered to be even likely listeners, and actual investigation proved that only 13.3 per cent of the total really practised listening on any noticeable scale." Lazarsfeld found that 36 per cent of a carefully selected cross section of the people in Erie County, Ohio, owned a short-wave receiver, but that only 10.4 per cent used them to listen to news by short wave.

Naturally one would expect to find considerable variation in the number of short-wave listeners in different communities. And only in a comparatively small number of communities would the percentage of listeners correspond to that for the country as a whole. Nowhere, however, do we find that the percentage of listeners is less than five, and the upper limit is probably about ten per cent. To claim greater definiteness at the present time would be misleading.

On the basis of the data obtained from the Institute survey there is no evidence to show that potential or actual listening among aliens is greater than for citizens generally. The percentage of aliens who stated that they had a radio in their home which could get short-wave broadcasts direct from Europe was 27 instead

of 31 per cent for the people of the country as a whole. Only 25 per cent of the aliens who could not get short-wave broadcasts on their own sets had seen short-wave sets elsewhere. And only 8 per cent of the aliens claimed that they had actually listened to short-wave programs during the preceding month. Obviously there is no assured method for testing the honesty of these replies, and the fact that the number of aliens sampled was so small suggests the need for a bit of skepticism in drawing conclusions therefrom.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Although it is hazardous to speak confidently about the precise number of short-wave listeners in the United States, it is not so perplexing to discuss the personal characteristics of listeners in comparison with those of non-listeners. The validity of such comparisons does not depend upon the precise number in each category. The information obtained from the Institute survey indicates that approximately 30 per cent of the people of the country as a whole claim that they speak or understand some foreign language besides English; that 31 per cent of the short-wave listeners are in this same category; and that 76 per cent of the aliens have this ability.

In his more restricted and localized study Schuler found that 69 per cent of his listening group could understand only English, and that of the remaining 31 per cent, 18 per cent understood French, 6 per cent German, and 3 per cent Italian. Schuler's figures, it should be emphasized, are not validly comparable with the Institute results because of the obviously atypical character of the public surveyed. Neither of these studies suggests, however, that short-wave listeners have a greater knowledge of foreign languages than the population of the country generally. Nor is there evidence to show that a disproportionate amount of short-wave listening is being done by the foreign-born in this country.

Whereas the Institute survey showed that between five and ten per cent of the adult population listened to short wave, only 0.3 per cent of these listeners were foreign-born. Doubtless the percentage of short-wave listeners who are foreign-born varies considerably from section to section and from community to com-

munity. It is quite possible that nation-wide averages tend to obscure the extent of foreign-born listening in selected centers. Douglas found, for example, that only 71 per cent of the listeners in Princeton had been born in the United States, although the percentage of native-born whites in that community, according to the latest census, was much larger.

DISTRIBUTION BY RESIDENCE

Is short-wave listening more prevalent in one section of the country than in another? Do people in cities listen to a greater extent than those in small towns and rural areas? To answer these questions the United States was divided into six geographical sections and the proportion of people in the sample listening to short-wave broadcasts in each section determined. The results are given in the accompanying table.

<i>Section</i>	<i>Per cent of sample listening to short-wave broadcasts</i>
1. New England	19%
2. Middle Atlantic	9
3. East Central	9
4. West Central	6
5. South	7
6. Rocky Mountain and Pacific	8

The most marked deviation from the national average was found in the New England States. Why this is so cannot, on the basis of the data at hand, be answered confidently. In constructing the sample the Institute was careful to have the sectional distribution of those interviewed correspond to the sectional distribution of the adult population generally. The quality of short-wave reception may have had something to do with the deviation, as well as public interest in international affairs, proximity to Europe, the educational attainments of the population, economic conditions, and density of population.

As might be expected, the extent of short-wave listening proved to be greater in urban centers and small towns than in metropolitan centers and rural areas. This may be due in part to the tendency for more families in small towns and medium-sized cities to own radios than for those in villages, rural areas, and large

cities. Curiously enough the largest percentage of listeners was found to be in small towns, with cities of 10,000 to 500,000 a close second.

ECONOMIC STATUS

One of the most significant and distinguishing characteristics of short-wave listeners is discovered when they are classified according to economic status. The rule seems to be clear that the higher one goes in the economic scale, the greater the number of short-wave listeners. In this respect listening to short wave seems to differ from listening to domestic broadcasts for numerous studies show that, in the case of the latter, the *lower* one goes in the economic scale the greater the amount of radio listening. The percentage of people listening in various economic categories as shown by the Institute survey was as follows:

Wealthy	23.3%	Poor	6.2%
Average plus	15.2	On relief	7.1
Average	12.1	Old Age Assistance	2.2
Poor plus	12.1		

The local studies of Schuler and Douglas tended to corroborate this Institute finding. In his Erie County survey, however, Lazarsfeld found that "contrary to expectation short-wave ownership was not found to be related to economic status." And further analysis convinced him that there was no economic differential between listening and non-listening set owners. That the number of short-wave set *owners* did not vary with economic level is not surprising in view of the fact that even the cheapest sets frequently have short-wave bands. That short-wave listening was as great in Erie County among the poorer classes as it was among the well-to-do is difficult to understand. This may have been due to the fact that the population of Erie County, essentially rural, did not display the extremes of economic status characteristic of the country as a whole.

The findings of the Institute, Schuler, and Douglas that short-wave listening increases as one goes up the economic scale seems more reasonable. Without doubt people in the higher income groups are more likely to have receiving sets capable of getting *good* short-wave reception than those in the lower income groups.

Moreover, the well-to-do would seem to be better informed and educated than the poorer classes, and partly for this reason to take a greater interest in international and foreign affairs. That education and knowledge about world affairs does have much to do with short-wave listening is emphasized by the information obtained regarding the educational attainments of short-wave listeners.

EDUCATIONAL FACTOR

Whereas only 8 per cent of those who claimed to have a grade school education indicated that they were short-wave listeners, approximately 17 per cent of those who said they had attended college were found to be in this category. In some communities, as for example in a college community such as Princeton, the influence of the educational factor may be even more marked. Douglas found that 80 per cent of his listeners were high school graduates, and that 57 per cent had attended college. Only 10 per cent of all listeners admitted they had failed to reach high school. Obviously Princeton is not a typical listening community, but there is definite evidence, nationally as well as locally, that educational attainment is an important factor determining the extent of short-wave listening. Although Schuler did not classify his short-wave listening public on the basis of education, he did find that: "A comparison of the distribution of Baton Rouge short-wave listeners with several publics selected on the basis of their comparability in one way or another shows a consistent and larger over-representation among professional workers and under-representation among unskilled and semi-skilled workers."

The situation in Erie County as revealed by the Lazarsfeld study is perplexing, and may be accounted for by the small number of short-wave listeners in his sample and the atypical character of the community. He found that these listeners were markedly different from non-listeners with respect to their interest in political affairs, their articulateness, their qualities of opinion leadership, and their participation in community activities. "In every instance," he states, "the short-wave listeners were found to be markedly more interested and active politically than either the non-listening owners of short-wave sets or the non-owners . . .

later analysis proved the short-wave listeners to be an exceptional group both from the standpoint of interest in national affairs and exposure to media of communication." Nevertheless, he was unable to detect any difference between the educational attainments of listeners and non-listeners.

The weight of evidence to date suggests that short-wave listeners are better off financially and educationally than the average. The significance of short-wave listening is not, therefore, to be measured solely by the *number* of listeners. The quality and the influence of listeners must also be taken into account. The short-wave listening public seems to comprise a disproportionate share of public spirited, politically active, opinion leaders in their respective communities, agents for disseminating more widely whatever ideas and opinions they acquire from the broadcasts they hear.

AGE AND SEX

When the short-wave listeners were classified according to age and sex, little difference was found in the proportion of listeners under thirty and those over thirty, except that the proportion of listeners decreased noticeably after fifty. In Princeton Douglas found that short-wave listeners were as a rule somewhat younger on the average than non-listeners. Lazarsfeld failed to detect any significant difference.

The percentage of women listeners proved to be much less than that for men, 8 per cent as compared to 12 per cent for the latter. Whether interest in public affairs or male proficiency in dial operations accounts for this differential is unknown. The Douglas and Schuler studies tended to substantiate this finding.

LISTENING PRACTICES

The primary purpose of the Institute's nation-wide survey was to identify the short-wave listening public in terms of various personal characteristics. Cost precluded an intensive examination of listening habits and the reasons for listening. The local surveys completed or in progress consider these questions more fully. The Institute did ask four questions that are of interest in this connection.

- (1) If, during the past month you have listened to any short-wave radio programs DIRECT from any European country, about how many times in the past month have you heard short-wave programs DIRECT from these countries: England, France, Germany, Italy, other?
- (2) From which European country do you usually get the best reception?
- (3) From which European country do you usually get the most reliable news?
- (4) From which European country do you usually get the most interesting speeches and other features?

All studies which have thus far been made indicate that the short-wave listening audience in the United States is primarily an English audience. The great majority of short-wave listeners listen to English broadcasts most, prefer them, and consider them most reliable. The Institute survey indicated that 93 per cent of the short-wave listeners had listened at least once to broadcasts from England; 23 per cent at least once to broadcasts from France; 55 per cent to those from Germany; 24 per cent to those from Italy; and 9 per cent to short-wave programs from some other country.

From answers to the question, What short-wave stations do you listen to frequently (once a week)?—Gill found that:

46.5%	mentioned London
14.4	mentioned Berlin
3.4	mentioned Rome
17.0	mentioned some other station
12.0	said none in particular
25.7	said they did not know
2.5	gave no answer

That listeners tend to be somewhat haphazard in their selection of programs is suggested by the answers to another Gill question. Approximately 70 per cent stated that they did not try to tune particular programs and stations but just tuned any station that was on. The fact of the matter seems to be that there is only a slight tendency on the part of listeners to confine their attention to the programs of a single country. Schuler found that 53 per cent of his listeners had listened to programs from all four countries, England, France, Germany, Italy; that 25 per cent had listened to programs from three; 18 per cent from two; and only

3 per cent had confined their listening to a single country. Douglas discovered that 73 per cent of the listeners in Princeton said they listened to English broadcasts most; 15 per cent to German broadcasts, and only 2.2 and 1.1 per cent to France and Italy respectively. His conclusion was: "All but one of those who listen to Germany and Italy also listen to England. Altogether 97 per cent of the listeners mentioned that they listen to London stations."

How often do listeners listen, and how much time do they devote to the practice? Of the 93 per cent who said they had listened to England at least once, the Institute found that 50 per cent claimed to have listened at least three times during the preceding month; 33 per cent said they had listened five or more times; 25 per cent ten or more times; and only 6 per cent thirty or more times. In the case of listeners to German programs (55 per cent), 57 per cent stated they had listened at least three times; 31 per cent five times; 18 per cent ten or more times; and only 4 per cent thirty times. It is evident from these figures that the frequency of listening is not great. Apparently only about 0.006 per cent of the adult population listen to England as often as once a day, and the comparable percentage for German programs is 0.002. This suggests that there may be daily audiences of 438,000 and 146,000 for English and German programs respectively.

During the early days of international short-wave broadcasting, 1931-1939, there is some evidence that the number of listeners increased rather rapidly. Schuler found that during this period the number virtually doubled each year. Douglas found, as Schuler did, that approximately 50 per cent of his short-wave listening public began to listen before the outbreak of war in 1939, but he also discovered that two-thirds of the listeners claim to be listening less now than they did when they first began. Lazarsfeld is of the opinion that there is a considerable turnover among short-wave listeners, and that newcomers merely stabilize the totals in recent months.

That the quality of reception probably has much to do with the extent of short-wave listening is obvious. From the evidence available it seems that English broadcasters have a decided advantage in this respect, although the quality of reception certainly

varies from place to place and from time to time. The Institute found that 62 per cent of the short-wave listeners claimed to get the best reception from England; 12 per cent said Germany; and 21 per cent gave no answer. Doubtless these results were affected to some extent by the fact that only 55 per cent of the short-wave listeners had listened to German broadcasts during the month preceding the interview. And yet it is quite possible that answers could have been based on earlier experience. Schuler found that 49 per cent of the listeners in Baton Rouge got English stations strongest on their radio, whereas only 24 per cent mentioned Germany in this connection. Douglas found that: "Indications point to a probability that all three of the major short-wave broadcasting countries can be heard quite clearly in Princeton. England seems to provide the best reception and Germany is close behind."

TUNING IN FOR NEWS

One of the principal reasons for listening to short-wave programs is the desire to obtain news. This is the conclusion reached by all investigators to date. Schuler found that 84 per cent of his listening public claimed that they listened to news most. Douglas discovered that 60 per cent of the short-wave listeners in Princeton listened to news programs primarily, 21 per cent to music, and 15 per cent to talks and other features. At the time the Institute made its survey, 51 per cent of the short-wave listeners said they found the news reports coming from England by short wave the most reliable and 37 per cent gave no answer; 6 per cent said they could believe none, and 6 per cent gave no answer. Schuler found that 45 per cent thought England broadcast the most reliable news; 32 per cent expressed no preference or did not reply; 11 per cent said that none of the news reports by short wave were reliable, and only 3 and 1 per cent respectively expressed confidence in the news broadcast from Germany and France.

Such evidence as we now have indicates very definitely that the desire for news accounts for much of the short-wave listening in the United States, but that as yet the short-wave programs do not satisfy this desire to any great extent. In fact, as Schuler's study emphasizes, a large number of listeners are definitely aware of the propaganda nature of these broadcasts, which may account

in part for the non-increase in number of listeners since the outbreak of war in September 1939. After the novelty of short-wave listening wears off, many listeners doubtless reach the conclusion of the person who wrote the Institute to the effect that, since the war, short-wave programs were nothing but "bunk"—just propaganda.

If and so long as other media, particularly the newspaper and the domestic radio, continue to furnish a better brand of news than the foreign broadcasts, one of the main reasons for short-wave listening is lost. The best antidote to the influence of foreign propaganda by short wave is the maintenance of domestic press and radio news services in which the public has confidence, and from which it obtains better news than elsewhere. This fact also suggests that the development of short-wave programs in the United States for dissemination abroad should take into account not only the general broadcasting needs and desires of people in other countries, but also the existing alternative means for satisfying them. The success of international short-wave broadcasting depends to a large extent upon the ability of the broadcaster to satisfy program desires now going unsatisfied, or doing a better job in satisfying them than other agencies or media.

Although the German Lord Haw-Haw programs attracted much attention for a time in this country as well as in England, and the Douglas survey showed that many people in Princeton had heard this feature, it is very doubtful whether talks, dramatic skits, and similar features have a very large listener following except on those rare occasions when Hitler or Churchill speaks. Only 56 per cent of the short-wave listeners answered the question regarding speeches and other features, 48 per cent stating that the most interesting programs of this type came from England. For the great majority of short-wave listeners, apparently, entertainment and "educational" features from abroad encounter a devastating competition from local, domestic stations.

REASONS FOR LISTENING

The Institute survey contained no questions that probed directly into the reasons why people listen or do not listen to short-wave programs, although the analysis of listening practices,

program preferences, and the personal characteristics of short-wave listeners does throw some light on the problem. On the basis of this information and more detailed information obtained from some of the local surveys it appears that sympathy for the Allies, quality of reception, desire for news, curiosity about foreigners, the urge for variety and thrill, as well as income status and educational attainments, are important factors determining the extent of listening.

Douglas found, for example, that a large proportion of short-wave listeners were really radio fans, frequent and persistent listeners to domestic long-wave as well as foreign short-wave broadcasts. Lazarsfeld discovered that "their short-wave listening does not detract from their regular radio listening, but is a sign of great interest in the radio in general." Not only that, but "they also mention newspapers and magazines as sources of their information in greater numbers than non-listening groups."

Many of the people interviewed said that it was difficult for them to obtain information about short-wave programs, with the result that they had gradually given up the attempt and lost interest in the programs. Press notices, so they said, were very inadequate. Others referred to the age and loss of vitality of their receiving set in explaining why they had given up short-wave listening. Many seemed to find, after a few experiments, that domestic long-wave broadcasts, newspapers, and other media proved to be the most satisfactory sources of information and entertainment; after the novelty of short-wave reception had worn off, they turned to these other media.

LISTENER VS. NON-LISTENER OPINION

The information now available does not answer directly the question of the specific *effect* of European short-wave broadcasts upon the attitudes and opinions of the American people. To determine the *effect*, controlled experiments would be necessary and the influence of short-wave programs would have to be isolated from the influence of other factors. The Institute survey did contain a number of questions on issues of public policy, on which it was possible to compare the opinions of listeners and non-listeners to short wave.

(1) If you and some of your friends were discussing the question of whether or not we will get into the war, and someone said we were actually in the war already, would you agree, or disagree, with him?

44.1% of the listeners would agree
33.6% of the non-listeners would agree

(2) Do you think it was a mistake for the United States to enter the last World War?

38.0% of the listeners said it was a mistake
50.7% of the non-listeners said it was a mistake

(3) Have you been following the discussion of the lease-lend bill regarding aid to England and other countries, which Congress is now considering?

85% of the listeners said yes
59% of the non-listeners said yes

(4) Do you think Congress should pass this bill?

57% of the listeners said yes
54% of the non-listeners said yes

(5) Suppose the United States does not go into the war, and Germany defeats England, do you think you, personally, would be affected by this German victory?

79.5% of the listeners said yes
66.9% of the non-listeners said yes

(6) If the British Navy were defeated or surrendered, do you think the Germans would send war planes over to bomb the United States within six months?

59.1% of the listeners said no
61.0% of the non-listeners said no

(7) Which of these two things do you think is the more important for the United States to try to do: To keep out of war ourselves, or to help England win, even at the risk of getting into the war?

32.6% of the listeners said keep out
38.8% of the non-listeners said keep out

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In the course of a month between five and ten per cent of the adult population in the United States probably listen to at least one short-wave program from Europe, but the number of people who listen seriously and regularly, day by day, is very small, probably not more than one per cent.

Since the beginning of the year the number of short-wave listeners does not seem to have increased appreciably and may, in fact, have decreased, although the turnover among listeners is probably great. As sets get older, reception poorer, and novelty loses its charm, listening decreases or may be given up entirely. New, experimental listening tends to appear sufficiently to offset the losses.

Much of the short-wave listening in the United States is done by persons—the majority of them men—who are radio-minded in the sense that they also listen extensively to all types of radio programs, long as well as short wave. They are also, as a rule, much more interested in public affairs than the average citizen, and are better off financially and educationally. In many cases they are opinion leaders in their communities.

Comparatively few people confine their short-wave listening to one country. The overwhelming majority are citizens, speak English exclusively, listen to English programs most of the time and prefer them. There is some evidence to show that short-wave listeners are more pro-Ally in their sympathies than non-listeners. This is not surprising, however, in view of the atypical character of listeners educationally, economically, and linguistically.

There are many reasons why people listen to short-wave programs, but the principal one is the desire for news. At first they seem to hope that they will get news more quickly and completely than it is possible for them to get it from newspapers and domestic broadcasts. When they find that this is not the case, and become increasingly aware of the propagandistic nature of the short-wave programs since the war, short-wave listening decreases. Short-wave broadcasters from Europe find it extremely difficult to hold their audiences in this country because of other and superior news sources, the greater appeal of domestic radio entertainment programs, to say nothing of the uncertain quality of short-wave reception, lack of program information, and the diminishing stimulation of curiosity, thrill, and novelty.

There is no evidence as yet that there is a disproportionate amount of short-wave listening among aliens or the foreign-born. National averages, which include those born in the British Empire

and English speaking aliens, may obscure the extent of listening in particular centers and among some foreign-born groups. Special studies of short-wave listening within such groups is needed and is contemplated.

So long as the people of the United States are supplied with a better brand of news and entertainment over their domestic radio facilities, and retain confidence in the integrity of a free and uncensored press and radio, the impact of short-wave propaganda from abroad is not likely to be marked. One suspects that the principal audiences to European short-wave broadcasts are to be found in those countries and centers where alternative sources of news and entertainment are for one reason or another unsatisfactory.

The studies to which reference has been made in this paper can give only a part of the picture needed regarding the short-wave audience in this country. Mention has already been made of the need for intensive studies of short-wave listening in selected foreign-language groups. It is also desirable to provide a mechanism for charting *trends* in short-wave listening, and to set up experiments for determining more precisely the *effects* of short-wave programs as such. In the opinion of the writer it would be feasible and not expensive to establish some six or eight survey posts in different sections of the country which would give the information desired. University faculty members in these sections might be willing to cooperate in this undertaking. Procedures could be standardized, results compared periodically, and, if the survey centers were carefully selected, the returns would be almost as accurate indications of national trends as nation-wide surveys, and much more detailed.

TREATMENT OF WAR THEMES IN MAGAZINE FICTION

By VERNON MCKENZIE

Fifty-five short stories about the war, published in American popular magazines, are grouped according to character of material and attitude conveyed. On the whole, the type of presentation could be expected to influence the reader in favor of the British. The author is Director of the School of Journalism, University of Washington, and was assisted in this study by two graduate students, Don and Hyslop Ingham.

Fiction dealing with the war has appeared in almost every American magazine which publishes serials or short stories. But it has been more commonly found in two classes of magazines: the mass circulation "slick" weeklies, *Saturday Evening Post*, *Collier's* and *Liberty*; and in the action "pulps." So far as is known, the editors of the three weeklies have not publicised their desires for this "point of view" fiction, but an editorial representative of a "pulp" group has been quite frank about it. Early in the war Jerry K. Westerfeld, assistant editor, sent the following communication to *Writers' Digest*:

We are accepting pulp fiction dealing with the present European War. The former ban on anti-German stories has been lifted. For *Air Adventures* we would like air story writers to make their heroes English, French or American adventurers. For *Fantastic Adventures* and *Amazing Stories* we will welcome stories dealing with Nazi intrigue in the United States.

Attitude-inducing short stories and serials in *Liberty* have been published in almost every issue but, on the whole, have not been as subtle as those in the other two weeklies. In addition, it may be more than a suspicion that many of these yarns have been written as the result of Fulton Oursler's editorial suggestion and perhaps even cooperation. Several have been what are called fact-fiction stories. Either they purport to be fact and yet are not; or they frankly assemble incidents that have happened to several individuals, and narrate them as the record of a single principal character. As an illustration from World War I: one of the most

successful serials ever published was "War Birds: the Diary of an Unknown Aviator," which appeared in *Liberty* in 1926—after being turned down by Ray Long of *Cosmopolitan* because it was not authentic. It has been generally understood that the author of "War Birds" was one of the top-notch magazine fiction writers of the 1920's and early 1930's: Elliott White Springs.

Twenty-seven short stories in the *Post* and twenty-eight in *Collier's*, published during the first eighteen months of the present war, might fairly be expected to influence the reader in favor of the British. The majority were pro-British rather than anti-Nazi, except by implication. It is possible that most of them were designed *primarily* as entertainment, but there is no question in the mind of this writer but that the subject matter was presented in such a way that the reader would be subtly influenced in favor of the British way of life and British conduct of the war. There were no pro-Nazi stories, although in many it was made clear that individual Germans may be gallant, courageous and efficient.

Germans may die as they fight—bravely, but it is the Nazi government which drives them to war. The British, wherever the contrast is brought out, fight for national principles which are also their own. The British, and occasionally the French, are depicted as true defenders of the pleasant, free way of life. Nothing of this is stated blatantly. The writers in the *Post* and *Collier's* are almost without exception masters of their craft. They use what would be called in law the "case history" technique to make their points. In accordance with the rule of economy and simplicity in short fiction, each writer is usually content to make one point and to make that clearly.

These fifty-five stories may be considered to fall into six fairly well-defined categories:

(1) *The British Navy and merchant marine can't be licked.* German sailors also fight courageously but, as Nazis, they scuttle their ships. Many of the stories' origins can be traced back to an actual news dispatch. In Steve Fisher's "Thunder at Night," which appeared in the *Post* August 17, 1940, Germany is not mentioned, but the *Graf Spee* analogy is clear. A British battleship, in this story, knocks out three enemy ships. As a fictional variant, it is a

vessel of the Royal Navy which has to leave a neutral port to escape internment.

Three stories are devoted to the Dunkirk evacuation, and in each it is the "little man" who is the hero. Several yarns show the part played by R.N.V.R. seamen and by variegated volunteers from the dominions and the colonies. In Paul Gallico's "Snow Goose," published in the November 9, 1940 issue of the *Post*, the main character is a hunchback with a maimed hand. Despite this handicap, he is a "sailing fool." This story and others back up Churchill's last-ditch speech, and imply that every Briton, man, woman and child, will fight to the death.

In general, Germans may be courageous but the Nazis' courage is the result of government fiat. Germans may be tricky, but their foes always outsmart them. One story shows that when it is "for the Fatherland" a German feels justified in breaking his parole. There is no such thing as personal honor left; it is submerged in something different, which might be called "Nazi honor."

Thirteen stories in the two magazines deal, along these lines, with fighting at sea.

(2) *The Nazi way of life is not an admirable one.* Little straight hate is shown, but Germans are shown—by specific illustration—as ruthless, humorless and regimented. Often they are courageous and efficient, but it is made clear that the free way of life and that of the Nazis cannot co-exist.

One story is largely successful because of its sardonic humor. In *Collier's* issue of August 24, 1940, Pat Frank's "They Think of Everything" tells of parachutist spies who are caught and shot because they follow instructions too rigidly, and fail to be flexibly minded. Other stories make various points: the German Youth Movement is a soul-searing experience; in Nazi Germany laughter is a thing of the past; old-type German burgher detests Nazi way and aids underground movement; Nazi Germany dragoons scholars and scientists into its war machine, without regard for their feelings. There are eight stories in this category.

(3) *The Royal Air Force can take it and "dish it out."* It is perhaps surprising that, considering the interest in and prominence given to the battles in the air, there are not more than five stories

in this group, published in the *Post* and *Collier's*. (*Liberty* has made air-combat fiction peculiarly its specialty.)

Three stories have a certain nostalgic touch. They present as principal characters pilots who were in World War I, and by hook and crook get into the current fracas. The best story is probably Leland Jamieson's "East from Botwood," published in the August 31, 1940 *Post*, which would seem to be the first major magazine feature, fact or fiction, dealing with the delivery of American planes from Newfoundland to England. The effect of this story on the reader would not be greatly different from that created by the two fact-features published during the past few months in *Harpers*.

(4) *There are many kinds of Britishers, but all are "stout fellas."* Some are queer fish, but every man-Jack of them—and Jill, too—comes through when duty, pride, ancestry, patriotism, or whatever you term it, calls. Some of the principal characters of the ten stories in this group are a reprobate poacher, a casino-wandering widow, a one-armed watchman, "tiny victims of the Blitzkrieg," and an odd assortment of over-age "dug-outs" whose usefulness in a crisis might be supposed to be negligible.

George Surdez, in his story "The Men of Yore," published in the April 12, 1940 issue of *Collier's*, has two heroes, British and French "dug-outs," who join forces to stop Nazi tanks in Northern France. The underlying thought for the reader is that of the confraternity between France and Britain, and that gallantry and courage never die in these nations, so long as such exemplars can exist. Another story, "Crashaw on Strategy," by William Arthur Breyfogle, in the September 9, 1940 *Post*, anticipates the results of Wavell's campaign in Libya by presenting a retired British officer in Kenya who takes on the Italians, catches the latter flat-footed, and learns that they have no stomach for fighting.

(5) *Stories which are located in Nazi-occupied areas.* In this classification, which includes nine stories, the message conveyed is more clearly anti-Nazi, or even anti-German.

Probably the most poignant and direct propaganda message is conveyed in Edna Ferber's story in the December 16, 1940 *Collier's*, "No Room in the Inn." Two German Jews, a man and

his pregnant wife, are brutally deported into that No Man's Land which is said to have existed between Germany and Poland. A child is born there, in a ditch. Nazis ask the baby's name. "Niemand" [Nobody], the mother replies. The soldiers ridicule her and give definite evidence of callousness towards her plight. In this case there is no doubt but that the story is bitterly anti-Nazi and anti-German, and that Miss Ferber meant it to be. But, as a craftsman, she permits the incidents themselves to carry the burden of the message.

Three stories may be traced back to spot-news items: the return to a Scandinavian country of German soldiers who had been selected by Hitler for their missions because they had been nurtured in this area as children, during the post-World War I period of starvation. Others, especially one by that veteran fictional critic of Germany, I. A. R. Wylie (*Post*, July 6, 1940, titled "Depth Charges") show that the ruthless, disciplined Nazi knows nothing of the finer feelings, such as love, honor and trust.

(6) *Americans cannot be disinterested in the world struggle.* In this group there are at least six stories. If there was an intention on the part of any or all of these writers to persuade the reader of the inevitability or justifiability of Anglo-American cooperation, it is usually pretty well buried. Two are tales of the sea, one harks back to action of the United States Navy in 1917, one touches on the plight of a youthful émigré Briton who learns to understand his juvenile host, and two are told through the eyes of American newspapermen.

American foreign correspondents come in for their fair share of fictional treatment. Paul Gallico's "Hiram Halliday" stories ran for several months in *Cosmopolitan*, and had an especial spot-news tang. Their propaganda value, if any, is very slight. Halliday's melodramatic adventures when he was rescued by a U-boat, and thus miraculously forced to be present at the sinking of the *Royal Oak* in Scapa Flow, give the Germans a fair break with the reader.

One story, "A Bomber Goes Back Home," by Guy Gilpatric, in the February 8, 1941 *Collier's*, defies classification under any of the above headings, as do several lesser tales. In this yarn six Jewish flyers leave a British base in a German bomber which had been

captured fairly intact, and dive bomb—crashing to their death—on Hitler and his staff at broad noon, in the yard of the Friedrichstrasse chancellory. Mr. Gilpatric would appear to have deserted Glencannon and the *Post* for the once, and indulged in some wishful thinking!

Magazines in the so-called “women’s group” have fought shy of war stories. Those that have been published, and they are few, deal usually with refugee children’s problems of adjustment.

There is a striking difference between war stories in “slicks” and “pulps,” but the two groups have one thing in common: Germans may be villains in both types, but Nazis are *always* the villains.

“Pulp” and “slick” stories differ when describing the qualities of characters. In the action group there’s something, usually physical, doing all the time. The Nazi calls the British foe “swine” and “dog” and spends much of his time snarling gutturally. As one writer remarks, “he enjoys being a heel.”

In the “slicks” the condemnation of Nazism is almost as regularly emphasized, but done with more subtlety. Instead of using clubs the “slicks” arm their characters with mental qualifications—the ability to break a man’s soul rather than his arm. The “pulps” glorify war and as they devote so many tons of pulpwood to air stories they have an opportunity to play up the prowess of the individual. In the “slick” magazines there is no glorification of war, not even of war in the air. They exemplify the insidious and overwhelming menace of a system.

It may perhaps be worth while noting that the *Saturday Evening Post*, in its non-fiction, has been consistently and vigorously non-interventionist. *Collier’s*, on the other hand, is frankly, on every page which it devotes to the issue, in favor of the Lease-Lend Bill and all its implications.

It does not seem possible to measure the influence on attitudes of the kind of magazine short fiction discussed above. These stories present a problem which I must pass along to Messrs. Gallup, Roper and Crossley.

JOHN L. LEWIS AND THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE C.I.O.

By IRVING BERNSTEIN

The attempt of Lewis to carry the C.I.O. vote for Willkie in the 1940 election was a dramatic test of his influence. This article describes the reaction of C.I.O. officials and editors, and analyzes the vote of the rank and file on the basis of a study of sixty-three counties and fourteen towns, selected as best reflecting C.I.O. voting behavior. Mr. Bernstein is a Fellow of the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

IN THE black days of 1932 the United Mine Workers was a sick union in a sick industry; its membership slumped to a low of 150,000 and its treasury was empty. In 1935 its membership reached half a million and it was rich and powerful enough to undertake the leadership in the organization of the mass industries. This new-found strength was in large measure due to the New Deal, notably the labor section of the Recovery Act and the Guffey Coal Act, and so the Mine Workers gave the Democratic Committee \$600,000 in the 1936 campaign. John L. Lewis, however, did not regard it as payment on something owed; he regarded it as an investment which was to be repaid in the future by a grateful Administration through a larger voice for labor in the decisions of state. The voice was granted, but it was less and less frequently the voice of John L. Lewis. By 1940 the division between the President and the labor leader became so sharp as to appear unbridgeable.

As the 1940 political campaign went into its penultimate week, the result of the presidential election became increasingly doubtful. The re-election of President Roosevelt, which a month before had seemed certain, now hung in the balance. The political experts and the polls were virtually unanimous in proclaiming that this would be the closest election since 1916. The Republican Party, hungering for the power it had not known for so long and convinced that it now had a chance of attaining it under the vigorous leadership of Willkie, cast about for some dramatic event to clinch the victory.

Into this setting came the voice of John L. Lewis on the night of October 25. Speaking to an enormous radio audience, he expressed a view which had been a subject of debate for weeks among his followers, politicians, and millions of the voting public. The shaggy leonine labor leader, the most dramatic and powerful individual in the labor movement, threw in his lot with Wendell Willkie.

Lewis was fully conscious of the drama in the situation and exploited it to the full; nor did he underestimate the potential influence he wielded. "The direct and affiliated membership of these several organizations, [of which I am the representative] amounts to substantially ten million men and women. Adding to this number the numerical strength of their dependent families, there is achieved a sum-total of human beings amounting to approximately one-fourth of the total population of our nation." Upon these people of labor President Roosevelt depended for re-election. If he lost them, Willkie would win, and Lewis would have carried them for the Republican candidate.

There could have been no more dramatic and clear-cut test of Lewis' influence than the one he presented with this speech. He said: "It is obvious that President Roosevelt will not be re-elected for the third term unless he has the overwhelming support of the men and women of labor. If he is, therefore, re-elected it will mean that the members of the Congress of Industrial Organizations have rejected my advice and recommendation. I will accept the result as being the equivalent of a vote of no-confidence, and will retire as President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations." He then made stirring personal appeals to the component units of the C.I.O.; to the leaders upon many of whom he had bestowed their positions, to the mine workers, the steel and automobile workers, the shipbuilders, the maritime, lumber, textile, and white collar workers. The success of his appeal can be measured in two ways: the reaction of the C.I.O. officials and editors and, above all, the votes of the workers on the fifth of November.

CLASSIFYING OFFICIAL REACTION

The labor press in late October and early November 1940 revealed that the official reaction to Lewis' speech fell into three divisions. One group endorsed Willkie and said that Lewis, regardless of the outcome of the election, should remain as head of the C.I.O. A second group very forcefully endorsed Lewis and said nothing about the presidential candidates. Affiliated with it was a small group which maintained complete silence. The third group repudiated Willkie, endorsed Roosevelt, and some repudiated Lewis as well.

The first group, those who supported both Lewis and Willkie, included the leaders of the Construction Workers Organizing Committee, President H. J. Straub of the Utility Workers Organizing Committee, President J. F. Jurich of the Fishermen, and Vice-Chairman Nicholas Fontecchio and Assistant Director Henry Johnson of the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee. The *C.I.O. News* claimed a number of the district leaders of the United Mine Workers, especially in West Virginia, but it did not give their names nor specify the nature of the support. These leaders were at the head of unions without large and solidly organized memberships, "paper" organizing committees rather than established labor unions, and they were appointees of Lewis who depended upon him for the continuance of their positions. In the case of the Packinghouse Workers, a solid though young union, the key leaders did not endorse Willkie.

The Construction Workers Organizing Committee was the most active union of this group, whose attitude was given the ablest presentation in an editorial by Cecil Owen, the editor of their paper. He said that labor was to decide the election and "the election will decide whether labor is to continue to advance, or whether it is to go down before the forces of reaction unleashed by war. That is why John L. Lewis has counseled the 25,000,000 people who look to him for leadership to cast their ballots for Wendell Willkie." Willkie would stop the rush to war. The New Deal as a reform administration was dead, and he cited the collapse of labor and social legislation and the fact that the defense commission, the real ruler of the country, was riddled with mil-

lionaires with no real voice for labor. Willkie, presumably, was to end this situation.

Owen then proceeded to what was the heart of the issue for him. The re-election of Roosevelt would mark a real attempt to unite the labor movement and, since this would destroy the Construction Workers by putting them under the more powerful A.F. of L. Building Trades, it was to be opposed at all costs. The issue, he said, was between Roosevelt and Lewis, between militant industrial unionism and foggy craftism. He was not for Willkie, but against Roosevelt, because Roosevelt stood for labor unity which would be the end of his vested interest.

The second group of officials consisted of those who supported Lewis vigorously but said nothing about Willkie, refusing to endorse either candidate. In this category fell the remainder of the "paper" unions, the Farm Equipment Organizing Committee and the Die Casting Organizing Committee. It also included some of the leaders and the editors of the Mine Workers. The *United Mine Workers Journal* maintained a position of complete silence on the election. It is not difficult to see the reason.

POSITION OF LEFT-WING OFFICIALS

Most important, this group contained the left-wing officials of the C.I.O., for this position was the "party line." Included in this category were Regional Director Leo LaMotte of the Automobile Workers (the only official of that union who did not adopt a vigorous Roosevelt stand and who, therefore, did nothing to hinder the union's Roosevelt campaign); President Abram Flaxer and Secretary Wenning of the State, County, and Municipal Workers; Presidents Lewis Merrill of the Office and Professional Workers, Mike Quill of the Transport Workers, Donald Henderson of the Cannery Workers, Harold Pritchett of the Woodworkers; Vice-President Kaufman and Secretary Pasche of the Newspaper Guild; and the maritime union leaders, including President Joe Curran of the National Maritime Union and Harry Bridges of the West Coast Longshoremen and Warehousemen.

The classic expression of this view was in a speech by Bridges to the San Francisco Industrial Union Council on November 1, just after the Council adopted the same position. He said in sub-

stance: Neither candidate is worth endorsing because neither will make specific guarantees to labor. "It does not matter what party a candidate belongs to as long as we think we can get something out of him." Beyond the question of candidates, he stood wholly behind Lewis. Everything Lewis said about the New Deal was correct. "We got our union and our conditions by fighting for them all the way down the line against the attempted betrayals and sell-out of President Roosevelt and the New Deal." The reason why he, Bridges, had not been deported was because labor fought for him, not because of anything the New Deal had done. The most important thing Lewis did was to point out the danger of war and thereby lessen our likelihood of getting into it. Every act of Roosevelt's was leading straight to war and the only way to stop him was for labor under Lewis to fight him. Trade unions cannot exist in war-time and Roosevelt is proceeding to take them over. Willkie, who cannot fool the people so well, would not know how to do so. If Roosevelt were re-elected, we would be well on the road to dictatorship.

Bridges then listed a series of acts by the Administration unfriendly to the C.I.O. He warned that Lewis' threat to resign was no bluff and that it would be a catastrophe which he was doing everything to prevent, and everyone else should do the same. If Roosevelt were re-elected, there would be an immediate "blitzkrieg on labor" and then labor would have to depend on its economic strength alone. He concluded: "I hope that everyone will think over this question and keep in mind that politics and elections may come and go, but we have to go on a little longer. The main strength of a union is its economic, organized fighting strength. I hope everyone will remember that one of the best ways of keeping, preserving and extending those things is to keep Lewis at the head of the C.I.O., no matter who is looking for the job in the White House."

LARGE GROUP REPUDIATES LEWIS

The great body of C.I.O. officialdom was contained in the third group, those who repudiated Lewis' endorsement of Willkie and reaffirmed their support for Roosevelt. Included in this category was the leadership of the great unions: The Textile

Workers, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the United Automobile Workers, the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, the Retail and Wholesale Employees, the United Rubber Workers. The Electrical Workers occupied a somewhat ambiguous position. Their convention endorsed Roosevelt but after Lewis' speech the leaders met with him and Philip Murray and decided to permit electoral autonomy to the locals. President Carey, however, continued to work for Roosevelt. Only the United Mine Workers, among the great C.I.O. unions, is missing from this list. These unions officially endorsed Roosevelt and were very active in his campaign. In many localities the union leadership virtually took over the Democratic campaign, as Van Bittner did in West Virginia, and many conducted campaigns as independent voters in Roosevelt's behalf, as the Clothing Workers did in New York.

A number of small unions repudiated Lewis as well. These included the Oil Workers, the Furniture Workers, and the Shipbuilding Workers. All six Vice-Presidents of the C.I.O., Philip Murray of the S.W.O.C., R. J. Thomas of the Automobile Workers, Sherman Dalrymple of the Rubber Workers, Reid Robinson of the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, and Emil Rieve of the Textile Workers, continued to work for Roosevelt. In a number of unions led by left-wingers, the leadership was repudiated by many of the locals. This happened in the Maritime Federation of the Pacific, where the San Francisco Warehousemen, the San Francisco, Aberdeen, Stockton, San Pedro, and Portland Longshoremen, and the Marine Cooks and Stewards endorsed Roosevelt, some of them spurred to action by Lewis' repudiation of the President. A telegram written by Curran endorsing Lewis was voted down by the National Maritime Union 132 to 33. The Rockford, Cincinnati, and Columbus locals of the Newspaper Guild went on record in favor of Roosevelt, the latter two asking that Lewis be relieved of the presidency of the C.I.O. in any contingency. The Transport Workers of Akron had come out for Roosevelt earlier and saw no reason in Lewis' speech to change their position.

The almost universal reaction of the leaders of these unions was one of disagreement with Lewis on the election and the feeling that their efforts must be redoubled in order to secure the

re-election of Roosevelt. It also spurred the unity idea and many meetings were organized jointly by the C.I.O., the A.F. of L., and the railway brotherhoods. A meeting of 30,000 was addressed in Chicago by Mayor LaGuardia of New York.

ATTITUDE TOWARD LEWIS AS C.I.O. HEAD

Though this group was unanimous as far as the non-endorsement of Willkie was concerned, there was a sharp disagreement as to what attitude to take toward Lewis as head of the organization. One point of view, which included the leaders of the Clothing and Textile unions, believed Lewis must be gotten rid of, preferably by voluntary action but, if necessary, by ouster. A more moderate view was held by the majority of the group who believed it best for Lewis to go, but would have no part in his ejection because of his achievements in the past.

No one individual expressed the total view of this group, but the attitude can be reconstructed from three sources. The *Shipyard Worker* for November 1 stated in an editorial that Lewis spoke for himself alone, since no responsible leader of the C.I.O. nor any of its component unions had endorsed Willkie. What his motives were, they did not know. They agreed that Lewis was justified in much of his criticism of Roosevelt, but the extollment of Willkie was absurd political "platitude and chicanery." The Shipbuilding Workers had endorsed Roosevelt in September and saw no reason to change their view.

President J. B. Carey of the Electrical Workers, in his column in the *UE News* for October 26, said that the New Deal had many deficiencies from the viewpoint of labor and were the election between Roosevelt and Lewis he would surely be for Lewis, but it was between Roosevelt and Willkie, and Roosevelt was the only choice. He had taken this position publicly on July 27 and saw no reason to change it.

Most moving was the column of President Thomas in the *United Automobile Worker* of November 1. Lewis' sincerity, he said, could not be doubted; but his stand was wrong. The Auto Workers had endorsed Roosevelt and they must redouble their efforts to elect him. He (Thomas), however, would under no circumstances be a party to the removal of Lewis from the C.I.O.

ANALYSIS OF C.I.O. VOTE

Though the official reaction of the union leaders was important, the basic test of Lewis' influence came at the polls on the fifth of November. If Lewis could have carried 20 or 25 per cent of the rank and file of the C.I.O. for Willkie, the Republicans would have won. Since this block of votes was so strategically distributed in the Eastern and Midwestern states with large electoral votes, every one of which was doubtful, the control of the block determined the outcome of the election.

There are difficulties in discovering how C.I.O. workers vote because they vote with the rest of the population in communities which include all classes of voters. To meet this problem, a careful selection of 63 counties and fourteen towns in twelve states was made. In each locality at least 20 per cent, and in many cases more than 50 per cent, of the voters were members of C.I.O. unions. The assumption is that these 77 cases, which best reflect C.I.O. voting behavior, will also reflect it in those communities where the C.I.O. vote is so diluted in the general vote as to be unmeasurable. The localities selected represent the states of Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, and West Virginia, and virtually every union of the C.I.O.

The only objective was to determine whether John L. Lewis was able to swing the industrial workers of the C.I.O. to Willkie and no attempt was made to segregate motives in voting. The essential factor in measuring Lewis' influence is not the candidate who won (which is important in another connection) but the decline in the Roosevelt percentage of the two-party vote* in 1940 from the percentage of 1936. A decline from the Roosevelt majority of 1936 took place in every social segment of the population and in virtually all regions and there were many reasons for it, most of them having nothing to do with Lewis. If the decline in the selected localities is greater than the decline over the whole state where all classes of voters are counted, it is frequently possible to attribute the decline to Lewis. If the decline is not

* Whenever the term "total vote" is employed it applies only to the combined Democratic-Republican vote. Third parties are a confusing factor and in no case significant enough to change any of the conclusions and they have, therefore, been omitted.

greater than that over the whole state, it may be assumed that Lewis exerted little or no influence.

Of the 63 counties selected, 61 were carried by Roosevelt in 1936 and 55 were retained by him in 1940; Landon carried two and Willkie eight. But in 61, Roosevelt's proportion of the total vote dropped in 1940 from 1936 and in only two did it rise. The towns present the same pattern. All fourteen were carried by Roosevelt in 1940 as they had been in 1936. But in twelve his percentage of the total vote declined and it rose in only two. Roosevelt, in other words, was able consistently to maintain a margin of victory from his enormous majorities of 1936.

The breakdown into figures shows that, in the 63 industrial counties, of the 3,847,594 votes cast in 1936 Roosevelt received 64.3 per cent, and of the 4,265,622 cast in 1940 he received 58.2 per cent. This marks a decline of 6.1 per cent but it is still a handsome margin of victory. In the fourteen industrial towns, of the 709,852 votes cast in 1936 Roosevelt received 68.1 per cent, and of the 834,982 cast in 1940 he received 61.2 per cent. This is a decline of 6.9 per cent and once again a substantial victory. The combined figures for all 77 counties and towns show Roosevelt receiving 64.9 per cent of the 4,557,446 votes cast in 1936 and 58.7 per cent of the 5,100,604 cast in 1940, a decline of 6.2 per cent.

Since the figures for the national vote reveal that Roosevelt's percentage dropped from 62.5 to 55.0 per cent, or 7.5 per cent, from 1936 to 1940, it is possible to say that Roosevelt ran well ahead of his national position in the C.I.O. regions, for in the former he polled only 55.0 per cent as compared with 58.7 per cent in the latter. And his decline from 1936 was sharper over the nation, 7.5 per cent, than it was in these industrial areas, 6.2 per cent.

The consistency of the results for these localities is their most impressive feature and this consistency is reinforced by the results of a Gallup Poll taken shortly after the election. The Poll revealed that Roosevelt suffered losses in every labor group from 1936 to 1940 as follows: C.I.O. declined from 85 to 79 per cent; A.F. of L. from 80 to 71 per cent; other union groups from 74 to 57 per cent; and non-union labor from 72 to 64 per cent. In every group he maintained a large margin of victory. As in 1936, the C.I.O. group

provided him with the largest percentage of votes and, in addition, it showed the smallest decline, revealing his enormous hold on its rank and file.

PENNSYLVANIA AN EXAMPLE

Pennsylvania is the heart of the C.I.O. country. It provides a good example of Lewis' influence for it was the state in which the Republicans expected the most from him and got it, and because it follows the pattern in the other eleven states in general.

In Pennsylvania half a million workers are members of C.I.O. unions, with the miners and steel workers predominating. There are seventeen industrial and mining counties in each of which the proportion of C.I.O. voters to all the voters is 25 per cent or more; in some cases it is as high as 50 per cent, and in the general average it is around 35 or 40 per cent. Of these seventeen, thirteen were carried by Roosevelt and four by Willkie. Of the four carried by Willkie, two were won by Roosevelt in 1936, both steel, and two were won by Landon, both coal. The following table indicates these results:

County	Per Cent C.I.O.	PER CENT DEMOCRATIC			Change
		1936	1940		
Allegheny	25-30%	67.5%	58.3%		-9.2%
Beaver	40	64.8	58.0		-6.8
Cambria	50	65.7	58.6		-7.1
Carbon	35	55.7	54.6		-1.1
Clearfield	25-30	58.9	53.5		-5.4
Fayette	35	68.7	63.7		-5.0
Greene	30	65.4	60.3		-5.1
Indiana	35	48.2	43.6		-4.6
Lackawanna	35-40	61.2	56.5		-4.7
Lawrence	25-30	58.7	49.3		-9.4
Luzerne	45	56.2	56.0		-0.2
Mercer	30-35	53.0	44.6		-8.4
Northumberland	35	59.4	53.5		-5.9
Schuylkill	50-55	55.4	52.8		-2.6
Somerset	35-40	48.2	44.8		-3.4
Washington	35-40	69.4	63.7		-5.7
Westmoreland	35-40	67.1	60.2		-6.9

In Pennsylvania in 1936, of 4,044,088 votes cast, Roosevelt received 58.2 per cent and in 1940, of 4,060,883 votes cast, Roosevelt received 53.5 per cent, a decline of 4.7 per cent. In the seventeen industrial and mining counties in 1936, of the 1,620,296 votes cast he received 62.9 per cent and in 1940 of the 1,672,967 votes cast he received 56.9 per cent, a decline of 6.0 per cent. The industrial counties declined 1.3 per cent more than the whole state. There is evidence of Lewis' influence in these counties but it is so small as to be negligible. Only two of them, Lawrence and Mercer, were won by Willkie that had not been won by Landon and only Lawrence can be attributed to Lewis' influence. Roosevelt depended on the industrial counties for victory, since he carried a minority, 25 of 67, of the state's counties. And in these counties he had to sweep the labor vote, for if Lewis had affected it appreciably they would have gone to Willkie. The conclusion, therefore, is that the workers voted for Roosevelt overwhelmingly.

This is emphasized in a further breakdown of these counties. Allegheny County showed a decline of over 9 per cent in the Democratic vote in 1940. This is greater than the state average and is largely explained by the decline in Pittsburgh from 70.6 to 61.5 per cent, a drop of 9.1 per cent. The county, however, also contains the three third-class cities of McKeesport, Clairton, and Duquesne, all steel towns and all heavily C.I.O. in their composition, much more so than Pittsburgh. Almost one-half of the voters in McKeesport are C.I.O. workers and the mayors of both Clairton and Duquesne are C.I.O. officials. Of the twenty-two election districts in these two towns, only one went to Willkie, that one in Duquesne. McKeesport, a traditional Republican stronghold, carried by the state ticket in 1938, went strongly Democratic. The voting was as follows:

Town	PER CENT DEMOCRATIC		
	1936	1940	Change
McKeesport	65.0%	60.1%	-4.9%
Clairton	70.3	67.3	-3.0
Duquesne	69.2	68.5	-0.7

The average decline in the three towns was 3.6 per cent, from 66.6 to 63.0 per cent; this is under the state-wide decline of 4.7

per cent. Roosevelt not only held the C.I.O. group but may even have slightly increased his share of it.

In Lackawanna County, in the hard coal region, eight of nine officials of the mine workers declared for Roosevelt early in the campaign and stayed by him despite Lewis. In the Dupont section of Scranton, one of the most highly concentrated mining regions in the country, the vote was five to one for Roosevelt. In the whole of Scranton the decline was 5.5 per cent from 59.8 to 54.3 per cent, while in Wilkes-Barre in Luzerne County, another hard coal town, the Democratic vote increased from 55.5 to 56.4 per cent.

In the seventeen Pennsylvania counties considered, the total vote declined from 1936 to 1940 in twelve and increased in only five. In the four predominantly industrial counties, Allegheny, Beaver, Lawrence, and Mercer, the total vote turned upward in each case. In the three counties of Cambria, Washington, and Westmoreland where coal and steel are fairly equally distributed, the total vote rose in two and declined in one. In the ten coal counties, Carbon, Clearfield, Fayette, Greene, Indiana, Lackawanna, Luzerne, Northumberland, Schuylkill, and Somerset, the total vote declined in all. This is a peculiar development inasmuch as the total vote of the state increased and the population of the state did the same. In the ten mining counties five showed an increase in population 1930-1940. In five the fall in the vote might be laid to the decline in population, but in the others the population-increase rules that explanation out. And in the counties where the population did drop, three of the five counties had a sharper rate of decline in the vote 1936-1940 than the decline in population 1930-1940. In Westmoreland County there was also a decline in the vote as the population rose.

This phenomenon indicates what might be expected, that Lewis had a considerable and peculiar influence with the miners. The majority of the miners voted for Roosevelt (he could not have carried these counties without them) but a substantial minority found it impossible to vote against the will of their leader even if they could not follow him into the Willkie camp, and so they abstained. This is the same attitude as that expressed in the silence of the *United Mine Workers Journal*.

EXTENT OF LEWIS' INFLUENCE

In the election returns there is little evidence that John L. Lewis' action moved any appreciable number of C.I.O. workers, their families, or their sympathizers to vote for Willkie.* If the Gallup Poll figure of a 6 per cent decline in the C.I.O. vote from 1936 to 1940 is accurate, then Lewis may have provided 2 or 3 per cent over the nation, a pathetically small figure. There is evidence, however, that he exerted an influence in a few individual localities. He undoubtedly convinced a minority of miners in Pennsylvania and perhaps in West Virginia and Ohio, though nowhere else, to follow his plea, at least negatively, in abstention from voting. In Akron, Ohio, one of the most highly organized cities in the country, the substantial decline in the Democratic vote from 71.4 to 59.6 per cent, 3.2 per cent greater than the state-wide decline, must be partly attributed to Lewis, though the confusion in the local political situation was a factor. Roosevelt, however, won by a substantial majority which indicated that the Rubber Workers were loyal to him in the main.

Over the country the Roosevelt vote showed no more than a normal decline from 1936 and in some instances it rose. It was only where the election was extraordinarily close that Lewis' slight influence was decisive in terms of electoral votes. It is quite likely that Willkie carried Michigan because of Lewis, for the election was won by 6,926 votes in a total of 2,072,908, and the decline in Flint, which was substantially over the state-wide decline, prob-

* EDITORIAL NOTE—Of interest in this connection are the results of a special poll of labor taken by the American Institute of Public Opinion during the week following Lewis' speech to determine its influence on voting intentions. The following data were supplied by the Institute and especially prepared for the QUARTERLY by Paul Perry.

In this special survey, 75.5 per cent of those polled said that they had planned to vote for Roosevelt before the speech; while after the speech 75.7 per cent intended to vote for Roosevelt. Further analysis revealed that the net effect of the speech on 401 persons polled was to shift two previously Roosevelt voters to Willkie, one Willkie-ite to the Roosevelt column, and to decide 16 of 26 previously undecided voters. Ten of these went to Roosevelt, 3 to Willkie, and 3 to a third party candidate. An analysis of the C.I.O. interviewees showed that not one of them (out of a total of 189) shifted from Roosevelt to Willkie or vice versa as a result of the speech. Five out of 9 who were undecided made up their minds after the speech: 3 in favor of Roosevelt, 1 for Willkie, and 1 for a third party candidate.

Asked, "What did you think of Lewis' speech?" 227 of the 401 workers expressed disapproval, 43 liked it, and 131 gave no answer.

ably provided the margin of victory. There is also the very slight possibility that Lewis carried Indiana for Willkie.

TWO INTERPRETATIONS

Whatever the motives that impelled him to endorse Willkie, Lewis based the action on insufficient or bad advice, for it turned out to be what Ernest Lindley has called it—a piece of “monumental political stupidity.” By way of explanation, one group maintains that Lewis was a Communist or under Communist influence, and the other maintains that it was due to a combination of factors arising out of the events of the last few years. The former view held greater currency during the campaign when it was politically expedient for his enemies to drive it home and it has been decreasing in popularity since. Actually, there can be no final answer till Lewis himself is ready to reveal what his motives were; there is no pipeline to his mind.

The Communist interpretation was stated by labor leaders like David Dubinsky and George Hedley, and reporters like Ernest Lindley and Dorothy Thompson. Miss Thompson used it with great enthusiasm and effect in a radio speech in the closing moments of the campaign. The line of reasoning of this group was as follows: Under the influence of a small clique of Communist advisers, Lewis had become increasingly disillusioned with the New Deal because it had failed to work out an equitable economic system and because it was drifting toward war. He was coming to believe that half-way measures could not save capitalism in America and more revolutionary means were needed. The defeat of Roosevelt was, therefore, essential. Willkie was a sorry alternative but he was the only one. It was a policy of rule or ruin, what Dubinsky called “wrecking.” Evidence for this view was cited in the fact that many of the leaders of the C.I.O. were left-wingers, some appointed by Lewis, and that these leaders strongly endorsed him during the campaign.

The second group, and the only one that makes sense, maintains that Lewis was neither a Communist nor under Communist domination. The league between Lewis and the left-wingers was a marriage of convenience rather than an alliance.

They had joined hands because each was friendless and needed the other.

Labor's destiny is locked with public policy. A national labor leader must wield political influence if he is to lead his organization effectively. Since 1936 Lewis' political influence declined steadily and the influence of the other leaders of the C.I.O. rose. Both those leaders and the rank and file were convinced that the President was their friend, and in resolution after resolution they indicated that they would vote for him. Only Lewis and the left-wingers stood in opposition, but each with different objectives.

John L. Lewis was a Republican for a quarter of a century before the New Deal and was a defender of free enterprise. Many of his oldest friends, like Senator Davis of Pennsylvania, are Republicans. How logical, therefore, that he should endorse the Republican candidate when the Democratic candidate had nothing more to offer him. The Communists did not endorse Willkie, and they were shocked and surprised when Lewis did.

UNDERLYING FACTORS

The reasons for Lewis' action are to be found in more limited concrete facts. He was sincerely disillusioned with the New Deal as a vehicle for producing a better life for labor. As the foreign crisis increased in intensity, the eyes of the Administration were turned more and more abroad. The extension of social security and plans for federal medicine and housing, which had been talked about in 1938 and 1939 were forgotten. In October, before the election, Lewis went to the President with three demands: that Madden be reappointed to the Labor Board, that a miners' safety statute be enacted, and that all defense contracts to companies violating the federal labor laws be abrogated. The President refused.

The dominant theme of Lewis' speech was the drift toward war. He himself had opposed conscription and he felt that intervention in the European conflict would bring no solution to either the problems of Europe or America. Added to these factors was the personality issue, for Lewis bore an intense personal dislike for Roosevelt, a feeling aggravated by his jealousy of the Presi-

dent for his command of the loyalty of the C.I.O. leadership and rank and file.

The existence of these views in Lewis' mind was widely known by the C.I.O., the Administration, and the general public. If Lewis had confined himself to silence on the candidates, he would have clearly indicated his disapproval, and he would have been understood. But he went much further; he endorsed Willkie. The entire C.I.O., even the groups most outspokenly for Roosevelt, sympathized with his criticism of the Administration, but virtually none of them could see how Willkie would be an improvement. Willkie admitted only grudgingly the efficacy of the advanced labor and social laws of the New Deal—and that against the advice of the Republican leaders in Congress—and he stood four-square on the Administration's foreign policy.

The explanation for his action in endorsing Willkie must be sought in Lewis' personal ambition. There have been many hints of it in recent years but it has never crystallized politically. The Willkie campaign, teetering on the edge of success, seemed to offer the opportunity to play the kingmaker. It was a great gamble with losses to pay if Roosevelt won; but if Willkie won, Lewis would have won for him, and who knew

By his endorsement of Willkie, Lewis created a problem in divided loyalties among his followers. He asked the common man to choose between his loyalty to the labor leader, who asked him to vote contrary to his economic interests, and the political leader, who asked him to vote for his economic interests. The issue of personalities was exciting, but the decision was grounded on something far more important, the common-sense attitude of the workingman that the New Deal had given him a stake in society. That stake was too important to expose it to any danger.

It was not a choice between two leaders but a choice between the New Deal and that vague something called Republicanism. To the man on the bench the New Deal was something specific to him personally. It meant more money in his pocket, a sense of security in his job, and the knowledge that people in positions of responsibility were looking after his interests. He did not know what the Republican Party meant to him and, if he had a long

memory, he was not inclined to trust it. In that simple line of reasoning lies the crux of John L. Lewis' failure.

That failure revealed the innate stability of electoral habits in the majority of the people. No last minute effort, even one so dramatic as Lewis', can basically alter these habits. Changes come slowly and cumulatively, resting upon economic foundations. The bustle and excitement in the last moments of a campaign serve little purpose beyond sharpening nerve-ends already too sharp and increasing bitterness already too embittered. A party cannot win a general election by having the endorsement of this individual or that one or by spending a large sum in a certain locality during a campaign; it can win an election only by the loyalty it produces in the interests and minds of a majority of the people built up cumulatively over the years.

The fundamental factor in the re-election of President Roosevelt was his hold on the labor vote. Without it he could not have won. In the strategic industrial states the industrial unions were the sheet anchor of Roosevelt victory. His debt to them is, indeed, great.

PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS AND THE SCIENCE OF DEMOCRACY

By BRUCE LANNES SMITH

From his own experience, the author concludes that present methods of teaching propaganda analysis often produce destructive cynicism in students. The remedy he suggests is a "Science of Democracy" to define social structure and individual motivation in a way both comprehensible and reassuring to students. Mr. Smith is an Instructor in Economics at New York University, an associate editor of the *QUARTERLY*, and compiler of the Bibliography in each issue.

CONCERN about the increasing power and influence of professional propagandists in national and world affairs has led many teachers into very earnest attempts to build "propaganda resistance" among their students. Most popular of the methods toward this end is a series of classroom lessons and assignments usually called "propaganda analysis."

What are the actual effects of these lessons on the student? Do the methods of teaching propaganda analysis promote, for example, a vigorous faith in the values and ultimate triumph of democratic practice? Or do they, as critics often complain, simply promote an attitude of generalized cynicism, a feeling that you can't trust any newspaper, any radio commentator, any political speaker?

If this high degree of cynicism develops, does it last or does it gradually disappear? If it lasts, does it not increase the probability that students who have been exposed to propaganda analysis will accept the distrust of democracy, the counsels of despair, that have already led the youth of Europe to flock into anti-democratic, anti-rational and hyper-nationalistic mass movements? If this tendency is often a by-product of propaganda analysis, and cannot

be prevented, is there any way to direct its course into constructive forms?

I have myself attempted to teach propaganda analysis, and have talked with other teachers who have tried. Although we have not sampled the field statistically, we all seem to have felt that an extremely high, if not menacing, degree of cynicism develops, especially among adolescents, as a result of the methods in use at present. I have tried, therefore, to formulate a rather careful analysis of what goes on among the students during a course in propaganda analysis. Possibly these formulations may, even in their present uncompleted state, strike a familiar note among other workers in propaganda analysis, and lead to a restatement of the psychological effects in a form suitable for explicit statistical and clinical testing.

For the most part, classroom teaching of propaganda analysis consists in calling the attention of the student to the following facts:

(1) That the contents of newspapers, movies, radio programs, public speeches, and sometimes sermons, have often been predetermined by highly skilled propagandists.

(2) That a great deal of news-suppression takes place in the American press and newsreels—often in the name of “editorial balance” or “avoiding sensationalism”—even though it is also true that the press and newsreels in the United States are far more complete in their coverage than any others in the world, and more free to report what they please.

(3) That most propagandists resort to a bag of tricks which any trained citizen can detect if he is keenly alert. The most popular list of these tricks is “The Seven Propaganda Devices,” drawn up by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. Other students of the subject sometimes use other lists of devices.

Observed Effects

Having used this teaching method myself, and having talked with others who have tried it, I suspect that the results, at least among high school and college students, are about like this:

Students at first become tremendously interested in the sportive side of launching an attack on “propaganda devices.” Their enthusiasm is often reminiscent of bull-fighters, throwing the bull. After this first excitement, they tend to become morally indignant, at least in most cases, about the sheer quantity of fraud and misleading utterance to which they have been exposed all their lives, especially in paid advertising and in political speeches. At this point they have a tendency to espouse some program or other of violent censorship and even suppression of those who issue “anti-social” propaganda. They demand a Board of

Public Opinion Censors, with wide and confiscatory powers.¹

At this level of opposition to free speech many of them remain, even if it is pointed out to them that censorship of anyone who claims to support democracy is in no way compatible with the traditions and program of the American people. After a time, a few farsighted ones develop intellectual vitality enough to go beyond censorship and to undertake the lifelong burden of preserving freedom of speech by analyzing each new controversy as it arises.

These few who have courage to struggle anew every day with the problem of social life are of course the hope of democracy. If their pattern of life prevails, it may be possible, as social evolution unrolls, to develop our social structure from a democracy of the few to a democracy of the many.

We have therefore at the outset to deal with the emotions of two groups: (a) those who are caused by propaganda analysis to demand censorship (authoritarianism) in some form; (b) those who are caused by propaganda analysis to demand a wider freedom of speech than at present prevails, and who have faith in their own capacity—and, presumably, in the capacity of our whole society—to deal reasonably (democratically) with the controversies that would ensue.

Any teacher or parent interested in preserving democracy would presumably wish immediately to neu-

¹ An example of this approach is found in an essay of Max Lerner, “Freedom in the Opinion Industries,” in his *Ideas Are Weapons* (New York, 1939).

tralize the effect on the first group and ultimately to bring its members into sympathy with democratic aspirations. The goal in the case of the second group would be to encourage them in every way; to make sure that educational opportunities and social influence are kept in their hands; and to utilize to the fullest the resources of mental and physical hygiene in helping them to endure, with serenity and high morale, the severe and mounting burdens they must at once assume if democratic practice is to survive. A tentative teaching approach for getting these results may be briefly suggested.

Counteracting Cynicism

Highly differentiated teaching techniques might be devised for dealing with the two types of student personality-reaction. However, students of both types are likely to turn up in the same class. In practice it is necessary to deal with both at once, as far as possible. Supplementary conferences and educational experiences outside of class may be advisable for a certain number of individual students. In the nature of the case, details of differential treatment must be worked out by the teacher to fit the personalities of the students and of the particular community where the school is situated.

In the nature of the case, also, I suspect that the suggestions I am about to make will appeal mostly to teachers of recent history and the social studies. However, the latter might do well to observe that other teachers, especially those in psychology and the humanities, could make an immense contribution. There is

little doubt in my mind, however, that the brunt of the burden of straightening out the present snarls in our social structure must rest on the shoulders of the social studies specialists. No one else is equipped or expected to carry out this task in the spirit of democracy, although others will deal energetically with our social structure—in quite another spirit—if our social studies teachers fail.

What, then, are some of the main tasks in counteracting the cynicism-producing effects of propaganda analysis and in developing a positive confidence in the democratic life?

I believe that we may start by asserting flatly that propaganda analysis is not in itself a powerful enough educational device to get the desired results. It appears to me psychologically impossible to counteract destructive cynicism by encouraging more and more and more uncertainty. There is a saturation point at which the human organism regresses to a more uncritical stage of its development in the frantic effort to escape anxiety. Certainly this is a truism among specialists in child development and, naturally, psychopathology. The teacher, therefore, needs to look ahead. To be sure, democracy demands that we constantly and vigorously practice propaganda analysis. But we must also look beyond it to the establishment of a "Science of Democracy," of which propaganda analysis is but one indispensable part.²

² The term "Science of Democracy" appears to have occurred to Dr. Harold Lasswell and myself at practically the same instant. We are not inclined to dispute as to

Defining a Science of Democracy

By a science of democracy, I refer to a clear, concise, empirical analysis of our social structure from the special point of view of anyone who seeks to establish substantial equality of social opportunity, substantial mutual respect among all members of the community, substantial educational equality (access to all the basic facts of social organization), and substantially just and equitable incomes (incomes proportional to socially approved sacrifice, and not due to inherited privilege, luck, or unearned increment).

I believe such a science can be developed and developed quickly on the basis of the wealth of data our social scientists, physicians, and mental hygienists have amassed over the past forty years. To a large extent, it seems to me, a science of democracy is already *implicit* in the social science teaching in our schools, and it can readily be made *explicit*. If this is done, I believe the especially favorable geography and traditions of America will give us an opportunity for democratic freedom such as Europe has never experienced.

I believe a science of democracy needs two frames of reference for its analysis of human events—two sets of terms with which teachers can readily become familiar, and which will furnish a ready means of communication between one democratic citizen and the next. These may be described as (1) a basic set of terms for the social structure; and (2) a basic set of terms for describing the motives of individual human beings.

Terms for Social Structure

The first set of terms would come primarily from a blending and simplification of economics and political science, with a dash of general sociology. Its function would be twofold:


(1) To block out the major social groups in a comprehensive way, so that ambiguity of statement in identifying them would be virtually impossible, even for students of early high school age. (To democracy, this is vitally important because this is the median educational level at which the present school population will leave school and start looking for a job.)

(2) To block out the major alternatives in social organization which are possible within the democratic framework.

For example, only very small differences in such advantages as educational opportunity, health facilities, and incomes are thinkable within a democratic framework. The crucial points—we may call them "critical ratios"—at which a democratic system passes into an oligarchical system or a tyranny can be very explicitly stated. On the other hand, a democratic society as a whole could contemplate a wide variety of policies in the production of goods and services which *all* might enjoy. Shall we *all*, for example, take a six-weeks vacation every year, or shall we *all* cut our vacations to two weeks and thereby enable ourselves to produce a few per cent more shoes, clothes, and

who holds the copyright. Consult, for example, his address on the subject before the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion at the Jewish Theological Seminary (*New York Times*, Sept. 12, 1940).

U. S. SOCIAL DIVISIONS



Figures show % of gainfully employed population, 1940

Money incomes shown are annual incomes in recent years

SOME OF THEIR NATIONAL PRESSURE ORGANIZATIONS
PRESSURE GROUPS EXERT INFLUENCE THROUGH THREE LEADERSHIP SKILLS:



PAGANDA



MANAGEMENT OF GOODS AND SERVICES



VIOLENCE

American Bankers Association

American Newspaper Publishers Association

Association of American Railways

Chamber of Commerce of U.S.

Edison Electrical Institute

National Association of Manufacturers

Public Relations Offices of the 250 Largest U.S. Private Firms

CUTICIANS: Democratic National Committee—Republican National Committee

MINISTRATORS: The two National Committees

About 10 of the groups listed in

Directory of Public Administration Organizations

Republican and Democratic National Committees may be thought of as pressure groups
of monopolistic and basic business to large extent, in view of source of campaign funds.

doubtful whether any pressure organization represents this group as a whole.

best approaches are perhaps:

National Association of Retail Druggists

National Retail Federation

National Small Business Men's Association

merican Assn. of Adv. Agencies

American Newspaper Guild

merican Bar Association

C. I. O.

merican Engineering Council

Federal Council of Churches of Christ

merican Federation of Labor

National Education Association

merican Medical Association

MMERS: OWNERS

American Farm Bureau Federation—Farmers (Educational
and Co-operative) Union—National Grange

EMPLOYEES

Unorganized except for a few C. I. O. agricultural unions

NSKILLED LABOR: C. I. O.

houses? These alternatives (which may be called "basic ratios") can also be stated with utter explicitness.

The accompanying chart is an example of the way the present social structure of the United States can be blocked out for these purposes. Our social structure can be thought of as a pyramid. It will be observed that six "Social Divisions" are indicated within the pyramid, into one or another of which all persons in the population fall.⁸ Since there are always borderline cases in any classification, a series of sub-categories has been worked out for ease in identifying each member of the population with his social division. (To save space, this is omitted in the present chart.)

For ease in following the activities of the social divisions in the newspapers, and especially for convenience in propaganda analysis, a list of the largest and best-known *national* pressure organizations is indicated at the proper places on the chart. As a reminder that social control in modern society can be exercised only by those who possess certain definite types of education and training, three "Leadership Skills" are listed at the top of the chart. This is intended to stress the fact that leaders who have each of these skills are necessary to each of the social divisions, and to offset the common habit of using the word "leadership" in an ambiguous or even mystical way.

Advantages for Student Use

All social classifications have their advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages of the present chart

will be readily apparent. Its advantages for the present purposes appear to be the following:

(1) It counteracts the cynicism-producing effects of propaganda analysis by showing the student that he is not forced to battle in the dark against unpredictable propagandas put out by innumerable propaganda agencies. Strange as it seems, in view of the efforts that are made in this country to train teachers, such an impression seems to be left with the student more often than not, after stiff doses of the present type of propaganda analysis.

By using this chart, the student may be made to see that there is a very finite number of major propaganda agencies, and, much more important, that they stand in a very definite relationship to each other—a relationship that can be defined and predicted rather readily. Thus, the student's sense of mastery over his own fate may be partially restored, and his mind set to functioning along rational, constructive channels.

To clarify the picture further, and further restore the sense of mastery, it may be pointed out that certain social divisions habitually use certain propaganda devices and not others. The reasons for this may be given by the teacher. The implications for the science of democracy and for democratic practice may be drawn by teacher and class.

⁸ Certain features of this classification are drawn from the social analyses by Alfred Bingham, Lewis Corey, Alba Edwards, Arthur N. Holcombe, Robert and Helen Lynd, Pitirim Sorokin, Wladimir Woytinsky, and others.

(2) By referring to just *six* social divisions, and not to a larger or smaller number, this chart probably puts social analysis within the reach of the early high school age group, who are so vital to the future of democracy. If more social divisions were postulated, the problem would become unmanageable, not only to this group but also to most college and post-graduate students, if my experience is reliable. If a smaller number of social divisions were postulated—two for example, such as "workers" and "bosses"—the terms of analysis might lend themselves to agitation on soapboxes, but would not shed much light on our social problems.⁴

Beginning with this chart of social structure as a central term of reference, it is fairly easy to inquire how high the pyramids of income and privilege may become and still be termed a "democracy." This is the problem of "critical ratios," mentioned above. It is also possible to discuss what our social processes would be like if there were more, or fewer, people engaged in each of the social divisions and each of the leadership skills. This is the problem of "basic ratios," mentioned above.

With this chart it is also easy, for purposes of propaganda analysis, to point out the large extent to which members of each social division are dependent on one another's help and good will, even though they never meet. This helps to remove the cynical illusion that "the sky is the limit" in issuing propaganda, and that slick deception is a more certain way of getting income and prestige

than is the performance of a socially valuable job. Both of these illusions seem to me to be highly prominent, at present, among those students who have been exposed to propaganda analysis.

Terms for Human Motives

It is not customary as yet for social scientists, except in the fields of Criminology and the Sociology of the Family, to attempt to say very much about individual human motivations. This has always been left, in the past, to psychologists, experts in child guidance, pediatricians, and psychiatrists. Nevertheless, I am going to venture into this field, because I believe that a careful study of personality problems is unmistakably essential to the democratic economist and political scientist, and especially to the high school teacher of social studies.

Workers in propaganda analysis can be expected to have even more need of an accurate conception of human nature than workers in other fields of social science. For propaganda analysis deals with the most profoundly irrational elements in the human emotional structure, and attempts to bring them into the light of day. Inadequately informed teachers are themselves tempted to feel that the demonstrated irrationality of man is so great as to preclude democratic social organization. Young students are likely to get this notion almost immediately. The science of

⁴ Of course the six social divisions constitute a workable number rather than a *must*. Conceivably a scholar or student might use five or seven, without changing the main argument.

democracy must be able to cope with this defeatism, by stating the exact psychological conditions under which democratic practice is maintained, and those under which it collapses. No wishful thinking or ambiguity on this point has any value whatever in defending democracy.

Students frightened by their recent discovery of the gullibility and irrationality of the great mass of mankind cannot be expected to retain much faith in the value of social control by democratic discussion. To preserve and develop this faith, it is necessary to encourage them to analyze and appraise the potency of such common mechanisms of wishful thinking as regression, rationalization, repression, projection, sadism, and masochism. It is not necessary, however, to clutter up their vocabularies with a great number of terms like these in order to put over the essential points. What is needed is a concise, structuralized picture of individual human motives, comparable with the structuralized picture of society already drawn.

I cannot undertake in these brief remarks to set forth my conception of the basic terms of reference for such a psychological teaching device, although I hope to do so later. Here I can only indicate that a basic psychological diagram of this type is probably no less necessary for social science instruction and propaganda analysis than is a picture of the social structure.

The student, confused by the propagandist claims and counter-claims of our times, is usually in desperate need of a means of blocking out the

various patterns of impulse-life of which the human being is capable. Further, he needs the tranquilizing experience of finding out what his own character is like, what occupations he is psychologically capable of taking up and enjoying, what forms of sexual and scientific and artistic enjoyment are consistent with his occupational interests, and what are the limits within which he can, if necessary, change his emotional tastes to accord with unavoidable world conditions. For better or for worse, we are all tied together by the present world technology, and we need to understand one another's personalities much better if we are to avoid a series of frightful social breakdowns.

Psychiatric Training Needed

In dealing with delicate personal problems, about which many students find it almost impossible to speak, a half-trained teacher is often worse than none at all. I believe that a considerable amount of psychiatric training is indispensable to any teacher who proposes to deal with propaganda analysis. At least a year of supervised clinical and consultative work would appear to be a minimum prerequisite. In dealing with the work of major propagandists, one is dealing with slogans and symbols that have been chosen especially because they appeal to the most powerful and least understood of all human motives: those connected with unconscious love or attachment, and with unconscious hate or aversion. If this were not true, then propagandists would not wield the influence they

have in the world today. Dr. Goebels, it may be remembered, has a Ph.D. degree. It is scarcely to be expected that an untrained mind, however alert, could fully detect the patterns of the more subtle propagandas.

I believe the only means of dealing with the most effective of the anti-democratic propagandas is to train a large number of people in the psychology of the unconscious as quickly as this can be done without the sacrifice of necessary thoroughness. This is not an easy task by any means, but there seem to be many reasons for thinking that it can be done.

The principal terms of reference for such an enterprise, I believe, would come from the work of those who have combined a considerable training in psychiatry with a considerable training in the social sciences. Indicative of the sort of thing I have in mind are the works of such writers as Karl Mannheim, now at the London School of Economics and Political Science; John Dollard, Yale Institute of Human Relations; Harold D. Lasswell and Harry Stack Sullivan, both of the William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation; Hadley Cantril, Princeton University; Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd, and Gardner and Lois Murphy, Columbia University; Edward Glover, Psychoanalytic Institute, London; and various others.

For a general introduction to the topic, I should be inclined to refer to *The Psychology of Insanity*, by Bernard Hart, well-known British psychiatrist. This little book could well be considered an introduction to the psychology of propaganda as well.

In the field of teacher-training, I should like to call attention to an article by C. V. Hobson, entitled: "How Much Do Teachers Know About Mental Hygiene?" (*Mental Hygiene*, 21: 231-42, April 1937). In this, the supervisor of a state teachers' college reports on teachers' knowledge of forty principles of mental hygiene which are considered basic by a group of authorities in the field. He also makes a clear statement of a method for testing awareness of "the mental hygiene point of view," so that job applicants and others may be properly interviewed and rated.

I believe no human being who deeply understands the problem of his own mental and biological hygiene will ever become a menace to society. If deeply enlightened as to his own emotional and biological characteristics, any man is a friendly and cooperative being toward those who treat him in the same spirit. But in an age of mass propaganda, often devised by shrewd and reckless personalities, the man who does not understand the principles of mental hygiene may often (by remote control, as it were) become a very great menace to society indeed.

Intellectually, we have a great distance to travel—and we must travel it quickly—if democracy is to be made secure in America. The essential problem is to find teachers and teaching devices adequate to sustain each man's feeling that a share in social control is after all possible for him, and that his share is best safeguarded through the practice and the science of democracy.

SAMPLING LISTENER REACTIONS TO SHORT-WAVE BROADCASTS

By EDGAR A. SCHULER and WAYNE C. EUBANK

Based on a sample of telephone subscribers in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this study supplies data, as of July 1940, on the characteristics and reactions of listeners to European short-wave broadcasts and suggests some public opinion implications. Dr. Schuler is a member of the faculty, and Mr. Eubank is a graduate fellow, of Louisiana State University.

THE IMPORTANCE of short-wave broadcasting is attested not only by the attention devoted to it by the belligerent countries and its increasing utilization by the United States, but also by the analyses of program contents by students of propaganda in neutral countries.

In all psycho-social phenomena, however, the stimulus is one thing; the response is another. And the response to long distance SW (short-wave) broadcasts, while probably studied as thoroughly as possible by the broadcasting countries themselves, has very rarely been publicly reported on. There is need for adequate and impartial study of reactions within listening publics to complement the analyses of the broadcasts themselves.

The present paper is concerned with a very limited attempt to fill in this great void in our understanding of the current war via SW. The public which was sampled and is reported on consists of 556 residential telephone subscribers other than Negroes in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

Preliminary Procedure

A mimeographed schedule was prepared to facilitate the telephone interviewing, and a standardized

introduction was used somewhat as follows: "This is —— of the Sociology Department of the University. We are making a study of the radio listening habits of the people in Baton Rouge. May I ask you a few questions?"

After this introduction, the first question ascertained whether or not the respondent owned a radio. Less than one per cent reported no radio. Those answering affirmatively were then asked, "Since September 1, 1939, have you gotten European programs direct?" Some difficulty was experienced in eliminating cases in which the respondent confused direct European reception with American long wave re-broadcasts of programs originating in Europe. When the second question was clearly affirmative, the following inquiry was made: "Which member of your family is most interested in European SW reception?" Even at the expense of considerable effort and some delay, the "most interested" person was always the one interviewed.

Out of a total sample of 556 names, 86 were eliminated either because the telephone had been disconnected or three calls had failed to secure any response. Of the remaining 470

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there were 87 current or recent listeners to European SW broadcasts (15.6 per cent of the total).

Socio-Economic Distribution

In order to evaluate the influence of any particular public upon public opinion in general not only do we need to know the number of members but also some of their characteristics. Of particular importance is their distribution among the several socio-economic classes.¹ (See Table I.)

A comparison of the distribution of Baton Rouge SW listeners with several population groups, selected on the basis of their comparability in one way or another, shows a consistent and large over-representation among professional workers and under-representation among unskilled and semi-skilled workers. If professional people may correctly be assumed to exert relatively greater influence in the formation of public opinion than members of other occu-

pational classes, it seems highly probable that the ultimate influence, in whatever direction that may be, of SW broadcasts upon American public opinion may be much greater than the absolute or relative numbers listening to SW would imply.

It must be recognized that the socio-economic distribution of telephone subscribers is not representative of the entire population, and therefore the proportions in each socio-economic class in our telephone subscriber sample who listen to SW cannot be applied to the total population, but only to the telephone-subscribing public.

Age and sex distribution of the "most interested SW listener" as reported for each family are as follows: adult men, usually husbands, 57 (66

¹ The classification used here is that developed by Alba M. Edwards and presented in the *Alphabetical Index of Occupations, by Industries and Social-Economic Groups* (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1937).

TABLE I

Distribution of Baton Rouge Short-Wave Listeners Compared with Selected Population Groups, by Socio-Economic Status

Socio-economic class	Short-wave listeners in sample ¹	Telephone subscribers contacted in sample ²	Sample of Baton Rouge city directory ³
TOTAL No.	80	400	1,347
Professional	27.5%	18.2%	9.7%
Managers and officials	17.5	17.8	17.0
Clerks and kindred workers	23.7	25.7	23.6
Skilled workers	23.7	22.6	22.8
Semi-skilled workers	7.5	13.7	18.3
Unskilled workers	0.0	2.0	8.6

¹ Seven cases omitted: occupation uncertain.

² Seventy cases omitted: occupation uncertain, or no radio.

³ 177 unclassified cases omitted.

per cent); adult women, usually wives, 14 (16 per cent); young persons and children, 3 (3 per cent); husband and wife, 9 (10 per cent); husband and child, 3 (3 per cent); and one family in which husband, wife, and a child were specified (1 per cent). When categories are combined the figures become: men, 70 (80 per cent); women, 24 (28 per cent); and children, 7 (8 per cent).

Most European broadcasts directed to the United States are, of course, in English. In response to the questions, "Do you understand broadcasts in any foreign language? If so, which, and how well?", the following data were secured. Sixty-nine (79 per cent) of the SW listeners reported that they could understand broadcasts in English only. Eighteen, or a fifth, could understand French; six could understand German; and three could understand Italian. The important French cultural influence in southern Louisiana is reflected in the fact that six persons understood the programs in French with no difficulty, six more reported moderate comprehension, and six others reported slight understanding.

Listening Habits

The next category of questions deals with the duration, frequency, regularity, and selectivity of listening. Responses to the question, "What European countries have you listened to?", revealed that although Holland, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland had been heard, only the English, German, French, and Italian programs had significant numbers of listeners. The respective numbers and percentages of all SW

listeners are as follows: 85 (98 per cent), 78 (90 per cent), 70 (80 per cent), and 47 (54 per cent). Forty-six, or 53 per cent, of the SW listeners reported listening to SW programs from all four of these countries, 22 (25 per cent) to three, 16 (18 per cent) to two, and 3 (3 per cent) to only one country. There is a slight tendency for professional people to listen more often to short-wave programs from three or four of these countries than is true of the other classes of listeners.

"To which country have you listened most frequently?" yielded answers from 55 (63 per cent) specifying England, 9 (10 per cent) each for France and Germany, and only one indicating Italy. The remaining seven either had no preference or named a combination of countries.

"What country comes in strongest on your radio?" disclosed 43 (49 per cent) naming England, 21 (24 per cent) naming Germany, 5 (6 per cent) naming France, 1 (1 per cent) naming Italy, 9 (10 per cent) naming England and Germany, and 4 (5 per cent) stating that they were uncertain.

By far the largest number reported that they had been listening to the SW broadcasts of a particular European country for less than a year. This was true for 57 (72 per cent) of 79 reporting on the period they had listened to England, 49 (78 per cent) of 63 reporting on France, 50 (74 per cent) of 68 reporting on Germany, and 28 (72 per cent) of 39 reporting on Italy. The cumulative frequencies of the responses to the question, "When did you first start

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listening to European SW broadcasts?", gave a temporal distribution as follows: 1931, 1; 1932, 2; 1933, 3; 1934, 4; 1935, 9; 1936, 16; 1937, 26; 1938, 45; 1939, 82; 1940, 87. The greatest increase is obviously that associated with the outbreak of the present European war.

To ascertain the amount of time spent in listening to the various European programs, this question was asked regarding each country listened to: "How frequently have you listened to this country?" The frequency ranged from "daily" to "weekly," and the estimated average length of time spent per country ranged from a quarter-hour to a full hour. Combining frequency and time-span figures gave a median amount of listening-time per week of from 75 to 90 minutes for England, France, and Germany, and about 60 minutes for Italy. No significant differences in total amount of time listened per week to each country were found between the various socio-economic classes.

Reactions to Broadcasts

Up to this point questions of an objective nature have been considered. Let us now turn to the central problem of this paper, the subjective question. What are SW listeners' reactions to what they hear?

In response to the questions, "In general, to which country do you enjoy listening most?" and "Why?", fourteen persons either had no preference, or named more than one country; of the remainder 63 (72 per cent) named England, 6 (7 per cent) named France, 3 (3 per cent)

Germany, and 1 (1 per cent) Italy. Responses to this question, when classified by socio-economic status of listener, showed little difference between classes. There was a slight tendency for professional persons to be less in agreement than those of other classes in naming England as broadcasting the most enjoyable programs. The reasons given for these choices, ranging from about half to one-tenth, were in order of decreasing frequency: pro-Allied sympathies, understanding of the language, liking for arrangement of the programs, and superior reception.

The next question was, "To which do you listen most—music, speeches, news, or plays?" The responses, combining replies in which more than one category was named, were as follows: news, 73 (84 per cent); speeches, 23 (26 per cent); music, 23 (26 per cent); plays, 1 (1 per cent). Analysis by socio-economic class showed no significant class differences. Excluding multiple choice response, men specified "news" more often than women, there being 30 (53 per cent) of the former, and 5 (36 per cent) of the latter, who gave this response.

"Which country do you think broadcasts the most reliable news?" Thirty-nine (45 per cent) responded with England, 3 (3 per cent) with Germany, one (1 per cent) with France, and none with Italy. The size of the remaining categories, however, is noteworthy: 17 said they had no preference, 11 said none is entirely reliable, and 15 simply did not know. Altogether, then, 43 (49 per cent) or practically half are not

sufficiently impressed by contrasts in reliability between the various European SW broadcasting countries to give an unequivocal answer. This proportion holds for each socio-economic class. An interesting difference appears when men and women listeners are segregated: eight of the men (14 per cent) said none of the broadcasting countries' programs are entirely reliable, whereas this response was given by none of the fourteen women listeners.

The next question, "Do you believe short-wave broadcasts contain propaganda?", was asked regarding each country to which the respondent had reported listening. If the answer was affirmative, further inquiry was directed to determine whether or not the listener classified the degree of propaganda content as "slight," "moderate," or "complete." (See Table II.) It will be noted that although the proportion reporting their belief to be that no propaganda content appeared in SW programs is small for each country, the country least suspected is England, the country most suspected is Germany.

Of particular interest is a comparison of the propaganda ratings given by listeners to both English and German broadcasts. Exactly half

of the 76 persons report their belief in a greater degree of propaganda content in the German than in the English broadcasts. Only one reports the opposite type of differential, and only one out of ten considers the programs of both countries to be completely propagandistic. When the several socio-economic classes are compared in this connection, the largest proportion classifying English and German broadcasts as containing propaganda to equal degrees appears in the professional class: 12 of the 20, or 60 per cent. In the other classes the proportions range from 15 to 39 per cent, though the numbers are small and therefore rather unreliable.

Sources of European News

The last category of questions to be raised dealt with the relative importance of SW broadcasts as a source of European news. "Where do you get most of your news about what is going on in Europe, short wave direct from country, regular broadcast, or newspaper?" When double responses were combined, 56 (64 per cent) reported main dependence upon the regular broadcast, 28 (32 per cent) on the newspaper, and 15 (17 per cent) on the SW broad-

TABLE II
Beliefs of SW Listeners Regarding Propaganda Content of Broadcasts

Broadcasting country	No. of SW listeners reporting	Degree of Propaganda believed present			
		NONE	SLIGHT	MODERATE	COMPLETE
England	85	11%	39%	39%	10%
France	70	11	49	28	12
Italy	47	9	31	29	31
Germany	78	4	16	20	59

cast. Analysis by socio-economic class shows greatest dependence on SW to be found in the skilled worker class, where 5 of the 19 gave this response. Among professional and managerial people the newspaper, primarily, and the regular broadcast, secondarily, supply the European news; but these relationships are reversed for the clerical and skilled workers.

"Which source gets you the news most accurately?"² In response to this question, 27 (31 per cent) reported "regular broadcasts," 24 (28 per cent) reported "newspapers," and only 13 (15 per cent) "SW." The remainder either had no preference (10), did not know (8), or mentioned more than one source.

The final question asked was this: "If you got conflicting news reports regarding a European country by short wave direct from the country, by regular broadcast, and from newspapers, which would you be most likely to believe?" Including one double response (newspaper and regular broadcast), the distribution is as follows: 31 (36 per cent) reported "newspaper," 17 (20 per cent) "SW," and only 16 (18 per cent) "regular broadcast," while 24 (28 per cent) said they thought there was no preference, or that they did not know.

Classification of responses by socio-economic status shows both professional and managerial classes most frequently specify newspapers as the most credible source (ten of 22, and eight of 14, respectively) while this is true of fewer clerical workers (seven of 19), still fewer skilled workers (four of 19), and fewest

semi-skilled workers (one of 6). Only two each in the professional and managerial categories specify SW, while that is true of eight of the 19 skilled workers. A comparison of men and women listeners shows no relative difference in the frequency with which SW is mentioned, but men seem to place more confidence in the newspaper, while women relatively more often regard the regular broadcast as most credible.

Implications of Study

What does this study, limited as it is, suggest regarding the influence of European SW broadcasting upon public opinion in the United States? Any interpretation here set forth must be tentative only, for the data upon which the findings are based should be checked for reliability and validity by means of follow-up personal interviews, repetition of telephone inquiries, enlarging of the size of the sample, securing daily listening records over a considerable period of time, and so on. Nevertheless, certain implications, which seem likely to have more general applicability than in the Baton Rouge area alone, deserve emphasis.

The number of families in which one or more persons have listened more or less frequently to European SW broadcasts is probably not large as compared with the total population, or even the entire long-wave radio public. But the SW listeners seem to be relatively much more numerous in the professional class

² See the very interesting materials on this and related questions in the article, "The Press and the People—a Survey," *Fortune*, August 1939, pp. 64 ff.

than in any other class of SW listeners, there being about three times as many in this class as in the telephone-subscribing sample. This excess is paralleled by a deficiency of SW listeners among unskilled, and to a lesser degree, among semi-skilled workers.

Accordingly, the European SW broadcasters are probably reaching a considerable proportion of the American public directly, and an indeterminate but possibly even more significant number are being reached indirectly, since the professional class includes such occupations as teaching, preaching, writing, and lecturing.

Americans who listen to European SW broadcasts are usually men, and they are more interested in the news than in any other type of program. They seem to be hoping to learn the European news faster and more directly through SW than through any other medium. But they are not too hopeful of accurate, impartial reporting over SW, any more than through any other news-transmitting channel. Nine times out of ten they think the SW program is essentially a propaganda device, and they therefore probably listen to the news programs critically and distrustfully if not actually with negative attitudes.

Probably the finding of greatest practical consequence, if it be generally applicable, is this: among those who listen to both British and German programs, there are about six persons who believe that the pro-

grams of Germany are "all propaganda" to one who believes the same of British programs.

Regarding American listening to European SW programs, then, our findings suggest that:

(1) There are considerable numbers of listeners who have differing expectations regarding the veracity of the speakers they hear;

(2) This disparity almost invariably consists of greater credence given to the spokesmen for the British point of view;

(3) Accordingly, the more the German Ministry of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment improves its facilities for reaching the U.S. public via SW direct, the more it tends to defeat its own purposes—it merely strengthens the already prevailing American attitudes and impressions regarding German propaganda activities;

(4) On the other hand, the SW broadcasting of the British Ministry of Information, while only rarely regarded as entirely innocent of propaganda, is thought to be so much less objectionable in that respect than that of Germany and Italy, as to be relatively credible;

(5) Finally, the continued operation of this disparity in attitude toward the SW presentations of the two major European belligerents is likely to have a cumulative effect, and exercise widely ramifying influences in the rapidly intensifying struggle against apathy and neutrality on the part of American public opinion.

A CASE STUDY OF NEGRO POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN DETROIT

By EDWARD H. LITCHFIELD

Three aspects of Negro political behavior—voting participation, major party affiliation, and third party voting—are analyzed and compared with the performance of the native white and foreign-born white. Formerly a member of the Department of Political Science at Brown University, Dr. Litchfield is now in charge of training, Personnel Division, the Panama Canal.

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Mich. Govt Service Comm. & with Natl. Sev. Dept. of U. of Mich.*

IN RECENT years both scholars and politicians have paid an increasing amount of attention to the Negro voter. He has probably been harangued, organized and "correlated" to a greater degree than ever before. There is, however, still much to learn about his behavior in the Northern political community of which he is a part. This study attempts to present the data pertinent to an understanding of the political performance of the Negro voter in industrial Detroit during the last decade.

In the first place, it must be pointed out that Detroit has no institutionalized political machine; ephemeral personal machines are common in this area as elsewhere, but they have never achieved the permanence, efficiency of performance and general institutional character of the machine organizations in Chicago, New York and many other large cities.

Moreover, the Detroit area, like the great majority of the State of Michigan, was rigidly Republican until the arrival of the Great Depression. Since that time, the uniformity of its Democratic affiliation stamps it as one of the many areas in which political behavior patterns follow close upon economic fortunes.

Finally, it is pertinent to observe that this area is still comparatively new, its growth having been largely confined to the twentieth century. This rapid growth was of course accompanied by a substantial influx of minority race and ethnic groups. Only in terms of the dynamics of this situation is it possible to interpret the facile adjustments which characterize recent political behavior in Detroit.

Character of Analysis

The data presented cover the elections from 1930 to 1940 and therefore represent six separate elections. For reasons which are too extensive to give here,¹ the index of voting behavior which was employed was the vote for the office of governor.²

¹ These along with all of the methodological procedures employed in this study are discussed in the author's *Political Behavior in a Metropolitan Community* (Ann Arbor, 1941), which includes a portion of this material in somewhat different form.

² All of these voting data were originally obtained from the Wayne County Clerk's Office but as most of the records have since been destroyed they are now available only in the author's own files, though some of them may also be found in *Detroit Voters and Recent Detroit Elections*, by Donald S. Hecock and Harry A. Trevelyan (Detroit, 1937).

From these voting data conclusions have been drawn regarding three separate aspects of behavior: electoral participation, major party affiliation and third party voting. Each of the sections dealing with the three behavior patterns will present (1) a comparison of the whole Negro community with the native white and foreign-born communities, and (2) a comparison of each of the distinct Negro economic groups with the same subgroups within each of the other communities.

Voting Participation

Voting participation figures are not calculated in a uniform manner by investigators in this field, and it therefore becomes necessary to specify that the participation data presented here represent percentages of registered voters who voted in the elections discussed.⁸ Comparisons of these with other data must be made with this fact in mind.

The voting participation of the Negro group along with that of the several other groups is presented in Table I. It will be clearly seen that the Negro group participated to a much smaller extent than did either of the other major groups or the city

as a whole. However, it also shows that the Negro curve rose steadily until 1940 when there appears to have been an appreciable reversal of this trend. Both the trend and the reversal are atypical of the performance of the city as a whole and of the other groups.

The reversal in the Negro participation trend seems particularly unusual in view of the fact that 1940 was a Presidential year. The failure of the Negro voter to respond to the stimulus of a Presidential campaign is also reflected in the fact that in both 1932 and 1936 his average participation fell farther below the city average than in any of the other years. In 1932 it was 24.2 per cent below, in 1936 it was 21.1 per cent and in 1940 it was 22.8 per cent below. Since we are accustomed to attributing increased general participation to the drama which a Presidential campaign injects into an election, we probably must conclude that the Negro responds less vigorously to these stimuli than does either the native or the foreign-born white.

⁸ The registration data employed in this calculation were obtained from the office of the Detroit Election Commission.

TABLE I
Percentage of Registered Voters Voting in the
Major Race and Ethnic Groups

Group	1930	1932	1934*	1936	1938	1940
Native White	42.5	87.0	85.1	75.4	85.4
Negro	29.1	57.5	59.6	66.0	59.2
Foreign Born	42.0	81.5	80.5	77.0	82.8
City Average	41.5	81.7	56.2	80.7	75.8	82.0

* Unfortunately the data are not available for the year 1934 for precincts which were the units in terms of which these materials were calculated.

It is interesting to note that the Negro community never came closer to displacing either of the other two groups than in 1938 when it was 9.8 per cent behind the native white group. At no time was it within less than 11 per cent of the foreign-born community.

A somewhat different set of conclusions are to be drawn from the more detailed data regarding the different income levels within the Negro community which are presented in Table II. These income groups are as follows: Lower—less than \$1,000 per year; Middle—\$1,001-\$2,500 per year.

In the lower income brackets the Negro is again found to be a less frequent participant than are similar income groups in the other communities. In 1930 the poor Negro recorded the lowest percentage, 27.5, charged to any group or income subgroup during the whole period reviewed. In general this group's performance corresponds in direction

of movement with that of the whole Negro community. Low in 1930, it rose steadily until 1940. In 1938 its participation was but 8.3 per cent less than that of the poor native white. Today, for all of its improvement during the decade of the 'thirties, this portion of the Negro group still sends but one-half of its registered voters to the polls.

The middle class Negro group presents a much more creditable record. While still the lowest participant of the three middle class groups, he nevertheless offers the others at least occasional competition. In 1930, for example, his percentage was but 7.6 points below that of the middle class native white, while in 1938 he was but 6.8 per cent behind the performance of that group.

At all times during the period this middle class group maintained a substantial lead over the lower income portion of the Negro community; a lead which at the close of the period amounted to 11.8 per cent. Compari-

TABLE II
Percentage of Registered Voters Voting in the Economic
Subgroups of the Major Race and Ethnic Groups

<i>Group</i>	<i>1930</i>	<i>1932</i>	<i>1934</i>	<i>1936</i>	<i>1938</i>	<i>1940</i>
LOWER ECONOMIC CLASS						
Native White	37.3	82.3	78.5	73.1	78.3
Negro	27.5	54.3	57.3	64.8	56.7
Foreign Born	41.3	80.0	76.3	76.5	75.0
Class Average	40.0	79.8	76.9	73.6	78.0
MIDDLE ECONOMIC CLASS						
Native White	43.0	87.1	85.9	76.7	86.0
Negro	35.4	69.2	68.5	69.9	67.4
Foreign Born	43.3	83.5	85.8	78.2	85.1
Class Average	43.0	85.9	84.1	76.4	84.8
CITY AVERAGE	41.5	81.7	56.2	80.7	75.8	82.0

son with the lower income group in the native white category shows that there have been several times when the middle class Negro has participated to almost as great an extent as has the poor native white.

It is clear that the middle class Negro is more stimulated by Presidential elections than is the poor Negro, though much less so than the other middle class groups, of which his was the only one which lowered its participation percentage in 1940 as compared with 1938.

It will be noted that the middle class Negro, in contrast with the poor Negro group, reached a plateau of performance in 1932 which he maintained from that time until 1940. During the whole of that portion of the period the group's percentage fluctuated less than 2 per cent. This is the most uniform performance to be found among any of the major or subgroups which were surveyed. It is astonishing to this author that elections which included the three Roosevelt campaigns and two gubernatorial campaigns by Frank Murphy, who has always had a very large Negro following, should have resulted in so little variation in the response of this group of voters.

In order that a clearer view may be obtained of the relative period averages of the several subgroups, the following scale of group participation is presented.

This scale illustrates the fact that within each of the race and ethnic groups participation is in direct relationship to income, with the consequence that there appears to be more participation homogeneity among the income groups than there is among

<i>Group</i>	<i>Period Average</i>
Wealthy Native White	79.5
Wealthy Foreign Born	76.1
Middle Class Native White	75.7
Middle Class Foreign Born	75.2
City Average	70.1
Poor Native White	69.9
Poor Foreign Born	69.8
Middle Class Negro	62.1
Poor Negro	51.9

the race and ethnic groups. The single exception to this is, of course, the Negro community. In other words further evidence is offered by these data that the Negro remains the most impervious of all groups to concepts of economic class solidarity.

Briefly, Negro voting participation may be summarized as follows: (1) throughout the whole period this group, both as a whole as well as in its parts, participated less than either the native white or the foreign-born groups; (2) its percentage, generally speaking, increased throughout most of the period; (3) its reaction to Presidential elections is much less pronounced than either of the other two groups; (4) its middle class income group maintained a considerable lead over the poorer group for the whole of the period reviewed.

Major Party Affiliation

Major party affiliation has here been calculated in terms of the vote for the Democratic party. Since third party voting is very small for practically all groups, the Republican vote is the amount remaining out of the total of 100 per cent. The affiliation of the major groups is recorded in Table III.

TABLE III

Democratic Affiliation in the Major Race and Ethnic Groups

Group	1930	1932	1934	1936	1938	1940
Native White	52.8	53.8	44.0	46.3	43.5	55.0
Negro	19.5	36.7	30.0	63.5	67.9	69.3
Foreign Born	54.2	72.1	61.2	72.8	73.9	78.8
City Average	53.1	62.4	52.7	60.0	59.1	66.2

Here the reader will note a very interesting trend in Negro party affiliation. The traditional Republican affiliations of the Negro community are probably typically expressed in the meager 19.5 per cent which the Democratic party obtained in 1930. In 1932 it doubled in size and in 1936 after a mild slip it again doubled. Today Detroit Negro voters are 14.3 per cent more Democratic than are the native white voters. In a single decade the major party interests of this racial community have almost precisely reversed themselves.

It is probably important to recognize that this movement of the Negro voters into the Democratic party has been a steady one. While punctuated by several abrupt increases the movement has nevertheless been a constant one with the exception of the vote in 1934, when the Democrats suffered in every group and almost all of the subgroups as well.⁴ If the present rate of this increase continues, it may well be that the Negro group will ultimately supersede the foreign-born community as the most uniform in its support of the Democratic party. This ten-year shift is without parallel in recent Detroit politics.

Several conclusions may be drawn from Table IV in which the affilia-

tions of the major groups have been broken down into their income sub-groups. In the lower income group it is significant to observe the greater amount of similarity in the later years between the Negro and the native white vote than is found in the groups as a whole. In connection with this it will be noted that there is an increasingly small amount of difference among all three lower income groups. Thus in 1940 the difference between the most and the least Democratic of the lower income groups was but 7.6 per cent. Each election finds the lower income voters, whether they be Negroes, native whites or foreign born, closer to one another.

Within the middle class groups a wider range may be seen to exist all through and even at the close of the period. There is less economic class similarity of response between the Negro and the other groups within this category than there is in the lower income groups. Again, it will be observed that the lower income class Negro is uniformly more Democratic than his middle class brother, though at the close of the period (1940) there was a slight tendency to cut the gap between them.

* See the author's *Political Behavior in a Metropolitan Community*, Chapter IV.

TABLE IV

Democratic Affiliation of the Economic Subgroups of the Major Race and Ethnic Groups

<i>Group</i>	<i>1930</i>	<i>1932</i>	<i>1934</i>	<i>1936</i>	<i>1938</i>	<i>1940</i>
LOWER ECONOMIC CLASS						
Native White	55.7	70.4	58.6	65.9	66.8	71.5
Negro	19.1	37.0	30.0	65.2	71.5	71.7
Foreign Born	56.6	75.5	66.4	76.1	77.9	79.1
Class Average	53.0	68.1	57.6	66.6	66.2	72.0
MIDDLE ECONOMIC CLASS						
Native White	51.8	51.5	43.0	44.8	40.1	53.4
Negro	22.3	35.3	28.8	57.7	57.4	62.8
Foreign Born	50.7	68.0	56.2	69.1	68.9	76.9
Class Average	52.8	57.6	47.4	52.9	50.0	61.1
CITY AVERAGE	53.1	62.4	52.7	60.0	59.1	66.2

The scale of major party affiliation averages for the period as a whole shows an interesting grouping of voters.

<i>Group</i>	<i>Average</i>
Poor Foreign Born	71.2
Middle Class Foreign Born	65.0
Poor Native White	64.8
Wealthy Foreign Born	63.6
City Average	58.9
Poor Negro	49.1
Middle Class Native White	47.6
Middle Class Negro	44.1
Wealthy Native White	39.1

Probably the most suggestive conclusion to be drawn from it is that the Negro and foreign-born groups tend to congregate within themselves, while the native white subgroups are distributed from top to bottom of the scale. The two Negro economic groups are closer together than are the groups in either the for-

eign born or the native white categories, although this does not modify the foregoing statement that the poor Negro group tends to vote more like other poor groups than like the middle class Negro.

For all of their increased Democratic affiliation in the closing years of the period, the over-all average of the Negro groups leaves them close to the bottom of the scale and well below the city average for the period. Parenthetically, it is interesting that the foreign-born groups are the only ones which stand together on the higher side of the city average.

In summarizing the major party affiliation of the Negro groups it may be said: (1) that whereas in 1930 the group as a whole was the least Democratic of the city's many elements, in 1940 it is one of the most Democratic; (2) that the poor Negro voter is coming to vote more and more like the poor man in other

TABLE V

Third Party Voting in Major Race and Ethnic Groups

<i>Group</i>	<i>1930</i>	<i>1932</i>	<i>1934</i>	<i>1936</i>	<i>1938</i>	<i>1940</i>
Native White	1.3	1.6	1.6	0.8	0.2	0.4
Negro	3.2	1.5	0.9	1.3	0.4	0.5
Russian	4.1	5.0	5.0	1.8	0.3	1.1
Polish	2.5	2.5	2.3	1.1	0.1	0.3
Italian	3.1	2.4	2.4	1.1	0.4	0.6
City Average	2.0	2.4	2.4	1.1	0.3	0.5

race and ethnic groups and less like his middle class neighbor.

Third Party Voting

Third party voting has never been particularly important in Detroit as far as the city as a whole is concerned. However, certain groups at particular times have demonstrated a tendency to break with the two party tradition, and for that reason it seems necessary to place the Negro voter in his proper position within this picture. Table V includes data for the smaller ethnic groups which make up a portion of the foreign-born group.

This table suggests the following conclusions: (1) it indicates that third party voting for the city as a whole has never been large enough to be called a significant percentage of the total vote cast; (2) it indicates that the high spots of third party voting occurred in the years 1932 and 1934 and that in the period since 1934 the percentage has been steadily reduced; (3) that at the present time third party voting constitutes less than 1 per cent of the total vote cast in all groups with the exception of the Russian (composed principally of

Russian Jews); (4) that for the whole of the ten-year period the Russian group was the only one that registered a high third party voting percentage at any time; (5) that the Negro in 1930 registered the second highest third party vote of all of the groups for the whole of the period; and (6) that for all of the foregoing fact the Negro group since 1930 has for the most part shown an average or less than average interest in third party voting.

Summary of Detroit Study

Several specific conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing discussion. The Negro community during this period has been a relatively poor participant in the area's elections though its record of performance has been steadily improving; the Negro has shown a much greater apathy for Presidential elections than has the remainder of the community; the Negro group as a whole has shifted its major party allegiance from the Republicans to the Democrats during the period from 1930 to 1940; the lower income Negro group aligns itself more with the other lower in-

come groups than it does with the middle class Negro group; and despite the fact that the beginning of the depression period found the Negro one of the most ardent of the city's supporters of third parties, the end of the period found the group well within the average pattern of this aspect of voting behavior.

In short this story of Negro voting behavior seems to show, above all else, that the Negro is at last becoming politically average. His participa-

tion, while once very small, has gradually approached the average; his party affiliation, once a paragon of rigidity, has shown an ability to adapt to changing ideas within the community in a normal manner; his third party voting which was once atypical has now moved well into the average pattern. These data appear to mark the passing of the period of the Negro as a wholly atypical factor in the political equation.

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PUBLIC RELATIONS OF THE U.S. ARMY

By JAMES R. MOCK and CEDRIC LARSON

The process of streamlining the public relations work of the War Department is described, with special attention to relations with the press. Dr. Mock is a member of the executive staff of the National Archives and Mr. Larson is with the Morale Branch of the War Department General Staff.

"IN THIS and like communities, public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who moulds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions."

A small placard bearing this quotation from Abraham Lincoln hangs in the press room of the War Department. Perhaps it is no more than a coincidence, but the new policy of the Department with regard to public relations emphasizes this viewpoint of the primary importance of public sentiment in achieving things in this day and age.

During the World War, the Army showed a progressively intelligent handling of the public relations problem. But even at best, the methods developed left much to be desired. The public relations and press matters of the War Department were from first to last under the management of the military intelligence, a branch charged primarily with gathering and evaluating information.

After the World War the pendulum of public reaction swung away from things military for almost two decades in the United States, and public relations were carried on in the traditional manner. It was only in 1940 that some new approaches

to solving this problem in the United States were put into operation.

The first step in streamlining the public relations work of the War Department came on July 24, 1940, when the newly appointed Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, announced the transfer of the Public Relations Branch, War Department, from the Military Intelligence Division (G-2), to the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff. It was to be designated thereafter as: Public Relations Branch, Office Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department General Staff, Washington, D.C.

However, in all echelons subordinate to the War Department and in all tactical and administrative units, public relations were to remain a function of command, and continued to be exercised through the intelligence section of each commander's staff. The Public Relations Branch, War Department, General Staff, was to be the agency for the distribution of all Department press material of general interest, except in cases where other provision was made by specific instructions.

Propaganda Rehearsal

During July and August of 1940, extensive field tactics and maneuvers were held in various parts of the United States by National Guards-

men and regular troops. For the first time in extensive maneuvers, "leaflet" raids were made by the opposing "Black" and "Blue" forces, to accustom the soldiers to propaganda appeals from the air. A sample "leaflet" dropped by airplane is shown in the accompanying illustration.

Whether or not any of the "Blue" soldiers deserted to the "Black"

force, allured by these honeyed words, was not made public. But its value lies in the comprehension on the part of the military authorities of the important part now played by psychology and propaganda in war. Mimic warfare simulates the real article even down to alluring propaganda.

To Soldiers of Blue Force

You know by now that a force, superior not in numbers, but in ability, is confronting you. Many of our airplanes are already poised to demolish your supply and communications—and after that no more hot coffee. The fast sweep of the BLACKS across your country is gaining momentum day by day. Within a few days your army will be completely destroyed.

Your leading newspapers tell you that your side of the show has the advantage owing to the ability of your general officers. That's all Bluey! Do not let your leaders fool you. A caged bird has freedom compared to your life. Behind in the cities and towns of New York, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Virginia your loved ones are awaiting your return. Unless you lay down your arms and return home your loved ones may never see you again. Why batter your heads against a stone wall? Far better forces than the Blues have fallen before this BLACK onslaught.

Put down your arms and come under the leadership of the BLACK Government and actually the great things in life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are a reality. A beautiful day will dawn for you as you contentedly abide in homes of peace under OUR great BLACK leader.

To fight on is obliteration and devastation of your country. Come over to our side and see the great BRASHER FALLS and the ST. REGIS INDIAN RESERVATION, and beyond—the famous AUSABLE CHASM and LAKE CHAMPLAIN.

Seriously, Blue soldier—think these things over.

With the passage of the Selective Service Act in September 1940, it became more evident than ever before that correct public relations was vital to the success of the training program. The impact of public opinion must be behind the Selective Service training program or it would be more difficult to put across. Public sentiment must support a military program that would touch personally a vast majority of the families of the nation. It is to the credit of the Selective Service publicity work that it has done an exceptionally good job in selling compulsory training. Considering the enormity of the program and the sacrifices it calls for on the part of the public, the press has in general responded admirably, from the Selective Service viewpoint, in support of the year's camp training, and criticism has on the whole been constructive rather than barbed.

Bureau of Public Relations

What seems to have been the final step in streamlining the public relations work of the War Department was taken on February 11, 1941, when Secretary Henry L. Stimson announced the organization, directly under his supervision and control, of a Bureau of Public Relations. All agencies of the War Department concerned with public relations or related matters are to function under the supervision of this bureau. The Public Relations Branch, Office Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Current Information Section of the Office of the Under-secretary of War were combined as part of this new bureau. Major General Robert C. Richardson,

Jr., was designated by the Secretary as the Director of the Bureau of Public Relations.

Under the reorganization achieved under General Richardson, the Bureau of Public Relations is divided into eight branches as follows:

(1) Administrative Branch. Has to do with personnel, funds, supplies, correspondence, records, mimeograph and distribution, and organization.

(2) Press Information Branch. This branch puts out press releases and maintains contact with correspondents and news agencies.

(3) Pictorial and Radio Branch. Supervises matters pertaining to still pictures, news reels, motion pictures, and radio broadcasts.

(4) Special Assignment Branch. Looks after special articles, reviews military articles, prepares speeches, keeps contact with magazine and feature writers, and attends to special correspondence.

(5) Planning Branch. Is charged with formulating policy, drawing up regulations, planning future events, war plans and supplying speakers.

(6) Intelligence and Analysis Branch. When this branch is fully activated it will concern itself with research work in press, radio and pictures, and special phases of publicity.

(7) Field Liaison Branch. Arranges field conferences, corresponds with field public relations officers and promotes certain field publications and releases.

(8) Procurement Information Branch. Is charged with information and procurement activities, and

contact with production activities.
(Came from the Under-secretary's Office.)

Press Branch Activities

The Press Branch has by far the most potent impact upon public opinion, and might be called the spear-head of the Bureau of Public Relations. Hence an examination of its activities furnishes a good example of the type of routine followed.

This branch maintains a vital contact with press, radio news commentators, speakers, magazine and publications, for stories which come under the heading of spot news. It has its press room in the War Department where the major wire services—Associated Press, United Press, and International News Service—and representatives of service journals permanently maintain reporters who cover the War Department regularly. In the same room are telephone, desk and typewriter facilities for the press, not only for those who cover permanently, but for the scores of others who cover daily but who have other assignments outside the War Department. There is also a United Press teletype printer service furnishing news; a library of service journals; map boards of charts and diagrams pertaining to the War Department; and folders for Washington representatives of newspapers scattered throughout the country, Chambers of Commerce, manufacturing associations, and others who have a pick-up service for all War Department releases. On a press-release board are posted the releases of the current day as well as the releases of the previous day.

The Press Branch has a force of five officers, two regular Army officers, and three Reserve Corps officers. They maintain contact daily with approximately 200 accredited correspondents of the working press, wire services, radio news commentators, news magazines and other periodicals. Approximately 100 telephone calls are received daily for information.

As in a newspaper office, a tremendous volume of material pours into the Press Branch. It originates in the many branches and sections of the War Department and presents a daily cross section of the military establishment. Again, as in a newspaper office, this material has to be sifted. Some of it is of vital importance and goes around the world. Some is of sectional interest—for instance, a national defense contract to a manufacturer that is of particular interest in the community where he is located. Other events interest mainly the feature writer. Much of this material requires developing and research before it can be presented to the public as a rounded statement; and much that comes in has little or no news value, but its potentialities must be examined nonetheless.

This branch prepares the press releases for distribution. Releases are drafted, in most instances checked with the General Staff Division concerned, the stencils are cut, mimeographed copies are run off, and distribution within the Department and to the press, locally and by mail, is made. The time consumed for preparation of a release varies from twenty minutes to several days.

One of the five officers covers a "news beat," following a route that brings him to all public relations officers of the War Department scattered throughout the city, to secure information the Press Branch should have. The White House press conference, held twice weekly, is covered by officers of this branch. They also arrange press conferences that are held by the Secretary of War, the Under-secretary and the Chief of Staff.

In the Press Release room the Press Branch keeps an index and files of extra copies of all releases. Some 20 to 30 telephone calls a day are routed to that room to give information on old releases. From 50 to 60 newspapers and commercial representatives visit this room daily for information on press releases and other information. In the Press Release distribution room, releases are made to 67 offices in the War Department and copies are placed in 190 folders that the various press and commercial agencies maintain in the Press Room. Other copies are mailed out daily to the headquarters of corps areas, overseas departments, Armies, and Army Corps, to 55 Army stations that have requested them, and to 183 other agencies representing newspapers, publications, writers, radio commentators, picture services, and other departments of the government. Important releases are run off on the mimeograph machine in numbers from 900 to 1,100; contract and construction releases 1,100 copies; releases of lesser importance, 850 copies; and some minor releases, 200 and fewer copies.

Public Relations and Morale

Introducing something of an innovation, a Conference of Army Public Relations Officers was held in Washington by the War Department, March 11-14, 1941. At this conference, practically every phase of publicity pertaining to the Army was threshed out.

Speakers included the Secretary of War, General George C. Marshall, General Richardson, Colonel John Callan O'Laughlin, Mark Watson (*Baltimore Sun*), Dr. Frederick Osburn (head of the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation), Colonel A. R. Pittsburgh, Walter Lippmann, and many other eminent publicists of radio, motion pictures and press. While some of the sessions were of an off-the-record character, other speeches were made available in limited numbers to those attending the conference, and the new policies discussed therein will go far toward shedding light on the present public relations work of the Army.

In the eyes of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, the primary purpose of public relations is to stimulate and maintain high morale in the armed forces and in civilian life. "This matter of public relations is directly connected with morale, and morale is of the highest importance," declared the Chief of Staff. "As a matter of fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the matériel, the munitions we turn out, will be of little avail without high morale in the personnel to handle them. The excellence of the training of that personnel depends greatly on morale,

and that morale can be seriously influenced, favorably or unfavorably, by the reactions of the people back home. The problem of public relations bears directly on all of these phases."

Speaking before the conference, Secretary Stimson also keynoted the subject of morale:

"The success of an army depends upon its morale, and its morale depends in very large part upon the morale of the people at home who support it. Nothing can undermine this morale, both of the army and of the people behind it, so rapidly and so thoroughly as the feeling that they are being deceived; that they are not being given the real facts about their progress and the progress of the cause which they are preparing to defend. This is true even in the case of the army of a free people. A free government does not go to war until its people are convinced that such a step is necessary and that they have a just and necessary cause for going to war.

"Therefore, the army of such a country does not need to be bolstered up by false propaganda. What they want is to be sure of the fair truth; and, if they feel they are getting that, they will carry through to the end, and their people behind them in the same way will carry through to the end. They are not afraid of the real news. What they want to be sure of is that there is no ballyhoo on one side and no sensational knocking on the other. Therefore, it is vital that both the army and the people behind it must know the real basic

facts, free from any false exaggeration either one way or the other."

Press Conferences

A word or two might be said about the press conferences of the Secretary of War, to give an idea of this phase of the Department's public relations. A press conference of Secretary Stimson is, in the words of one Washington reporter, "an Event, with a capital 'E'." Reporters must be registered and wear an identifying badge to get into the Department, and their names are checked as they enter for the weekly press conference, usually held Thursday afternoon. Generally the Under-secretary is there, and six or eight Army officers charged with various branches of public relations. At the oblong table at the front of the room, which seats about 200 reporters, sit two stenographers who take down everything that is said, and a complete account of the conference is later typed up and filed.

The Secretary opens the conference generally by reading from news releases, then a give-and-take in questions and answers proceeds. Someone asks about sending Army bombers to aid the British, but the Secretary smiles and shakes his head. Another reporter raises the query of what the Army is doing to combat yellow fever in the Southern states, and a reply is given which will make copy in a thousand papers the next day. Quite frequently the Secretary will not answer a question until he has conferred with some of the generals and colonels who flank him, and are experts on various military subjects. Sometimes the reporters will

address their questions to the Undersecretary or to one of the generals or colonels, who may or may not give the desired information.

Policy on Censorship

There are many policies and practices which directly affect the reporting of news which may be briefly considered. One of the favorite themes of reporters when dealing with the armed services is to dwell upon the element of censorship. The present policy of the War Department is to de-emphasize censorship, and give all the news to the press that can be legitimately handed out. Lt. Col. S. J. Grogan, a public relations officer in charge of the Press Branch, Bureau of Public Relations, stated in an address on October 2, 1940, before the Overseas Press Club of America:

"The War Department is opposed to censorship of the press in this country and believes that censorship is very often worse than that which it attempts to prevent. It believes that the press of the United States and other media of dissemination will voluntarily so act as to make censorship unnecessary. In fact, corps area departments and local commanders are forbidden to conduct any censorship activities and are required to maintain close contact with the press, radio, and other news services.

"The War Department will seek voluntary cooperation on the part of publicity agencies so that no information harmful to our country or beneficial to an enemy may be disseminated. The policy we now have, of giving accurate information to the

press, will be continued. But we will not give out information, which, in our opinion, will hinder the national defense, and on such questions, in time of great crisis, you must accept our judgment in such matters. It will be honest judgment. It may not always be the best judgment—but it will be our best."

Members of the Regular Army usually appear before the public in an official or semi-official capacity, and to avoid confusion in the minds of the public, such members are cautioned to differentiate clearly between personal opinions and official plans. Usually an officer submits what he has to say to higher authority for approval before he utters or publishes it, or qualifies it with a statement that it does not necessarily reflect official opinion, but only his own.

Impartiality Stressed

Another point emphasized is that of impartiality for all news services, photographic agencies, and the like. All competing agencies are to be furnished with information and pictures at the same time. If at some event, such as maneuvers or a special flight, limitations allow for only one or two representatives of the press, the individual permitted to cover the activity may be chosen by lot or one agency may cover the event for all.

With regard to photographs, the Signal Corps ordinarily conducts ground photographic service for all Army activities, and the Air Corps conducts the aerial photographic service. Prints of thousands of "shots"

made by these services are maintained in Washington and the larger field headquarters, where they may be selected and purchased for a small sum which represents actual cost. Commercial photographers, who take still and moving pictures, may by pre-arrangement with the War Department or Corps Area commanders concerned, have access to certain military areas to take pictures under special conditions and under supervision.

Very often, advertisers want photographs of their product in use at some Army post. The War Department generally does not object, provided the photographs do not show personnel or activities that are classified as restricted, and provided that the accompanying statements do not indicate that the Department uses any particular brand or product to the exclusion of others. Usually when such a picture is run in an advertisement, a complete layout of the proposed advertisement must be submitted to the War Department in advance before permission is given for the use of such pictures.

Motion-picture companies desiring facilities at Army posts and camps for filming photoplays must secure War Department approval in advance. When a motion-picture company has filmed a scenario with Department cooperation, they are required to so state in their advertisements and on the screen, the exact wording of which must be approved by the Department.

The foregoing paragraphs briefly sketch the present set-up and regulations of the War Department with regard to its public relations. But public relations of the Army today is not a static thing, and is constantly being perfected. The swiftness and ease of all types of communication now demand in a democracy a high index of coordination between the public and the armed forces. Public thinking must not be deluded by false information, and the press must print the truth even when it is unpleasant. A closer liaison between the press and the Army means more public confidence in the military establishment, and an enlightened opinion which can act decisively in an emergency.

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TRADE UNION PROPOSALS AND LABOR'S PUBLIC RELATIONS

By JOEL SEIDMAN

Significant from the standpoint of labor's public relations are the proposals advanced by trade unions to increase industrial production and aid national defense. These efforts indicate a recognition by some labor leaders of their larger responsibilities. Mr. Seidman is an economist working with the League for Industrial Democracy.

THE DEFENSE emergency, with its need for mass production of armament and supplies of all kinds for the United States and Great Britain, has focused public attention on every source of interference. Inevitably strikes have received major attention in the daily press and on the floor of Congress, and trade unions have been the recipients of an enormous volume of adverse criticism, in the course of which every shortcoming and abuse of the labor movement has received its share of condemnation.

In the general excitement much of the public has failed to note that from the energetic unions in the automobile, steel, and ladies' garment industries have come proposals to increase production and advance their industries' welfare that have won the respectful attention and sometimes the praise of conservative papers, government officials, and employers. Though the instances are still isolated, they demonstrate that some American labor leaders are seeking constructive solutions of the problems of their industries, and indicate a recognition on their part that they have responsibilities as well as rights.

Never was it more important, in fact, for the labor movement to have

public opinion friendly. The abler labor leaders recognize that in the New Deal the trade unions gained legal rights that were not due primarily to their economic or political power, but to the presence in high office of some who entertained liberal views. With the aid of the N.I.R.A. and more recently of the National Labor Relations Act, the unions have built up first their economic and then their political influence. It is recognition of sober fact, however, to say that labor is still dependent on the good will of non-union elements for the protection of its legal position. Some of the recent union proposals to increase production may have been made with a view to improving public relations; with others this is probably more a by-product than the primary objective.

Efforts to Curb Strikes

The A. F. of L. was not slow in responding to the pressure put upon it to terminate strikes and eliminate abuses, and it did not always wait for pressure before it advanced constructive proposals. William Green on several occasions has denounced the calling of strikes in defense industries, urging instead that issues

be submitted to mediation and arbitration.

Early in January the metal trades unions proposed a policy of no strikes on defense projects, provided employers agreed to arbitrate all disputes. Under the plan of the metal trades unions, management and labor should first deal directly to settle issues between them; should agreement not be reached, the services of the conciliation division of the Department of Labor should be speedily obtained, with arbitration resorted to if conciliation proved unsuccessful; agreements should outlaw both strikes and lockouts, with provision for the arbitration of all differences.

The building trades, likewise, early advanced proposals to eliminate interference with defense construction, making a total with the metal trades of twenty-five unions, representing more than 2,500,000 workers, that had taken such action. The Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhanglers, with 125,000 members, was the first to sign a national agreement prohibiting strikes and lockouts on defense work.

The building trades unions have voted to ban jurisdictional strikes among themselves on defense projects; they have also sharply limited the initiation fees that their locals may charge, and decided to permit the employment of non-union workers without permit or privilege fees where insufficient union members are available. The unions assert, moreover, that non-unionists are thus enjoying without cost the benefits of standards that union members have slowly and painfully built.

Plan for Warplane Speed-up

Most noteworthy, in view of past public relations, is the remarkable shift in the automobile industry. Four short years ago, when the great sit-down strikes were in progress, the union of automobile workers was widely and roundly denounced by most agencies outside the ranks of the labor movement as a threat to law, order, and property rights; the automobile manufacturing companies, in the same period, were widely pictured as the victims of property seizures and violence.

Today, when American plane production may prove a major factor in the fate of Britain and perhaps of this country as well, the automobile workers' union appears in a different light. It is Walter Reuther, head of the General Motors Division of the C.I.O.'s United Automobile Workers, who has advanced the challenging plan to use the facilities and the mass production methods of the automobile industry to produce an estimated 500 planes daily.

Whether this plan is practicable is a matter for engineers familiar with the industry to determine; important from the present point of view is the fact that automobile labor presented a plan, not to aid itself, but to advance the national interest, at a time when a Ford Motor Company bid for an Army contract was rejected because it refused compliance with federal and state labor laws. The fact that the United Automobile Workers has also received unfavorable publicity in connection with strikes, actual or threatened, in defense industry does not alter the

fact that a significant improvement in public relations has occurred.

In a broadcast over a national network on December 28, 1940, Reuther advanced his plan in words that undoubtedly helped to build up a favorable public opinion toward his union.

"Why should labor concern itself, some may ask us [he said], with speeding plane production? Labor is concerned because it believes a strengthened defense essential to our country's safety in this era of Axis aggression. . . .

"Labor asks only in return that its hard-won rights be preserved. Labor asks only that manufacturers like Ford be forced to obey the Wagner Act as his competitors of General Motors and the smaller companies have been obeying it. Labor asks only that it be allowed to contribute its own creative experience and knowledge and that it be given a voice in the execution of its program."

Garment Workers' Program

Even more remarkable, both for its industrial significance and its appeal to the public, was the program submitted by the New York Dress Joint Board of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union upon the expiration of its agreements in December 1940. On behalf of the 85,000 workers in this \$350,000,000 industry, Julius Hochman, manager of the Joint Board, asked neither wage nor hour concessions. Instead, following an exhaustive analysis of the ills of the industry, he presented a program for efficiency and promotion. The union proposed that a \$1,500,000 fund be raised to promote New York

as a style center, and as a start toward this sum the I.L.G.W.U. pledged a contribution of \$100,000, on condition that the union label appear on each dress and be included in the advertising and promotion campaign.

"A New Concept of Unionism" was the heading of the editorial in the *New York Herald Tribune*, commenting favorably upon the proposal. "It is to be hoped the plan will succeed," said the *Herald Tribune*, "but in any event the concept of unionism which inspired it is worthy of widespread imitation." *The New York Times* observed: "When employers and unions agree on a plan for the benefit of their industry, and of the community which it serves, before proceeding to discuss a new contract for hours, wages and working conditions, the public may well pay respectful attention." Along similar lines was the comment in other conservative papers.

The employers soon agreed to the promotion campaign, pledging contributions of \$1,000,000, with the remainder to be raised from retailers, textile and accessory firms, and real estate and banking interests. The union offer of \$100,000 was tentatively rejected, however, the manufacturers being unwilling to sew the union label on each garment. For some weeks negotiations were deadlocked on the efficiency clause, with the union asking the right to treat inefficiency in management as a violation of contract, for which complaint could be made to the impartial chairman.

As a result the sympathy of conservative newspapers was with the

dress union, with the pressure of public opinion helping to force employers to agree to efficiency standards. *The New York Times*, for example, commented editorially on February 4:

"One would think that there could be no dispute over the Joint Board's plan, fathered by General Manager Julius Hochman, to increase the piece-work earnings, and presumably profits as well, by requiring that 'the shop be operated by the employer at all times in an efficient and well-ordered manner.' The hitch probably is that small employers, operating in a traditionally chaotic industry with little ready capital, fear that they may have to make too large an initial investment.

"Yet if the 'efficiency' procedure is sound the credit to operate it should be forthcoming. Neither consumer nor employer can have any real quarrel with a union's statesmanlike plan to raise its members' incomes by increasing their productivity. Let us hope that the plan to make New York City 'the style capital of the world' will not be jeopardized by an unnecessary quarrel."

The agreement that was finally reached in the dress trade empowers the impartial chairman to promulgate rules to guarantee efficient management, if the employers and the union cannot agree on them. An employer who persists in inefficient methods and who fails to adopt suggestions to remedy the situation can be assessed damages by the impartial chairman, the money to be used to maintain a department in his office to advise manufacturers on efficiency.

Needless to say, this is not pure disinterestedness on the part of the union. The New York dress industry has long been faced with severe competition from other parts of the country, and some employers have moved from the metropolis in an effort to reduce their labor costs. To seek higher piece rates would be to encourage more to move; instead the union is seeking to bring more work to the market, thus providing its members with steadier work and higher annual incomes.

Advocating Cooperation

The Steel Workers Organizing Committee has been thinking along somewhat similar lines. It proposes cooperative effort between the union and management to eliminate inefficiency and increase production. In each case in which management has granted the S.W.O.C. the opportunity to participate to a greater extent in the productive process, the union asserts, the venture has been a success.

"Labor wants this opportunity to participate more in the job of production," declares a recent handbook issued by the S.W.O.C. under the title, *Organized Labor and Management: How to Make Effective National Unity in Defense*. "Any delay in management's becoming realistic will be at the peril of our essential National Defense efforts." When unions opposed scientific management in earlier years, the steel workers assert, it was because they felt that the sole purpose was to increase private profit at the expense of public welfare; now that organized labor is recognized and given greater par-

ticipation in production, it "is being given reason to visualize the efficient operation of industry as having to do with its own well being and that of society in general."

Significant also is the fact that, little more than a year ago, the chairman of the S.W.O.C., Philip Murray, could team with Morris L. Cooke, a leading industrial engineer, to write a book advocating cooperation between unions and management to increase the volume of production, and so raise living standards.

More recently Murray has proposed that an industry council, representing management and labor equally, and with a government representative as chairman, be created to ensure the efficient coordination and use of present steel-producing facilities, and to expand these facilities where necessary. Such a committee, Murray asserts, could put present idle capacity into production and coordinate armament and non-military demands upon the industry, so as to achieve maximum output. This proposal would of course confer upon the Steel Workers Organizing Committee far greater power than it has ever possessed, and for this reason alone it has received scant attention from management. In its

other features, however, and in its analysis of the industry from the point of view of maximum production for defense purposes, the plan represents a significant effort on the part of organized labor to discharge its larger responsibilities.

Many union practices that have produced highly unfavorable public reactions still persist, needless to say. Strikes in defense industries, closed books and high initiation fees, jurisdictional strikes, opposition to more efficient methods, and combinations with business men to raise prices are some of the practices still engaged in by a number of unions, to the irritation of sections of the public. Men of questionable character still hold office in certain A.F. of L. unions, and Communist Party members or fellow-travelers still wield considerable influence in some C.I.O. affiliates.

Nevertheless it is significant, from the point of view of the public relations of the labor movement, that some trade unions should now be advancing proposals designed to increase the volume of industrial production, aid national defense, and benefit employers and the public as well as the union membership.

RURAL AMERICA DISCUSSES DEMOCRACY

By M. L. WILSON

The discussion of democracy, as a leading extension project of the Department of Agriculture, is bringing about a better understanding of problems confronting American farmers today. The objectives and procedures of the discussion program are described by Mr. M. L. Wilson, Director of Extension Work, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

THERE HAS always been a good deal in common between rural America, freedom of speech, and the democratic way of life. American democracy as we like to think of it was in fact reared in the rustic cradle of the plain outspoken word.

Whenever a question of importance came up, our colonial ancestors talked about it. They discussed the issue until everybody had had his say. Then they patched up their differences and joined in carrying out the wishes of the majority. That was the beginning of American democracy.

Farmers still congregate in groups small enough for everyone to have his say. They discuss issues in groups around the cracker barrel in the country store; after church; on Sunday afternoon visits to neighbors or friends; at picnics; and at their work. And besides the many little issues, farm people now talk about *the issue* of the day.

Defining the Issue

On January 28 of this year there met in Washington—at the call of Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard—a group of distinguished scholars who made an effort to clarify the issue. They drew up a "discussion outline." Several drafts were made in a typically democratic

way. Practically no two members would have worded the outline in the same terms had they been called upon to write it individually. But all agreed to the draft as written in principle. They compromised by letting it be released as something to shoot at by people interested in true democratic discussion of the things regarding which everyone will have to reach a decision sooner or later.

Under the subhead "Moral Issues in the Present Conflict"¹ the scholars in their collective judgment defined the issue as follows:

"Today democracy is threatened by a new kind of revolution. For thousands of years, strong and successful revolutions have had as a purpose the enlargement of the life of every individual. The totalitarian revolution is toward submergence of the individual. We now have to ask what a totalitarian victory may mean to us as individuals. The totalitarian powers expressly reject the cardinal principles which are inherent in democracy, and which are inseparable from the historic creed of the United States. They deny what we affirm. They affirm what we deny.

1. Democracy affirms the right of every individual to exercise political power through the ballot and public opinion freely formed. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, proclaims that power is inherent in a leader, clothed with absolute authority.

¹ *Democracy in the Present Crisis*. U.S. Dept. Agr. Ext. Serv. Cir. 351, March 1941, 5 pp.

2. Democracy affirms certain inalienable rights of individuals and minorities. Among these rights are the civil liberties, which are protected by the law and sanctioned by the maxim of tolerance. These liberties are enjoyed by groups differing in religion, race, opinion. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, forces the whole of society into a rigid mold and concedes to the individual, or the minorities, no rights, either legal or moral, against the fiat of government.
3. Democracy emphasizes individual opportunity and envisages a society in which wealth, power, education, and other benefits accruing from society as a whole are so widely distributed among its members as to create a sense of equality between man and man. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, proclaims the superiority of a particular race or party group.
Both democratic and totalitarian states face pressing social and economic problems. In meeting these problems, democracies modify their social and economic institutions by free democratic procedures; they cannot make changes except as a result of discussion and popular choice. Totalitarian leaders, on the contrary, effect arbitrary, violent, and sudden changes, without regard to the opinion or well-being of individuals. The totalitarian leaders have not, furthermore, really met the problems created by new economic conditions, but have merely obscured them by turning to the production of armaments.
4. Democracy proclaims the dignity of the human individual, and seeks to create through organized society an opportunity for the full development and free exercise of each individual's inherent capacities. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, deifies the State and considers the human individual as its accessory or subordinate part.
5. Democracy seeks to bring about a world order in which different nations may live together in peace, mutual respect, and fruitful commercial and cultural intercourse, because only in such a

world can the objectives of democracy be attained. The totalitarian ideal, on the other hand, glorifies war and aggrandizement and encourages the effort to achieve world dominion by a nation believing in its own superiority."

Discussion Program

It is the above thesis of democracy that farmers have been discussing in many parts of the country in the past few months. Discussion material, training of local leaders in discussion technique, and general encouragement for participation are sponsored by the Department of Agriculture on the national level and by the state extension services and land-grant colleges of many states on the state level. The programs are of an extensive rather than an intensive nature in that the actual organization of state and local discussion groups is left to various agencies. The Department and the land-grant colleges, however, encourage the programs and act as an educational clearing house for literature and material that provides facts for discussion.

Groups all over the country, including civic groups, farm organizations, churches, 4-H Clubs, and others, are actively engaged in these discussions. Extension workers take an active part in preparing material for use by the discussion groups.

Discussion of democracy in the present crisis as a leading extension project is bringing about a better understanding of a variety of problems, from basic defense needs to emphasis on better nutrition and health and to the need for hemispheric defense and trade with South and Central America.

A Cooperative Effort

Neither discussion nor democracy can be measured by any rule except that of a civilized respect and consideration of minority opinion. It is hard to envision a democracy at work without discussion—without the free, open, intelligent exchange of ideas in which opposite points of view stimulate thought, but in which a civilized sense of tolerance keeps in check the unreasonable instincts of emotion.

Both discussion and democracy require the spark and inspiration that come with a civilized clash of opinions, free not only from dures or the threat of force but also from intolerant criticism for speaking up frankly in open debate. The strength of democracy lies in amalgamating the good that is found in all honest differences, in compromising the best thought of the minority and the majority in the interest of both.

The word discussion implies that the views held by those taking part in the discussion vary. You can't have an interesting one-sided discussion, any more than you can have a one-way democracy.

Said Dr. Ralph Barton Perry of Harvard University in a radio address to National Farm and Home Hour listeners on February 25:

"This process of forming public opinion by an interchange of private opinions is what we call discussion. A group of persons shouting their opinions in chorus would not be conducting a discussion. If each should speak in turn and listen while the *others* spoke, that would not be discussion. Discussion requires more

even than speaking and listening; it requires that each individual shall be willing to accept the truth without pride of opinion. . . . Discussion is not a chorus, or a monologue, or a dialogue, or a war of words, but a cooperative effort to find the truth."

Progressive Development

Discussion as an educational project under the leadership of the Department of Agriculture and the land-grant colleges is not new. The history of American agriculture is a series of progressive developments resulting from discussion. The original status of the National Grange, for instance, was that of an educational and social organization—aspects which remain an important part of all general farm organizations today. This type of farm organization, with the emphasis on discussion and democratic ways of reaching decisions, fathered the successive national laws which brought about the existence of the Department of Agriculture, the land-grant colleges, and the Extension Service.

It is natural, therefore, that discussion by local farm people has been a part of extension work since its beginning in 1914. Much of extension teaching follows the method of encouraging people assembled in groups to study and discuss such things as dairy-herd improvement, marketing improvement, child feeding, better kitchens, better diets, farm family gardens, the economic outlook, and similar subjects having to do with the welfare and improvement of country life.

In these group meetings farm people have learned to talk freely about

individual problems and hear from others how they have solved them. Through the exchange of ideas at extension meetings of this kind, farmers the country over have learned to "talk on their feet" and to express their opinions.

Training Group Leaders

In 1936 the Department of Agriculture launched a nation-wide series of training schools for discussion leaders to assist extension workers, AAA farm committeemen, rural leaders, and interested farmers in the techniques of discussion leadership. Dr. Carl Taeusch, formerly of the Harvard Business School, was chosen for this work. What he and his co-workers are doing is ably described in "Schools of Philosophies for Farmers," which appears in the 1940 Yearbook of Agriculture.

Up to the end of March this year, 90 "schools of philosophy" attended by the farm leaders of various states had been held, with a total attendance of over 21,000 farm leaders. Seven meetings had been held by junior chambers of commerce; 5 for rural leaders; and 59 meetings for some 7,000 farm people. Discussion training schools for extension workers had been held in 35 different states. Six schools had been held for USDA clubs composed of Department of Agriculture field employees.

As a result of this work by the Department and the State land-grant colleges, we have at least fifty or sixty thousand group discussion leaders in the United States today. These people are the leaders in many thou-

sands of the larger rural group discussions being carried on in the various states and counties.

Thus we have discussions conducted in the local Grange, Farm Bureau, Farmer's Union, and other farm organizations; civic groups, churches; and other fairly large gatherings which I prefer to call large community meetings. Some of the extension meetings and AAA meetings are of this type. It is desirable at meetings of this size to have leaders trained in the techniques of discussion. The advantage of these meetings is that they inspire large numbers of individuals to go home and think over what they heard and carry on further discussions in smaller groups.

Objectives and Methods

From the standpoint of really getting farm people to think about the close relationship between the defense program and the preservation of democracy in this country, the objective of the larger community discussion group is to get many of the smaller discussion groups started. When I speak of the small group I have in mind four or five families of farmers who get together on Sunday afternoon visits.

In order to promote intelligent discussion at the larger, community-type meetings, the aim of discussion leaders is to develop group thought along the following lines: (1) find out what the problems are; (2) present alternative solutions and lines of endeavor to meet these problems; (3) evaluate solutions as to lines of endeavor; and (4) promote action toward achieving the solution.

There are two possibilities in discussing such things as what the food-for-defense program, the nutrition program, or the total defense program means to American farmers. One approach is the consideration of fundamental issues such as the future American farmers would face if Britain went down in total defeat. This type of discussion is important in that it helps people to think in terms of the fundamental philosophies involved, and makes it not merely a matter of being for or against.

The alternative method is to go out and conduct one-way promotional discussions which are really not discussions at all. This takes the form of featuring speakers and having dominant individuals in the group lead thought in a single direction.

When we contrast the two we see the difference between the democratic approach and the totalitarian or regimented approach. Totalitarianism springs from having ideas directed one way, and refusal of leaders to brook opposing viewpoints.

The first approach is that which is back of all the discussion activity in which the Department of Agriculture is engaged. It is the approach followed by the Division of Program Study and Discussion in its "schools of philosophy." It is the approach being followed by the extension services and the land-grant colleges in furthering discussion of the defense issues.

It is one thing to go out and talk to a group and ask them to accept something. It is quite another to

lead discussion intelligently and to offer people the opportunity to evaluate and criticize openly and take part in matching ideas on the issue being discussed. The advantages of discussion are that people will carry thoughts back with them and think about them for a long time, gradually arriving at conclusions which should be fundamentally sounder than those formulated by merely listening to high-powered speeches which, after all, convey the single-track idea which the speaker wants the audience to accept.

Drawing on Experience

The Extension Service of the Department of Agriculture and the land-grant colleges are in a unique position during this emergency to lead in educating for citizenship in a democracy, because of their extended experience and their many avenues of approach particularly in relation to the organization of such discussion groups. According to reports, during 1939 there were in the Extension Service throughout the United States 475,000 unpaid local leaders of adult extension work and 150,000 unpaid local leaders of 4-H Clubs. These experienced, volunteer leaders are a tremendous resource upon which to draw in the effective use of the discussion method throughout rural America.

In the state and nation-wide program of discussing democracy in the present crisis, procedures may vary state by state. Much material supplementing the statement of moral issues involved as defined by the scholars is being prepared by the state extension services. In some

states, institutional committees of scholars have been appointed by the president of the state university or of the land-grant college. These committees are serving in a somewhat similar capacity on a state level as did the committee of scholars which drafted the national discussion outline.

In general the procedure in the county is to organize community committees of the various organizations interested in promoting these discussions. No fixed rule is followed in stimulating interest in the programs as in most communities there are some people who are very eager to launch the work. Discussion groups meeting at individual farm homes are encouraged.

Background Reading

It has long been recognized that discussion programs may be strengthened and made more fruitful if the participants have been able to glean information from literature and from other sources to supplement their own experience.

To this end, circulars, magazines, and literature on the philosophy, advantages, and problems of democracy have been prepared by various agencies, and are constantly being revised. Numerous groups outside of the Government have prepared lists of reading material such as "Dangers to Democracy," published by the American Library Association, and others too numerous to mention, which provide background reading to strengthen the discussion programs and aid also to satisfy the desire for information and for further

study that every really good discussion should stimulate.

There is now in progress a study, by a committee of librarians in co-operation with some eighteen national non-governmental organizations, of the available literature bearing on the points enumerated in the report of the scholars. It is hoped that the materials so selected will make available to all the people the best information on all sides of all problems facing our democratic way of life.

In individual states, such as New Mexico, the land-grant colleges have provided packets of printed materials to supplement the discussion programs; and all along the line there has been a sincere effort not only to provide the facts on which useful discussion and sound judgment may be based, but also to provide these data in such a manner that the people will be aided in forming their own opinions through free discussion, fortified by free access to all the facts and to the opinions of others which have appeared in print.

Psychological Defense

Only to the extent to which the discussion program of democracy in the present crisis is able to stimulate people to think and discuss with one another the issue of the day can we expect to strengthen the psychological phases of defense. Psychological defense provides the insurance we need to keep our feet on the ground. It is defense against hysteria whipped up by misleading propaganda, unreasonable claims and fantastic assertions. There is no better protection against emotional defeat than train-

ing in the rational art of objective discussion.

How far we can go and should go in developing objectivity in discussing a subject which involves high virtues like patriotism and loyalty and decent citizenship is hard to tell. Objectivity may be very desirable in a round-table discussion conducted by experts. It may not be exactly desirable when a handful of neighbors get together to talk about fundamental issues. And yet this is the type of discussion that will do most toward preserving democracy.

There is an old proverb which says "the fire in the flint shows not till it is struck." To develop the spark of intelligent thought, therefore, we must at times go beyond the borders of objectivity. It is on the fine line between the spark of thought and the fire of passion that civilized discussion must delineate. Honest difference of opinion among neighbors breeds respect. Hostile clashes lead to feuds. The history of feuds is that both sides usually

lose in the end. Intelligent respect for ideas that are different from one's own provides the cement by which lasting understanding and unity can be had.

The issue today is whether the American people want democracy to survive. By far the overwhelming majority of rural people are so constituted that they do. Rural life still has those qualities of spiritual strength that are necessary for struggling humanity in times of crisis. In this country, especially in the rural part, the free democratic way of life gives expression to that spirit in the highest degree.

The essence of democracy is truth and intellectual integrity. If democracy is to survive, those who say they believe in it must subscribe to these beliefs. If democracy should ever die in America it will not be the result of attack from without. It will be through a yielding of that spiritual strength that in the first place made us free.

PRESS, RADIO, FILMS

This selective survey endeavors to summarize leading events, situations, and research in the various fields of communications that particularly concern problems of public opinion formation and control. The period covered extends from January through March 1941.

International Communications

THE FIRST quarter of 1941 brought to all Americans a grave responsibility, and to students of public opinion the beginning of the hardest task they will perhaps ever have to face. By the passage of the lease-lend bill, we became substantially an ally of the nations opposing Hitler. As this alliance draws tighter and tighter, which it inevitably must, analysts of opinion and the means of influencing it will find increasing difficulty in preserving both their own perspective and the perspective of previously dependable sources of fact.

We in this country have until the present enjoyed the unique opportunity of observing a war reported to us in unparalleled fullness by word, spoken and written, and by picture, photographic and drawn. In addition to this relatively unbiased stream of communication, we have also been the principal recipient and target of elaborate propaganda drives conducted by parties of all complexions, within and without.

But our participation in the war initiated in the quarter under consideration, by whatever name we choose to call our activity, has already had a profound effect on the channels of communication which will increase almost daily. Not only will the control of information and

the introduction of a motive for bias deprive the fruits of our communications of their high disinterest; they will also make the preservation of personal perspective more and more difficult for students of opinion. Into judgments of the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of opinion-influences there will inevitably creep moral standards of goodness and badness as the influences seem benign or malignant. To remain objective in this powerful current is the hard task which the first quarter of 1941 has brought to those who would consider international communications.

News Transmission from Europe

The dispersion of news heads indicated in the report for the previous quarter, in which Athens, Cairo and Bucharest were raised to prime sources, continued during the first quarter of 1941. As the war spread, news transmission followed. While London and Berlin retained their dominant rôles, and Rome remained chiefly a communicational suburb of Berlin, not only the three additional capitals mentioned above figured prominently but Belgrade, Sofia and Ankara took their places boldly if briefly as centers of attention.

Particularly worthy of note is the increasing centralization of Berlin as

news head for all lands under Axis domination, contrasting with a greater diversity on the part of the British. The English released news from the nearest community possessing satisfactory facilities, save only for policy-making information. The Germans cleared through Berlin the information concerning an incident in a meadow a thousand miles away, not relaxing for a moment the central control over the vital commodity of news. An interesting evidence of this is the coverage of the British advance across Libya in the early part of the quarter, as compared with the German coverage of advances in the same area at the end of and shortly beyond the end of the quarter under consideration. News of the British advance was released through Cairo, and some dispatches were even sent back from correspondents near the spearhead of the movement. News of the German advance to point after point previously taken by the British originated, however, at Berlin and not from any news center anywhere near the area of operations.

An intensification of censorship was to be noted during the quarter, both on the part of London and Berlin. British concern was aimed chiefly at remarks made by returning correspondents, many of whom are called upon to lecture or write articles after their arrival here, naturally beyond the control of the British censor. The objection was registered in typically British roundabout fashion, through a resolution of the Association of American Correspondents warning against the practice, which it branded as unethical. Information published in American newspapers

about materials destined for England under the lease-lend act was also frowned on in stories by American correspondents plainly inspired by official opinion.

A further clamping down of Axis censorship was reported by Virgil Pinkley, UP European business manager, on his return here. The UP, he revealed, transmits much of its continental report through Zurich, though even with this neutral clearing house it is often difficult to get stories through Berlin censors.

All returning correspondents have emphasized the effectiveness of the "responsibility" technique of censorship used in Germany, whereby reporters are held accountable after the fact for what they have sent. Expulsion or simply a silent treatment may be the fate of those whose reports make them "politically unreliable" in Nazi eyes.

An interesting game conducted apparently with little success by the Nazi press authorities was reported during the quarter by Edwin Hartrich, CBS correspondent, who revealed that the various press and radio representatives are played off against each other by the authorities, first one and then another being favored with a scoop in the hope that they will thus be inspired to make deals with the Propaganda Ministry for preferred treatment.

European Miscellany

Among events during the quarter which concern European communications there may be briefly noted:

The arrest by German authorities of Richard Hottelet, of the UP Berlin

staff, charged with suspicion of espionage, and of Jay Allen, North American Newspaper Alliance correspondent, for trying to cross the border between occupied and unoccupied France without proper papers. Both remained in custody at the close of the quarter.

The ironically contrasting release on bail of Dr. Manfred Zapp and Guenther Tonn, officials of the Nazi propaganda agency, Transocean News Service.

The establishment in New York of a central clearing house for Netherlands news under the auspices of the Netherlands Indies News Agency. It will not only relay information from the Dutch possessions in the Pacific but also handle news from the Netherlands government in exile in London and from occupied Holland.

The cessation as a private enterprise of the Agence Havas, well-known French news agency, which was taken over as a government operation during the quarter and will now be known as the French Office of Information. Resignation of many of the leading executives of the agency was reported at the same time.

Mother Necessity

Improvisation to secure news where none is available through the normal channels is one of the fascinating aspects of international communications during war. The painfully sterile official postcards which are the only messages allowed to pass between occupied and unoccupied France are now being used, it has been reported, in a manner which

would give an omniscient Nazi officialdom serious concern. By tacit understanding among families, certain names are used to convey information which could not otherwise be sent. "Jean is well," for example, tells the recipient that John Bull still holds the fort; "Adolphe called yesterday" indicates a passage of Nazi troops; and so forth as far as the ingenuity of the correspondents permits.

Another German device which is reported to be backfiring is the elaborate interchange of populations by which Hitler seeks to make revolt against his rule more difficult. What is actually occurring, it is reliably said, is that persons from all parts of Europe are confirming to each other news of opposition to the Nazi régime in their areas. Some information about external events and opinions is also percolating through to German inhabitants by the same means.

More War Drawings

Continuation of the trend toward drawn picturization of the war, as noted in the report for last quarter, was evident in the publication by Hearst newspapers of some hundred sketches of scenes in England by Burris Jenkins, Jr., cartoonist, who spent nearly two months abroad gathering material. While some of the sketches were drawn on the spot and approved by censors, others have been drawn by Jenkins from memory after his return here.

Far Eastern Communications

The only development of particular note in this area during the quarter was the establishment by

Domei, Japanese news service, of its second Latin American office in Mexico City. The first, in Buenos Aires, was opened some time ago.

Hemisphere Communications

The courtship of Latin America through communications entered a new phase, with the announcement that the government is to spend \$700,000 for advertising in 350 newspapers in the southern republics. The ads will feature travel in the United States, though the theme is "the new world" and "our hemisphere" rather than the parochial one of the U.S. itself. Not featured in the announcement of the campaign by Nelson A. Rockefeller, co-ordinator of commercial and cultural relations among the American republics, the fact remains that the sum will be welcome to newspapers in that quarter which have lost advertising heavily because of the war.

Another enterprise combining good neighborliness with a forward-looking commercial sense is the survey of some 900 Latin American newspapers by the American Association of Advertising Agencies, which will also turn its attention to radio and other media. Not only will an attempt be made to identify journals subsidized by foreign governments but there will also be an effort to secure for advertisers and others, with cultural or commercial axes to grind in Latin America, sufficient data on circulation, mechanical requirements and the like to allow the various media there to be fitted into the American advertising circuit.

Australian Communications

A much-needed cure for a situation which cries for remedy was indicated during the quarter by Carroll Binder, foreign editor of the Chicago *Daily News*, who returned from a South Pacific news-inspection trip. Pointing out that the great obstacle in the way of a greater exchange of news between Australia and the United States lay in the prohibitive cost of cable tolls, he added that the transmission of news by radio at a very much lower cost was now being studied. Because of favorable inter-Empire cable rates, the principal external news reports are now of British origin, Mr. Binder stated.

HERMAN LIEBERT
*Executive Editorial Staff
The Paul Block Newspapers*

Press

PERSONS engaged in the newspaper business, during the first quarter of 1941, were probably in a better frame of mind than at any time since the collapse of the boom of the '20's. The last decade was full of troubles for the press. Heavy expenses and debts for equipment made operations under greatly reduced advertising revenues very difficult. Radio competition also cut into the effectiveness of the press, as well as into the business office receipts, during that period. The Newspaper Guild made impossible the procedure of times past—the editorial department shakeups, firings and wage cuts. To what extent the difficulties of publishers were

greater or less than those of businessmen in other lines, there is no way of knowing.

However, the decade did permit a reasonable percentage of the debts to be cleared up; consolidations eliminated some of the competitive difficulties, and a number of publishers went into the radio business themselves. The war sharpened interest in news and, according to the trade reports, circulations are now at an all-time high.

The Defense Angle

The defense program, which is making prosperity for nearly everybody, has not left the newspapers out. Increased advertising revenues, however, appear to be affecting principally the newspapers in the larger cities, especially wholesale distribution centers. Many smaller newspapers, even in boom towns where big military training programs are under way, are not showing great advertising gains. Their prosperity is coming rather from increased circulation revenues and from job printing. Nearly all of the newspapers under 25,000 circulation are operated in connection with commercial printing plants, and these plants as a rule are busy with rush orders.

The defense program has also given the newspapers something to promote. While a few are opposing "all-out aid to Britain," the majority are for helping the democracies to survive.

There was a period when some of the newspapers were rather hesitant about aggressively attacking the general tendency of workers to unionize.

They didn't let themselves go as far as they would like. But now, with the defense of the nation as an excuse, those who are anti-labor are rigorously demanding that Congress curb the "labor racketeers" and "unpatriotic labor leaders"; while those who are pro-labor are demanding with equal vigor that the government "force recalcitrant corporations to obey the national labor laws."

Censorship Discussion

Earlier in the year there was considerable nervousness on the part of many editors over the prospects of a national censorship. That fear appears to have been quieted. An article by Walter Davenport in *Collier's*, and assertions by several other writers, aroused such apprehension that a number of federal officials appeared at the National Press Club in Washington, early in March, and talked the matter out in an off-the-record discussion. Lowell Mellett, administrative assistant to the President and director of the Office of Government Reports (whom Davenport had designated as the probable "head censor") was present, together with Major General Robert C. Richardson and Commander H. R. Thurber, officers in charge of press information for the War and Navy Departments respectively.

Editors and publishers of a number of large newspapers were sufficiently concerned over the matter to attend the meeting in person and to ask questions. The gist of it was that there will be no censorship in the sense that news writers must submit their copy to government offi-

cials before publication, or that reporters, editors or publishers may be punished for printing articles attacking the Administration or any aspect of the defense program. Information which might be of value to a possible enemy country will not be given out by Army or Navy officials, it was stated, and a "voluntary censorship" by the press was suggested. Some time before, Secretary Knox had requested such a voluntary censorship concerning Navy matters.

Several of the newspaper correspondents present expressed the opinion that they would like to have a censorship of information concerning military and naval affairs. They pointed out that during the World War much confusion resulted because some reporters and editors had a different concept of voluntary censorship than others, with the result that certain newspapers printed news that other papers refrained from printing. The condition was particularly irksome for reporters for the Associated Press, United Press and International News Service, as there were almost daily squabbles over what might or might not be published.

The pointed question—is there any likelihood of control over the press?—was answered by Mr. Mellett in a firm negative.

Wage-Hour Suit Dismissed

Judge J. Cullen Ganey, of the Federal District Court in Philadelphia, dismissed on a technicality the Wage and Hour Division's suit against the publishers of the Easton (Pa.) *Express* and *Morning Free*

Press. This suit was brought to force the publishers of these papers to open certain books and records to inspection by employees of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor. The defendants contended that the action constituted a violation of the free press clause of the Constitution. The Judge merely held that a subpoena as issued was a nullity, because it was not signed by a proper official. (See the QUARTERLY for December 1940, p. 680.)

BURT P. GARNETT
Editorial Research Reports
Washington, D.C.

Vital Statistics

Annual statistical data on the newspaper industry published in January show a continuation of the downward trend in *number* of daily newspapers noted in the QUARTERLY last year (June 1940, p. 291).

According to the 1941 International Yearbook Number of *Editor & Publisher*, 1,878 daily and 525 Sunday newspapers were being published in the United States on September 30, 1940, as compared with 1,888 daily and 524 Sunday in 1939, and 1,936 daily and 523 Sunday in 1938. The net loss of 10 daily newspapers for the year 1940 represents a considerable decline from the loss of 48 newspapers during the year ending October 1, 1939, and may indicate that the long cycle of suspensions and consolidations is finally leveling off, and that the industry is relatively more stable than it has been for a number of years.

N. W. Ayer & Son's 1941 *Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals*,

which includes foreign language, trade and other types of daily publications in its compilations as well as English language newspapers of general circulation, reports 1,998 dailies in existence at the end of 1940, compared with 2,015 at the end of 1939, a net loss of 17. During the previous year, from the end of 1938 to the end of 1939, a net loss of 41 dailies was reported.

Ayer's reports 11,208 weekly, semi-weekly and tri-weekly newspapers in existence at the end of 1940, as compared with 11,266 newspapers in these categories at the end of 1939, a net loss of 58. Between the end of 1938 and the end of 1939 there had been a reported increase of 127 newspapers, leaving a net increase over the two-year period of 69.

In contrast to the continuing contraction of the newspaper industry in terms of the number of publishing units, daily newspaper circulations rose sharply over the previous year. According to the Post Office and Audit Bureau of Circulations figures reported by *Editor & Publisher*, there was a combined daily circulation of 41,131,611 week-day newspapers in 1940 and 32,371,092 Sunday, compared with 39,670,682 daily and 31,519,009 Sunday in 1939—a net increase of 1,460,929 copies daily and 852,083 Sunday.

While this increase approaches the peak week-day daily newspaper circulation of 41,418,730 in 1937, and is being cited by the Bureau of Advertising of the American Newspaper Publishers Association as an indication of the vitality of the newspaper medium, it would appear from *Ed-*

itor & Publisher figures that week-day newspaper circulation during the ten-year period, 1930-40, has had a net increase of only between 3 and 4 per cent, as compared with a general population increase during the same period of between 6 and 7 per cent.

Also, while total advertising rates per agate line for all daily newspapers have not been reduced, and there was actually a slight increase in gross revenue from advertising during 1940, the milline rate (an index that shows relative cost of advertising in terms of both agate line cost and circulation) continues to decline, giving additional evidence that increases in newspaper circulation do not produce proportionate increases in advertising revenue. In the case of one competing medium, radio, the percentage of increase in advertising revenue in 1940 as compared with 1939 was considerably greater than the percentage increase for the daily newspaper industry.

O.W.R.

Radio

THE FIRST quarter of 1941 opened with prospects for better business than ever for radio. There has been an increase in accounts placed on networks every year for the last half decade, but the stimulus of defense will undoubtedly push this year's increment above that of any other year. There are some factors which may lead to difficulty. Federal money is pouring mainly into durable-goods industries which do comparatively

little advertising and the effect of increased purchasing power may take a little time to be felt by consumer-goods industries. However, from the business point of view, radio people were sanguine over the outlook for the year.

Radio and Defense

There were a number of indications that the struggle for power in the broadcasting industry was growing more bitter and might lead to some sort of open break before long. So far as the defense effort is concerned, broadcasters are taking the initiative in their own hands. In January the Defense Communications Board met to perfect its organization. Under the Board, one of the most important committees is that on broadcasting to which Neville Miller, President of NAB, was elected chairman, insuring adequate representation of the industry point of view in any plans. Other members are a FCC engineer and Major Frank Meade of the War Planning Section of the Army Signal Corps.

Aside from the Army, the FCC, and the industry, an important departure from the original plan for membership was to include a labor member on each of the committees having employer status. Eleven of the subcommittees under the Board will therefore have a labor member. Deliberations are to be secret and although it is expected that plans will be worked out for the organization of radio in the event of hostilities, these probably will be kept from the public and even from the industry people not directly concerned.

Further industry control of the defense effort was indicated by the appointment of Edward M. Kirby, Director of Public Relations for the NAB, as expert in broadcasting for the Army. Another indication that the industry was taking the initiative was a statement by Neville Miller that the radio industry was voluntarily censoring broadcasting. After a leak from the Army of purportedly secret testimony at the Senate Military Affairs Committee, President Roosevelt commented that the responsibility for publication of such material was up to radio stations and newspaper publishers rather than reporters or persons responsible for the information. Miller stated that radio accepted this responsibility.

FCC Rampant

However, there were a number of indications that further regulation and control of the industry might be forthcoming. Although no formal publication has been made as yet, trade circles report that the FCC decision on the Monopoly Report will contain recommendations not desired by broadcasters. It is thought that the majority opinion would ban exclusive network affiliation contracts, option time arrangements, and would restrict network operation of stations. A strong minority report is expected with Commissioners Craven and Case dissenting, particularly with regard to the majority's desire to regulate the contractual relations of affiliates with networks.

Meanwhile the FCC has just announced another investigation, this time of the newspaper ownership of

radio stations. The reason for the investigation, they claim, is that so many of the applications for FM licenses have come from newspaper interests (one quarter of those applying are so affiliated) that they should make a study of the advisability of this tie-up. Broadcasters tend to regard this investigation as a crackdown on newspaper ownership and have hinted that it is dictated by New Deal politicians who are anxious to "get" newspaper owners who have been opposed to the Roosevelt Administration. The hearings will take place shortly.

Congress Has An Inning

Congress has also indicated restiveness with the existing broadcast set-up. In January Senator Tobey of New Hampshire, who baited the FCC during the investigation of Thad Brown last summer, introduced a bill in the Senate to have the Interstate Commerce Committee investigate monopoly in broadcasting, the administration of the FCC, and "attempts by any individual in the radio business to unduly influence any public official in the exercise of his duties." Other bills asked for an investigation of license trafficking and a ban against super power by any station carrying network programs. The hardy perennial, a bill to ban liquor advertising on the air, again appeared. Reports are current that Senator White is drafting a bill to revise the setup of the FCC. Meantime CBS made a gesture of great good will to Congress by starting a quiz program called "No Politics," on which prima donna-ish legislators

will have a chance to bandy words with each other without reference to their main job in life.

In February Senator Wheeler launched a broadside against the industry, claiming that the networks had been one-sided for the lend-lease bill, and that their commentators had "not only editorialized but propagandized" for the Administration stand. Broadcasters, operating under the NAB code which provides that they should give equal opportunity for both sides of a controversial question, vehemently denied this. NBC and CBS submitted figures to prove their contention. On one network there were 22 speakers for the bill, speaking for 6 hours and 25 minutes, while 22 speakers against the bill were given 8 hours and 45 minutes. On the other network 27 speakers spoke for 8 hours and 33 minutes against the act, while 26 speakers spoke 9 hours and 41 minutes for it. In spite of the admirable juggling which this record shows, it does not answer Wheeler's contention that the regular radio *commentators* were generally for the bill. However, he seemed satisfied, for a few weeks later he issued an official commendation of radio's impartiality.

Competitors Heard From

Another attack on broadcasting has come from the outside. The Allied Printing Trades Association, representing five A. F. of L. unions, has launched a campaign to raise the tax on broadcast stations from 10 to 20 per cent of gross receipts, to limit the amount of time which can be sold, and to ban absentee and mul-

tiple ownership of stations. They cited figures to show that the printing trades had been hurt by the slice of advertising going to radio, but these were challenged by broadcasters who cited other figures to show the increase in employment due to radio.

FCC Decisions

The FCC handed down two important decisions in the last quarter. The first settled a case which has been pending since 1939. John Shepard, owner of the Yankee Network, had employed a newscaster who had taken a definite stand in local politics. Later the Mayflower Broadcasting Corporation had sued for the wavelength held by the main Yankee Network station in Boston. Hearings were held in November 1939, but no decision on the case was reached until January of this year at which time the FCC reprimanded Shepard for "a serious misconception of a station's duties and functions under the law." It held that "the broadcaster cannot be an advocate." Because of the limitation of facilities inherent in the nature of radio, stations should not serve a private interest, but must reflect various points of view in the community in order that the listener might make up his own mind on controversial questions.

While this policy has long been held by the FCC, its restatement brought forth a number of challenging questions. Since the Yankee Network had crusaded against underworld activities, commentators wished to know if under the FCC decision gangsters should be put on

the air to defend themselves in actions which are not illegal but just beyond the pale.

A second FCC action which caused great comment was the approval in record time of the transfer of ownership of station WMCA, New York, from Donal Flamm to Edward Noble. It was rumored that Flamm was urged to sell because the New Deal was out to get him, and that some of the White House coterie were behind the deal. He protested the sale after the approval had gone through, but the FCC declined to change its mind. During a hearing on the Appropriations bill for the FCC for the coming year, Congressmen maintained that the FCC had been at fault in approving the sale.

ASCAP-BMI Controversy

The quarter ended with the ASCAP-BMI fight nearer solution than ever before. The Department of Justice under Thurman Arnold had brought a criminal suit against ASCAP, BMI, the NAB, and the networks for violation of the anti-trust act. The latter group settled out of court, but ASCAP finally came to trial in Milwaukee in March. The judge found the officers of ASCAP guilty and fined them \$32,350. At the end of the month, broadcasters and ASCAPers finally got together in New York for a discussion of possible settlement of the differences between the two. Meantime both sides fought over the CAB figures, with ASCAP partisans contending that they clearly indicated a loss of listener interest in musical programs

with the loss of ASCAP music, and BMers as vehemently denying this.

Incidental Notes

Some embarrassment has been caused by the reciprocal programming agreements made by North America broadcasters with our Southern neighbors. They were only too glad to send programs down South, but when our Good Neighbors wanted to send others back to us, that was another matter. Rumor has it that such programs will be dumped on "educational" stations which "ought to be glad to get them." . . . Radio moving-day has come and gone, with most of the stations in the country shifting to new places on the dial. This long-heralded change came about as a result of the Havana agreement distributing wavelengths to various countries. . . . Radio's service to the advertiser and the public continues to be improved by the development of better techniques of testing listener interest. NBC and CBS have just completed new surveys, with that of the latter dovetailing two indices of interest for the first time in any survey: extent of listening and station listened to. For the first time, also, family habits were accounted for, and income level properly controlled.

JEANETTE SAYRE
Harvard University

Films

FOR THE first time in the history of non-theatrical films it is possible to get satisfactory data on the location

of motion picture projectors in schools. A Department of Commerce study directed by Nathan Golden has just been published, telling the type and location of visual aid equipment in secondary schools and colleges all over the United States. The 17,500 replies, resulting from 28,277 inquiries, show that there are 6,059 16mm silent projectors in the schools reached and 6,384 16mm sound. Of the 2,447 35mm projectors in schools 1,624 are silent and 823 are sound.

None of these figures includes elementary schools. That part of the study is still in progress. The importance of the Golden study lies in the fact that it shows exactly—in terms of the name of the school and the town—where each projector is. Such information gives definite form to a market that has been talked about rather loosely for a long time.

The Department of Commerce plans to bring this study up to date periodically to keep in step with the rapidly expanding projector sales situation.

Films for Latin America

Kenneth MacGowan, leading producer for Twentieth Century Fox in Hollywood, has received a leave of absence from his company to head up the production of non-theatrical shorts for the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics (the Nelson Rockefeller Committee). It is reported that the films will present a number of aspects of life in the United States, including our factories, institutions, sports, forests, and entertainment. Plans are being

formulated to reach the non-theatrical public in South America through film distribution centers at the embassies and legations.

Organizing Film Forums

Experimental Film Forums held in public libraries in various parts of the country this spring have convinced the sponsors of the plan that it should be extended, and arrangements are now being made to make the Film Forums available to libraries all over the United States in the fall. The plan is being sponsored jointly by the American Library Association, the American Association for Adult Education, the American Association of Applied Psychology, and the American Film Center. The spring experiments have been held in the New York area and in the states of California and Oregon, with a total of ten libraries cooperating.

The sponsoring committee has selected three general headings under which the Film Forums have been grouped: Our Natural Resources, Our Human Resources, and Neighbors. Alternate programs of films have been made up under each of these headings and the libraries make their selection according to the interests of their particular type of audience. Some of the films included in the plan are: *The City, One-Tenth of Our Nation, The River, and Mother and Child*. The Forum lists will change as new films are released and evaluations of them will be put before the selecting groups.

The Film Forum plan was set up because it was felt that a great part of the potential non-theatrical film

audience was not being reached by the present system of film distribution which is quite puzzling to many would-be users of films. This plan is an effort to set up logical programs of films and to make them available to new audiences with practically no effort on their part.

As a rule the Film Forums are led by some staff member of the library or someone in the community who is an expert in the subject that is being discussed. The actual film showing lasts from 30 to 40 minutes and it has been the experience thus far that the discussion goes on for about an hour more and then usually has to be shut off.

Under the arrangement which has been found satisfactory during the trial period, the libraries pay \$100 for a series of ten shows. This payment includes the securing of the films, a 16mm sound projector operated by a skilled projectionist, and all other incidental equipment necessary for the showing of films. If the library has its own projector and operator the cost for the series is \$50, the rental cost of the films.

British Wartime Shorts

Since the war began in September 1939, approximately fifty non-theatrical short subjects have arrived in this country from England. Some of these deal with war subjects but many do not. For the most part the films have been produced for use in the extensive non-theatrical showing plan, now in operation in England, whereby films are shown in centers which have no theatres or which, due to the war pressure, have found their the-

are facilities inadequate. These wartime shorts have been sent to this country as a result of requests made to the British Library of Information in New York for facts on life in England during the war.

The job of the British Library since it was founded in 1920 has been to furnish Americans with official British documents. The films are looked upon as official documents of the British war effort. The Library has made them available to all commercial distributors of non-theatrical films and to non-commercial distributors such as university extension services and school systems. They can purchase the 16mm sound films at \$15 per reel and many of them in turn rent the films to the ultimate consumer for about \$1.25 per reel per showing. As a result the British films have been quite widely shown in this country, although no accurate figures are available as to just what the extent of these showings has been.

The films themselves cover such subjects as: the training of white-

collar workers for machine jobs; social services in Britain; maternity and child welfare services; transportation in London; medical services for the Army; and life in a village school that has acquired many new pupils. These films have been produced by various production groups in England, such as the General Post Office Unit, Strand Films, Rotha Unit, for the Ministry of Information under whose name they have all been released.

American movie-goers by the millions have seen the English wartime shorts which have been made for theatrical audiences. The most familiar of these are: *London Can Take It*, *Christmas Under Fire*, and *This Is England*. While these films tend to show a general condition or a mood, the non-theatrical shorts document a subject and appeal to those who want to learn about wartime conditions in detail.

JOHN DEVINE
American Film Center

FURTHER THOUGHTS ON RADIO CRITICISM

By C. A. SIEPMANN

Some intermediate steps toward the realization of a widespread and organized critique of radio are suggested by the author, University Lecturer at Harvard University and adviser to the President on radio and education.

MR. LANDRY's article, "Wanted: Radio Critics," in the December number of the QUARTERLY was far too good to let pass without at least a record of appreciation. His plea, moreover, if it is to bear fruit, must win sustained consideration. That is the excuse for this further study of his basic proposals.

These, if I interpret him rightly, are much as follows: It is time that we made good the social lag as a result of which radio still lacks such criticism as has long since been accorded to books, good and bad, music and films and plays. We need responsible and independent critics to offset the volume and the tedium of "complaints" from listeners, and of pressure from vested interests to which radio stations are subject. We need, in fact, to confront the industry with a body of critical opinion which it can recognize as independent but as informed and fair. The safeguarding of democratic processes demands such a foil both to rampant commercialism and to government bureaucracy. Radio will be the healthier for its existence.

We cannot, however, expect the infection of even so intelligent a plea as Mr. Landry's to spread widely overnight. Unpractical idealists can be left to keep shouting for the moon. Our concern is with what intermediate steps to take in order that a wide-

spread and organized critique of radio may ultimately be realized.

Radio's Bill of Fare

The first problem is to define more narrowly the kind of criticism that is needed. Two main categories suggest themselves. First, a critique of policy. What are the motives and the principles by which the entrepreneur determines radio's bill of fare? Why do we get what we hear and, equally important, how does it come about that we hear either nothing or so little of subjects and issues most apt to the techniques of radio and its potential range of public service?

One such problem, among others awaiting useful criticism, is why programs sponsored by educational and other well-meaning agencies should achieve so little and have such deplorable defects of presentation, such inadequate mastery of radio technique.

Questions under this head range, of course, far wider than problems of program content and their relation to problems of control. As Mr. Landry points out, it is not the industry alone which the guardians of democracy will do well to watch but its governmental partner in control, the FCC. If we are to preserve our democratic ways, we have to secure (and an army of critics might best secure it) that radio's listening audience also

has its finger in the pie. It is true, of course, that for a critique of policy as of audience reaction, we have as yet inadequate material to go upon. We need more research as a basis of criticism. One of our first problems, therefore, is to initiate such research.

Program Commentary

The second kind of criticism is presumably specific commentary on programs. The problem here is that of the sheer quantity of programs daily broadcast. A secondary problem is that of coverage. Different programs reach different audiences in a constantly varying geographical kaleidoscope. The quantitative dilemma, which at first seems baffling, can at least be partially resolved. There is no reason why certain programs should not immediately come within the purview of established critics in recognized fields of criticism. There is no radical distinction between broadcast music and the music of the concert hall. There is good reason for radio drama at its best (and discreet selection would partly solve the quantitative problem) being treated as seriously as stage drama and alongside of it.

This has been done for some time past in England, in the *London Times* and other papers, and curiously the most intelligent and trenchant criticism of radio appears in the BBC's own weekly publication, *The Listener*. Political broadcasts are not even today treated as *sui generis* because broadcast. The press reports them as of public interest. With radio thus admitted into respectable society, in recognized circles of legiti-

mate criticism, a good deal of the ground is cut from under the feet of those whose indifference to radio criticism relies on the quantitative argument.

Nor is the problem of variant coverage as complicated as at first sight it seems. The solution is to localize the criticism. We are most of us still bounded by local loyalties in respect of a wide range of our interests. In view of the trend towards centralized control and distribution of broadcast programs, the voicing of local needs and a local critique of what is offered for national consumption are both desirable as antidotes.

As superior efficiency and greater resources of talent and funds for centrally organized programs tend to put local programs in the shade, a fillip to more initiative in exploring distinctive local fields of interest and higher corresponding local standards might usefully be provided by local critics. New York is not America even over the radio as Dr. Lazarsfeld has demonstrated (*see Radio and the Printed Page*). A local interpreter of news in the State of Iowa, because of the conservative and local loyalties of country people, rates higher in popularity than Jack Benny or Charlie McCarthy.

Latent Highbrow Interest

Assuming the need for a critique of radio in the above two categories, how can we best secure that such criticism is effective? Criticism must be so written and so placed that it attracts attention at appropriate levels. There is the level of interest of the so-called highbrow, and the in-

terest of vox populi. At both levels, an intelligent direction of attention and an active promotion of interest are today lamentably deficient. High-brows, numerically the least significant, have from a social point of view an importance quite disproportionate to their numbers. As Mr. Landry points out, the early history of radio probably accounts for the fact that intellectuals even today display an indifference to it only matched by their ignorance and unawareness of its importance even within fields of study with which they are themselves concerned.

But even here the extent of latent interest is probably greater than one might suppose by listening to their contemptuous strictures of radio programs. A recent questionnaire issued at Harvard University secured a response from nearly two hundred and fifty members of the faculty and administration evidencing interest in radio and awareness of its social importance. Personal experience further suggests that a considerable body of thinking people respond with concern and interest to an intelligent statement of the case for radio. This is hardly surprising, seeing that familiarity with radio makes of it a convenient frame of reference for the consideration of most of the social and political problems with which people are today preoccupied. This latent interest at once justifies Mr. Landry's plea and shows how ready and responsive a market there would be for criticism.

Possible Outlets

It is at this level that it should be practicable to provide an outlet for

the findings of research. Radio research relates to and needs to be integrated with parallel research in the social sciences and in psychology. Universities could foster its development. The fruits of such research, presented as criticism, should find their way in a constant and steadily increasing stream into the journals of these departments of inquiry. Its relevance to education is similarly close and of particular importance at the present time.

At the highbrow level learned journals, therefore, offer at least one appropriate and useful outlet for radio criticism. Another obvious outlet is in the intelligent weeklies where both a critique of radio policy and of programs would seem to be relevant to the general context of readers' interest. A third outlet would be through publications concerned with sectional interests to which radio is relevant. Education, health, women's interests are obvious examples of these. The channels are available. What is wanted is promotional enterprise at universities and elsewhere to set the flow in motion.

And let us remember the two-fold scope of criticism, of intelligent and critical comment and of selective direction. A great deal needs to be done to draw attention in appropriate quarters to what goes out over the radio, both good and bad, that is of interest in such quarters. Many programs fail to reach anything like an adequate proportion of their potential audience through failure to publicize them. Right in the State of Illinois, of a hundred women interviewed only five had even heard of

the Chicago Round Table! Such a fact is eloquent of a need most pertinent to Mr. Landry's argument.

Criticism In Popular Terms

At the level of vox populi the scope of criticism is perhaps harder to define. Most certainly it would not, and should not be, the kind just referred to. Its main function would be to secure a local voice in directing the destinies of broadcasting. It could be a means both of improving and of extending the usefulness of programs over local stations. It could be a means of interpreting the part to the whole, and the whole to the part,—in politics and in all the complex social issues which we shall only solve by that two-way process of communication and interpretation which radio preeminently is fitted to achieve. Such criticism will, of course, have to be in the language of the people. Here is a problem of interpretation, the importance of which radio, as the people's instrument, has done much to bring to light.

The critic's function here is the education of people, not in a high-brow, academic sense, but in terms of a work-a-day, humane appreciation of their circumstance and needs, and of belief in their potentialities as persons. If there is a fight on between critics, actual or potential, and the industry, this is its ground. For by creating, in the interest of quick returns and of successful merchandizing, the illusion that it gives people what they want, radio has failed in leadership and in appreciation of what, given leadership, people are capable of responding to.

Our ultimate objective, then, stands as the realization of a widespread and regular critique of radio as of books, films, and plays, a critique carried on at different levels and related to research and comment in contiguous fields of interest. At its more popular level we can even look forward to the time when radio has its syndicated columnists. God knows it offers grist enough for such mills to grind.

From Theory to Action

Intermediate steps to such an end involve, it would seem, some such delineation of the field as is outlined above and a modest strategy of action. The first step would seem to be a getting together of the few who today combine knowledge and interest in radio: practical knowledge of its techniques and of its commercial structure, interest in the problems which it attempts to solve or to which it may give rise. Mr. Landry, stressing the limited amount of criticism that there is at present, drives home this very point. He is too modest, in fact, in claiming that criticism in *Variety* is limited, in the attention which it draws, to trade circles. The quality of that criticism, no less than its scarcity value, makes it a journal indispensable to anyone seriously concerned with radio. The collaboration of *Variety* and the PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY, as evidenced by his article, is a modest example of one means by which wider and more constant consideration of radio criticism can be realized. It would be surprising if even today quite a lot of intelligent criticism of radio was

not being put out by people whose effectiveness and whose belief in what they do would be strengthened by a similar joining of hands.

A second step must be the creation of further centers of research related to and extending beyond the promising achievements already realized at such centers as Princeton and Columbia Universities. We have yet to storm a good many citadels of aloofness and indifference in academic circles. That is the first, the tedious task. A further step might be to create a common meeting ground for those concerned with criticism, for research workers in related fields, and for practitioners within the industry itself. An analogy from journalism is the Nieman Foundation at Harvard, where men of practical experience sample the theorists of academic life and thereby widen their own professional horizon as well as contributing much to life and thought within the university. Radio might profit considerably from a similar benefaction.

Radio's Greatest Need

A further step, and it is at once the greatest and the most urgent and perhaps the condition of any ultimate success, is that of the creation of an informed and intelligent opinion about radio over a radius much wider than that of academic circles. Even within universities, as has been suggested, there is plenty to do. It is not without significance, for instance, that of over five hundred courses on radio given in colleges and universities today, one only is listed as dealing with radio's social signifi-

cance. Vocational training, knowledge of the tricks of the trade, is less important (the scope for employment in the industry being limited) for it overlooks radio's greatest need—a more widespread, intelligent reaction to what it offers.

One specific field of opportunity still within the realm of education is that of the schools of America, for the children of today are the mature listeners of tomorrow, and it is by their standards of appraisal that radio will be judged. I intend here not the use of radio in the classroom as a supplement to teaching but as a subject matter of interest, because of its familiarity, by which and in regard to which standards of taste and discrimination might be achieved. Is it not a little ironic that advertisers have shown themselves more shrewd in appraising the potentialities of radio's child audience than have the educators? Here, as throughout radio, Mr. Landry's stress on the importance of counterchecks to the free enterprise of the industry is relevant. Listening to radio as homework might prove invaluable as a means, in classroom discussion, of arousing interest in criticism, of redirecting interests, and of establishing standards of discrimination.

These are but a few among many possible developments to which attention seems worth directing. It will be a pity if Mr. Landry's plea is not now taken up by someone capable of rallying opinion and of fostering developments along some or all of the lines suggested above.

GALLUP AND FORTUNE POLLS

This section contains a compilation, topically arranged, of poll results released by the American Institute of Public Opinion and by *Fortune*. It is complete for the time periods covered except for a special *Fortune* survey listed at the end. The AIPO results cover the period from January through March 1941. (Previous AIPO questions were reported in the July 1938, October 1939 and all subsequent issues of the QUARTERLY.) The *Fortune* questions are those which appeared in the February issue of the magazine. (Previous *Fortune* questions were reported in the March 1940 and all subsequent issues of the QUARTERLY.)

Under each topic, all of the Institute data are given in chronological order, then all of the *Fortune* material, also in chronological sequence. Dates appearing in connection with AIPO questions are those carried in the date lines of Institute releases to subscribing newspapers; dates following *Fortune* questions indicate the issue of the magazine in which the information appeared. Institute questions are designated by AIPO; *Fortune* questions by FOR; "DK" stands for "don't know"; "no op." for "no opinion."

In considering these poll data, the reader should bear in mind certain salient points of reference set forth on pages 75 and 76 of the March 1940 issue of the QUARTERLY. The QUARTERLY wishes to express its appreciation to George Gallup and the American Institute of Public Opinion and to the editors of *Fortune* and Elmo Roper for their cooperation in making these survey results available in convenient form to other students of public opinion.

Part One: Domestic Issues

I. POLITICAL

ROOSEVELT

In general, do you approve or disapprove of Roosevelt as President? (Jan. 26, '41—AIPO)

	Total	Roosevelt voters in 1940 election	Willkie voters in 1940 election
Approve	71%	95%	38%
Disapprove	29	5	62
Undecided	9		

Same. (Mar. 15, '41—AIPO) Approve 72% Disapprove 28%

WILLKIE

Do you think Wendell Willkie would have made a good President if he had been elected last November? (Mar. 2, '41—AIPO)

Total	Rep.	Dem.
Yes	60%	85%
No	40	15
		61

Voters were asked whether their opinions of Mr. Willkie had changed since the election. Those who said they had changed their views were asked: Do you like him better or not so well as then? (Mar. 2, '41—AIPO)

	Total	Willkie voters	Roosevelt voters
Like Willkie better	22%	14%	31%
Like him less	14	24	7
Haven't changed opinion	64	62	62

Do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea to create a new and important government position (like a term in the Senate) to be filled by defeated candidates for President, starting now with Wendell Willkie? (Feb. '41—FOR.)

ELECTION RESULT

Now that the election is over, how do you feel about the outcome and its effect on the country? Which of these statements comes closest to describing what you think? (Feb. '41—FOR.)

Roosevelt's re-election was the best thing that could have happened to the country	47.7%	63.1% } 15.4
Although it was better for the country to re-elect Roosevelt, Willkie would probably have been all right, too	15.4	
It would have been better to elect Willkie, but we will probably get along all right with Roosevelt	21.9	32.2
Roosevelt's re-election was a very bad thing for the country	10.3	
Don't know	4.7	
Roosevelt's re-election very bad		
November 1940	40.2%	36.6% } 24.3%
February 1941	22.4	24.3 } 13.5

THESE BELIEVE—

	OF PEOPLE SAYING	THEY VOTED FOR
	Roosevelt	Willkie
Roosevelt's re-election best thing possible	79.8% }	3.8% }
Roosevelt better, but Willkie would have been all right, too	17.7	10.9 } 14.7%
Willkie better, but Roosevelt will be all right	1.1	55.0 } 81.5
Roosevelt's re-election very bad	0.2	26.5 }
Don't know	1.2	3.8

REPUBLICAN PARTY

In this country, the party that is not in power has always provided criticism and opposition to the party in power. How do you think the Republican party can now best serve the country—by providing more of this criticism and opposition than usual, or about the same amount as usual, or less than usual? (Feb. '41—FOR.)

PEOPLE SAYING—

	More criticism	Less criticism
Roosevelt's re-election best thing possible	4.2%	55.4%
Roosevelt better, but Willkie would have been all right, too	7.3	47.7

Willkie better, but Roosevelt will be all right	22.3	31.6
Roosevelt's re-election very bad	44.9	21.7

INTERNATIONAL POSITION

So far as our dealings with other nations are concerned, do you think our chances of taking care of ourselves successfully are better, worse, or about the same as a year ago? (Feb. '41—FOR.)

	Total	Prosperous	Poor	Executives	Farm labor
Better	55.2%	61.8%	52.2%	68.9%	45.4%
Same	22.1	19.4	22.7	17.0	26.9
Worse	10.2	12.7	9.7	12.1	7.9
DK	12.5	6.1	15.4	2.0	19.8

Of people who said they voted for—

Roosevelt	Willkie	Didn't vote
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THESE BELIEVE OUR INTERNATIONAL POSITION IS

Better	64.2%	47.7%	51.6%
Same	20.2	24.9	20.9
Worse	5.8	17.6	7.2
Don't know	9.8	9.8	20.3

2. GOVERNMENTAL POLICY**BUSINESS**

Which do you think has been most to blame for the unfriendly feeling that has existed between business and government—business leaders or the Administration? (Feb. '41—FOR.)

Business leaders	33.8%
Administration	28.0
Both	14.1
Neither	1.8
Don't know	22.3

(If respondent answered either "business leaders" or "both business leaders and the Administration.") Regardless of who is to blame, what do you think Roosevelt's attitude should be now?

He should continue to treat business in the same way he has	42.1%
He should give in a little and let business have its own way a little more	47.4
Don't know	10.5

(If respondent answered either "the Administration" or "both the Administration and business leaders.") Regardless of who is to blame, what do you think the attitude of business leaders should be now?

They should continue their present attitude toward Roosevelt	31.6%
They should give in a little and oppose fewer of Roosevelt's ideas	59.4
Don't know	9.0

CONSCRIPTION

Do you think the draft is a good thing? (Feb. 8, '41—AIPO)
 Voters in their twenties Yes 86% No 14%

HAWAII

Would you favor admitting Hawaii into the Union as a state? (Jan. 11, '41—AIPO)	Yes	48%
	No	23
	Undecided	29
	or no op.	29

WAR REFERENDUM

	Total	Males aged 21-36
Should a vote of the people be required before Congress can send men to fight overseas? (Feb. 4, '41—AIPO)	Yes 52% No 48 (Undecided 5%)	52% 48

3. SOCIAL**LABOR UNIONS**

What do you think is the chief argument against labor unions? (Mar. 27, '41—AIPO)

1. They use their power recklessly and unscrupulously.
2. Too many racketeers and exploiters among labor union leaders.
3. Too many strikes.
4. Poor leadership.
5. Too many communists in labor unions.
6. Not democratic—leaders are dictators.
7. Dues and fees are too high.

What do you think is the chief argument in favor of labor unions? (Mar. 27, '41—AIPO)

1. They protect the rights of the working man.
2. They keep wages up, and improve hours and working conditions.
3. They give labor a chance to express its views.
4. They provide job security.

Henry Ford says he will refuse to recognize labor unions in his plants. Do you agree or disagree with this viewpoint? (Mar. 29, '41—AIPO)

	Mar. '41	Apr. '37
Agree	58%	47%
Disagree	29	41
No op.	13	12

Westbrook Pegler, the newspaper writer, claims that many labor union leaders are racketeers. Do you agree or disagree with him? (Mar. 29, '41—AIPO)

	Agree	Disagree
Agree	72%	28%
Disagree	14	86
No op.	14	86

INCOME TAX

The following tabulation shows what the public thinks a man with a wife and two children *now* pays in Federal and state income taxes combined—and what the public thinks he *should* pay—at various income levels. Added for comparison are the sums actually to be paid this year (based on Federal and New York State rates): (Mar. 16, '41—AIPO)

<i>Head of family earning—</i>	<i>What public thinks he now pays</i>	<i>What public thinks he should pay</i>	<i>What he actually does pay</i>
\$3,000 a year	\$30	\$60	\$00
5,000 a year	100	200	130
10,000 a year	300	600	720
100,000 a year	5,000	10,000	46,000

LOTTERIES

Would you favor lotteries in this country run by the Federal government to help pay some of the cost of national defense? (Feb. 18, '41—AIPO)

	<i>New Eng. & Total</i>	<i>East Mid. Atl.</i>	<i>West Cent.</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>Far West</i>
Yes	51%	60%	50%	39%	45%
No	38	30	39	46	40
No op.	11	10	11	15	15

Would you favor lotteries in your state run by the state government to help pay the cost of old age pensions? (Feb. 18, '41—AIPO)

	<i>New Eng. & Total</i>	<i>East Mid. Atl.</i>	<i>West Cent.</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>Far West</i>
Yes	45%	59%	40%	36%	31%
No	41	31	44	51	51
No op.	14	10	16	13	18

MOTION PICTURES

Respondents were shown a list of more than one hundred top grossing pictures for the period January 1 to November 30, 1940, and asked the question: Are there any pictures here which you especially liked? (Feb. 25, '41—AIPO)

FREQUENT THEATER-GOERS
(Once a week or more)

1. Boom Town
2. Knute Rockne
3. Northwest Passage
4. Rebecca
5. Strike Up the Band
6. The Fighting 69th

INFREQUENT THEATER-GOERS
(Less than once a week)

1. Rebecca
2. Boom Town
3. Northwest Passage
4. Knute Rockne
5. The Fighting 69th
6. All This and Heaven Too

MEN

1. Knute Rockne
2. Boom Town
3. Northwest Passage
4. The Fighting 69th
5. Sea Hawk
6. Strike Up the Band

WOMEN

1. Rebecca
2. All This and Heaven Too
3. Boom Town
4. My Favorite Wife
5. Strike Up the Band
6. Waterloo Bridge

Part Two: The War In Europe

I. AMERICAN ESTIMATES

LAST WORLD WAR

Do you think it was a mistake for the U.S. to enter the last World War?
(Jan. 9, '41—AIPO)

	Mistake	Not mistake	Undecided
New England & Middle Atlantic	37%	44%	19%
East Central	43	35	22
West Central	45	42	13
South	24	55	21
Far West	42	38	20
Total U.S.	39	42	19

U.S. SAFETY

Do you think our country's future safety depends on
England winning this war? (Jan. 2, '41—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Undecided
Yes	68%		
No		26	
Undecided			6

Same. (Jan. 9, '41—AIPO)

	Yes	No	No opinion
New England & Middle Atlantic	71%	24%	5%
East Central	63	30	7
West Central	62	30	8
South	79	17	4
Far West	66	31	3
Total United States	68	26	6

	Yes	No	Undecided
Same. (Jan. 14, '41—AIPO)	Willkie Voters	65%	30% 5%
	Roosevelt Voters	72	22 6

Same. (Jan. 18, '41—AIPO) All voters: Yes 68% Labor members: Yes 64%

BRITISH POSITION

If the United States stopped sending war materials to
England, do you think England would lose the war?
(Jan. 2, '41—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Undecided
Yes	85%		
No		8	
Undecided			7

If Germany tries to invade England within the next year, Yes 11%
 do you think she will be successful in conquering England? No 74
 (Jan. 2, '41—AIPO) DK 15

Which of these two things do you think
 England should do now—try to make the Try to make peace now 15%
 best possible peace now with Germany, or Keep on fighting 79
 keep on fighting in the hope of defeating Don't know 6
 Germany? (Jan. 30, '41—AIPO)

IRISH POSITION

Would you like to see the Irish give up their neutrality and let the English use war bases along the Irish coast? (Jan. 12, '41—AIPO)

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
All survey voters	63%	16%	21%
Irish-Americans only	40	52	8

EFFECT OF GERMAN VICTORY

Suppose the United States does not go into the war, and Germany defeats England—do you think you, personally, would be affected by this German victory? (Jan. 25, '41—AIPO)

	<i>Affected</i>	<i>Not Affected</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
March 1940	47%	35%	18%
May (After Lowlands Invasion)	64	24	12
June (After Defeat of French)	58	27	15
July	67	24	9
September	65	23	12
January 25, 1941	71	21	8

PEACE PROPOSALS

Have you given any thought to what should be done to maintain world peace after the present European war is over? (Mar. 4, '41—AIPO)

Approximately one-third of the voting population or 20 million people are thinking about a future peace.

These were asked: In your opinion, what should be done?

1. The largest number—about 8 million voters, the survey indicates—lean toward some sort of international federation of countries either along the League of Nations principle or some variation of that principle. In order of frequency, these suggestions are: A revived and strengthened League of Nations with some sort of international police force; a "United States of Europe," a plan put forward many years ago by the French statesman Aristide Briand; and a "union of democracies" or a "world union" such as that suggested by Clarence Streit in "Union Now."

2. The second largest group believes the future peace of the world depends on moral, social and political reform both inside individual nations and in relations between nations. These people call for better understanding among nations, based on tolerance and Christian principles; getting rid of dictatorships and giving "the people a voice"; and economic readjustments to provide a better division of world resources, removal of trade barriers and sharing of colonies.

3. Since a similar survey a year ago, there has been some increase in the number of people who would propose dismemberment of Germany as a solution. These argue that Germany should be put under the military control of other nations—assuming of course that Germany is defeated—that her territory should be divided among the victors, and that she should be completely disarmed.

4. Conspicuously absent are any suggestions that the Nazis should be permitted to carry out their idea for world peace—control and organization of Europe under Nazi supervision. Only one or two persons in the entire survey suggested that as the solution to world problems.

2. BRITISH REACTIONS

(Based on surveys by British Institute of Public Opinion)

Are you sleeping less than before the war? (Feb. 22, '41—AIPO)

No	52%
Yes	44
DK	4

What are your thoughts when you hear there has been a very heavy air-raid? (Feb. 22, '41—AIPO)

Wonder how the bombed people are getting on	28%
Intensify our bombing of military targets in Germany	24
Bomb German civilians in retaliation	22
Get better protection for people in this country	16
Find some way to stop the war	10

Do you think the United States should take part in the peace settlement after the war? (Mar. 8, '41—AIPO)

Yes	65%
No	15
Undecided	12
or no op.	20

Is Eire in her own interests right in refusing to allow Britain to use naval bases like Cobh, Berehaven and Lough Swilly? (Mar. 8, '41—AIPO)

Right	14%
Wrong	62
Undecided	12
or no op.	24

3. U.S. POLICY

NATIONAL DEFENSE

See Part Three: National Defense.

AID TO BRITAIN

Since the English have lost many ships, they may not be able to come and get the war materials we make for them. If this proves to be the case, should American ships with American crews be used to carry war materials to England? (Jan. 16, '41—AIPO)

	Total	New Eng. & Mid. Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	Far West
Yes	42%	39%	38%	38%	58%	45%
No	45	47	50	49	26	42
Undecided	13	14	12	13	16	13

(Asked of persons who favored sending American ships) If American ships and American crews are used to carry war materials to England, should these ships be guarded by our Navy while crossing? (Jan. 16, '41—AIPO)

Yes	82%
No	12
Undecided	6

If the British are unable to pay cash for war materials bought in this country, should our government lend or lease war materials to the British, to be paid back in the same materials and other goods after the war is over? (Jan. 21, '41—AIPO)

	Total	Republicans	Democrats	Voters in their twenties*
Approve	68%	62%	74%	61%
Disapprove	26	32	20	34
Undecided	6	6	6	5

* published Feb. 8, '41

Would you approve or disapprove of the United States leasing about 40 additional destroyers to Britain? (Mar. 22, '41—AIPO)

Approve	52%
Disapprove	26
Undecided	22

Would you approve or disapprove of the United States leasing about five destroyers a month to Britain? (Mar. 22, '41—AIPO)

Approve	55%
Disapprove	25
Undecided	20

Which one of these statements comes closest to describing what you would like to see the U.S. do in relation to Great Britain? (Feb. '41—FOR.)

Declare ourselves allies and send our air force, navy, and army, if necessary	7.4%	54.4%
Declare ourselves allies and send our air force and navy but never send an army	3.3	
See that Britain gets anything she needs except men—even if it's more than half our production and even if we have to give it to her	43.7	
Continue to sell Britain military supplies up to half our production		27.8
Sell food and medical supplies but no fighting equipment	5.9	
Stop letting her have anything	3.7	9.6
Don't know		8.2

(If respondent answered to the above question either "continue to sell Britain military supplies up to half our production" or "sell food and medical supplies but no fighting equipment")

		% of answers	% of population
Should we sell only for cash or give England credit?	Cash	57.2	19.3
	Credit	35.4	11.9
	DK	7.4	2.5

If we should give England credit, what do you think our chances would be of getting paid—good, fair, or poor?	Good	4.9	1.7
	Fair	22.7	7.6
	Poor	62.9	21.2
	DK	9.5	3.2

(Asked of the same 33.7 per cent who favor only limited help to Britain.) If enough supplies were not getting transported from here to England, would you—

	% of answers	% of population
Favor sending supplies in our ships with American sailors defended by our own navy	8.7	2.9
Favor sending supplies in our ships with American sailors guarded by the British navy	9.9	3.3
Favor lending England ships to be sailed by British sailors	30.1	10.2
Favor selling England ships at reasonable prices	40.4	13.6
Favor none of these	5.1	1.7
Don't know	5.8	2.0

LEASE-LEND BILL

Do you think Congress should pass the President's lease-lend bill? (Feb. 6, '41—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Qualified	No op.
New England & Middle Atlantic	54%	21%	16%	9%
East Central States (Ohio, Ill., Ind., Mich.)	39	35	17	9

If Congress does pass this bill, should the powers which it grants to the President be given to him for as long as the war lasts, or for only a limited period of time, such as two years? (Feb. 6, '41—AIPO)

	New Eng. & Mid-Atl.	East Central
As long as war lasts	35%	31%
Limited period	56	59
No opinion	9	10

Do you think Congress should pass the President's lease-lend bill? (Feb. 9, '41—AIPO)

	Total	Democrats	Republicans
Yes	54%	69%	38%
No	22	13	30
Qualified answers	15	10	23
Undecided	9	8	9

Same. (Feb. 11, '41—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Qualified	No opinion
Total	54%	22%	15%	9%
New England & Middle Atlantic	54	21	16	9
East Central	39	35	17	9
West Central	53	22	15	10
South	77	8	10	5
Far West	55	20	16	9

(If the nation-wide sampling results are applied against the total of 50,000,000 voters in the last Presidential election—)

Favor the bill	27,000,000 voters
Opposed to the bill	11,000,000 voters
Qualified opinions	7,500,000 voters
No opinion	4,500,000 voters

If Congress does pass the bill, should the powers which it grants to the President be given to him for as long as the war lasts, or for only a limited period of time, such as 2 years? (Feb. 11, '41—AIPO)

	As long as war lasts	Limited period only	No opinion
New England & Middle Atlantic	35%	56%	9%
East Central	31	59	10
West Central	33	60	7
South	49	45	6
Far West	36	58	6

Do you think Congress should pass the President's lease-lend bill? (Feb. 13, '41—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Qualified	No opinion
Total	58%	21%	14%	7%
New England & Middle Atlantic	58	20	16	6
East Central	46	30	16	8
West Central	55	22	14	9
South	78	9	8	5
Far West	60	18	15	7

Same. (Feb. 27, '41—AIPO)

	Total	Democrats	Republicans
Yes	55%	67%	41%
No	20	13	28
Qualified opinions	11	6	18
No opinion	14	14	13

Same. (Mar. 1, '41—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Qualified	Undecided
New England	52%	21%	15%	12%
Mid-Atlantic	54	18	13	15
East Central	50	24	11	15
West Central	51	22	11	16
South	73	9	6	12
West	57	19	11	13
New York City	55	28	13	4
Chicago	37	38	9	16
Philadelphia	60	20	10	10

Same. (Mar. 2, '41—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Undecided
Roosevelt voters	67%	13%	20%
Willkie voters	41	28	31

Same. (Mar. 6, '41—AIPO)

	Men aged 21-29	In terms of 50 million voters		
Yes	55%	Definitely favor bill	56%	28,000,000
No	24	Definitely opposed	20	10,000,000
Qualified	10	Qualified opinions	11	5,500,000
No op.	11	No opinions	13	6,500,000

Same. (Mar. 6, '41—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Qualified	No Opinion
New York	50%	22%	14%	14%
Pennsylvania	52	18	11	19
Illinois	45	29	10	16
Ohio	58	16	12	14

Same. (Mar. 9, '41—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Qualified	Don't Know
Well-informed voters	59%	21%	17%	3%
Fairly well-informed	58	22	14	6
Uninformed	53	23	6	18

Questions on which the information ratings were based:

1. Can you tell me the name of the country where the armies of Greece and Italy are fighting?
55 persons in every 100 correctly supplied "Albania."
2. Can you name four leaders of European countries and tell me what country each one heads?
62 persons in every 100 answered correctly; Hitler, Mussolini, Churchill, Stalin and Petain, with their proper countries, being most frequently named.
3. Can you remember the names of five countries that Germany has conquered since the war began?
54 per cent supplied correct answers.
4. Can you tell me what country controls Gibraltar?
68 per cent of those interviewed answered "England."
5. About how many miles would you say it is from London to Berlin?
The actual distance is approximately 600 miles, and this proved the hardest question of the lot. 27 persons in every 100 put the distance correctly or close to the mark.
6. Do you happen to know how many years Hitler has been in power in Germany?
47 per cent correctly answered eight years.

Same. (Mar. 11, '41—AIPO) *Dates as shown:*

	<i>Feb. 9</i>	<i>Feb. 14</i>	<i>Feb. 28</i>	<i>Mar. 8</i>
Yes	54%	58%	55%	56%
No	22	21	20	27
Qualified opinions	15	14	11	8
No opinion	9	7	14	9

If the lease-lend bill is passed, do you think it will result in sending an American army abroad to fight? (Mar. 11, '41—AIPO)

Yes	31%
No	47
Qualified or DK	22

U.S. PARTICIPATION

Which of these two things do you think it is more important for the United States to try to do—to keep out of the war ourselves, or to help England win, even at the risk of getting into the war? (Jan. 9, '41—AIPO)

	<i>New Eng. Total</i>	<i>East & Mid-Atl. Cent.</i>	<i>West Cent.</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>Far West</i>
Keep out	40%	37%	45%	45%	24% 34%
Help England	60	63	55	55	76 66

If you were asked to vote on the question of the U.S. entering the war against Germany and Italy, how would you vote—to go into the war, or to stay out of the war? (Jan. 9, '41—AIPO)

	Total	New Eng. & Mid-Atl.	East Cent.	West Cent.	South	Far West
Go in	12%	13%	10%	9%	17%	14%
Stay out	88	87	90	91	83	86

Which of these two things do you think is the more important for the United States to try to do—keep out of the war ourselves, or help England win, even at the risk of war? (Jan. 14, '41—AIPO)

	Keep out	Help England
Willkie Voters	40%	60%
Roosevelt Voters	38	62

Which of these two things do you think is the more important for the United States to try to do—keep out of the war ourselves, or help England win, even at the risk of getting into the war? (Jan. 23, '41—AIPO)

	Jan. '41	Dec. '40	Oct.	Sept.	Aug.	July	June	May
Keep out	32%	40%	50%	48%	53%	61%	64%	64%
Help England	68	60	50	52	47	39	36	36

Did you happen to listen to President Roosevelt's radio speech December 29? (Jan. 23, '41—AIPO)

	Help England even at risk	Stay out
Persons who listened to fireside chat Dec. 29	71%	29%
Persons who did not listen	59	41

If you were asked to vote on the question of the United States entering the war against Germany and Italy, how would you vote—to go into the war or to stay out of the war? (Feb. 2, '41—AIPO)

To go in 15%
To stay out 85%
(Undecided 9%)

	Favor entrance	Favor entrance
October 1939	5%	October 1940 17%
June 2, 1940	16	December (following first
June 14	19	British gains in Africa,
July 6 (following collapse of French government)	14	Greece) 12
July 19 (following reorgani- zation of British strength)	15	February 2, 1941 15

Same. (Feb. 8, '41—AIPO)

	<i>Go in</i>	<i>Stay out</i>
Voters 21-29	10%	90%
Voters 30-49	15	85
Voters 50 and over	20	80
National total (published Feb. 2)	15	85

Same. (Feb. 13, '41—AIPO)

	<i>Go in</i>	<i>Stay out</i>		<i>Go in</i>	<i>Stay out</i>
All men	19%	81%	WOMEN		
All women	10	90	Aged 21-29	10%	90%
MEN			30-49	11	89
Aged 21-29	13	87	50 and over	10	90
30-49	20	80	National total	14	86
50 and over	22	78			

If American merchant ships with American crews are used to carry war materials to Britain, and some of them are sunk by German submarines on the way over, would you be in favor of going to war against Germany? (Feb. 16, '41—AIPO)

Yes	27%
No	61
Qualified	
& undecided	12

Which of these two things do you think is the more important for the United States to try to do—keep out of the war ourselves, or help England win, even at the risk of war? (Mar. 9, '41—AIPO)

MORE IMPORTANT TO—

	<i>Help England</i>	<i>Stay out</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Well-informed voters	66%	30%	4%
Fairly well-informed	62	35	3
Uninformed	47	43	10

If you were asked to vote today on the question of the United States entering the war against Germany and Italy, how would you vote—to go into the war or to stay out of the war? (Mar. 9, '41—AIPO)

Undecided or qualified

	<i>Go in</i>	<i>Stay out</i>	<i>Undecided or qualified</i>
Well-informed voters	17%	78%	5%
Fairly well-informed	13	81	6
Uninformed	12	78	10

If you were asked to vote on the question of the United States entering the war against Germany and Italy, how would you vote—to go into the war, or to stay out of the war? (Mar. 20, '41—AIPO)

<i>Go in</i>	17%
<i>Stay out</i>	83

Part Three: National Defense

I. DOMESTIC PROGRAM

PRODUCTION PROGRESS

Do you think America's warplane production is going ahead fast enough? (Jan. 3, '41—AIPO)

Yes	28%
No	58
No op.	14

Asked of those who replied in the negative) Whose fault do you think it is? (Jan. 3, '41—AIPO)

Leading factors mentioned, in order of frequency:

1. Roosevelt administration	4. Congress and politicians
2. Labor and labor unions	5. Government red tape
3. Industry and business	

About how many warplanes would you *guess* the United States is now producing a month? (Jan. 3, '41—AIPO)

Median or average figure (for 50% who answered) 800

(26 per cent of the people who answered thought production was in excess of 1,100. The latest and most authoritative estimate is in the neighborhood of 700.)

What country do you think is now producing the fastest and best planes? (Jan. 3, '41—AIPO)

America	56%
Germany	15
England	12
No op.	17

Do you think America's warplane production is going ahead fast enough? (Jan. 18, '41—AIPO)

Total	Labor members
No	58%
DK	14 11

Do you think America's production of arms, airplanes and other war materials is going ahead fast enough? (Mar. 23, '41—AIPO)

	<i>New Eng.</i>	<i>East</i>	<i>West</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>West</i>
<i>Total</i>	<i>6 mos. ago</i>	<i>& Mid-Atl.</i>	<i>Cent.</i>	<i>Cent.</i>	<i>West</i>
Satisfied	30%	40%	30%	30%	35% 29%
Dissatisfied	53	41	50	57	47 63 53
No opinion	17	19	20	13	18 16 18

(Asked of those dissatisfied) What do you think is the chief reason why production isn't going ahead faster? (Mar. 23, '41—AIPO)

Strikes in defense industries	52%	Lack of public interest	4%
Politics and red-tape; the government	11	Shortage of skilled labor	3
Shortage of plants and materials	6	Fifth-column sabotage	3
Lack of organization in the defense setup	5	Profit-seeking businessmen	2
		All other replies	2
		No answer	12

SPEED-UP MEASURES

In order to speed up defense production, should factories making war materials hire enough men to work 24 hours a day (three shifts)? (Jan. 4, '41—AIPO)

Yes	89%
No	7
Undecided	4

If it would help speed up the defense program, would you be willing to work more hours per week at the same rate of pay per hour as you are now getting? (Jan. 4, '41—AIPO)

Yes	75%
No	15
Undecided	10

If it would help speed up the defense program, would you be willing to work more hours per week at the same rate of pay per hour as you are getting now? (Jan. 18, '41—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Undecided
Employers and employees as a whole	75%	15%	10%
Rank-and-file unionists	68	27	5

In order to speed up defense production, should factories making war materials hire enough men to work 24 hours a day (three shifts)? (Jan. 18, '41—AIPO)

All voters	Yes 89%	Labor members	Yes 89%
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INDUSTRY AND LABOR

In connection with our national defense program, do you favor increasing or decreasing government regulation and control of industry? (Jan. 4, '41—AIPO)

Increase	51%
No change	24
Decrease	12
Don't know	13

Should employees of industries working on defense contracts have the right to protest, if they believe they are underpaid? (Jan. 4, '41—AIPO)

Yes	69%
No	22
Undecided	9

Should they have the right to strike if their protests are not taken care of? (Jan. 4, '41—AIPO)

	Total	Upper income	Middle income	Lower income
Yes	27%	17%	27%	30%
No	61	76	64	51
DK or undecided	12	7	9	19

If a factory refuses to make defense materials for the government at a price considered reasonable by the Defense Commission, should the government take over that factory? (Jan. 4, '41—AIPO)

Same. (Jan. 14, '41—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Undecided
Willkie voters	64%	31%	5%
Roosevelt voters	79	15	6

Favor increase in amount of government control that should be exercised over the defense industries. (Jan. 14, '41—AIPO)

Republicans 39%

Democrats 62%

Against permitting labor to have the right to strike in the defense industries. (Jan. 14, '41—AIPO)

Republicans 69%

Democrats 57%

Do you think labor union leaders are helping the national defense production program as much as they should? (Mar. 25, '41—AIPO)

Yes	18%
No	68
No op.	14

Do you think industrial (business) leaders are helping the national defense production program as much as they should? (Mar. 25, '41—AIPO)

Yes	51%
No	31
No op.	18

Which do you think is trying harder to help national defense production—labor union leaders, or industrial leaders? (Mar. 25, '41—AIPO)

Labor leaders	10%
Industrial leaders	56
Both the same	16
No opinion	18

Would you favor a law compelling employers and unions to submit their differences to a Federal Labor Board before a strike could be called in industries connected with the defense program? (Mar. 27, '41—AIPO)

Yes	85%
No	7
No op.	8

Should the government forbid strikes in industries manufacturing materials for our national defense program, or should the workers in these industries continue to have the right to strike? (Mar. 27, '41—AIPO)

Forbid strikes	72%
Allow right	
to strike	20
Don't know	8

TAXES FOR DEFENSE

To pay the cost of defense, should every American family not on relief pay an income tax based on the family's earnings, no matter how little? This tax would amount to about \$5 a year for the poorest families and larger amounts for families with larger incomes. Would you favor such an income tax on every family? (Jan. 7, '41—AIPO)

	Yes	No	Undecided or DK
All voters	51%	41%	8%
Upper & middle income	54	38	8
Lower income	44	48	8

In order to help pay the cost of defense, should the United States government collect a national sales tax on everything that people buy? (Jan. 7, '41—AIPO)

Yes	42%
No	49
DK	9

Which kind of tax would you prefer to raise money for defense—a national sales tax on everything you buy, or an income tax based upon the amount of income you receive, and collected from every family except those on relief? (Jan. 7, '41—AIPO)

Sales tax	30%
Income tax	54
Both	8
Other	3
Don't know	5

Willing to pay considerably more taxes now in order to meet the cost of the defense program. (Jan. 14, '41—AIPO)

Willkie voters 59% Roosevelt voters 62%

Want to see every family, except those on relief, pay an income tax no matter how small. (Jan. 14, '41—AIPO)

Republicans 52% Democrats 50%

CIVILIAN DEFENSE WORK

Would you personally be willing to spend an hour each day training for home-guard, nursing, first-aid work, ambulance driving or other defense work? (Jan. 19, '41—AIPO)

	Total	Men	Women	& Mid-Atl.	Cent.	New Eng.	East	West	Cent.	South	West
Would be willing	67%	66%	68%	70%	65%	57%	71%	70%	71%	71%	70%
Unwilling or unable	22	22	22	20	25	25	18	20	18	18	20
Undecided	11	12	10	10	10	18	11	10	11	11	10

Would you personally be willing to spend five hours each week on some kind of defense work without pay? (Jan. 19, '41—AIPO)

Yes	66%
No	23
No op.	11

Do you think that boys between the ages of 16 and 21, who are out of high school, should spend one year in a training camp learning things useful to our defense program? (Feb. 1, '41—AIPO)

Yes	79%
No	14
DK	7

Same (regarding girls 16 to 21). (Feb. 1, '41—AIPO)

Approve 56%	Disapprove 34%	Don't know 10%
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TRIAL BLACKOUTS

New York City is planning to have a practice blackout shortly. Do you think all towns and cities in your state should have practice blackouts every few months? (Feb. 15, '41—AIPO)

Yes	42%
No	45
Undecided	13

Percentage in favor in—New Eng. & Mid-Atlantic	50%
East Central	34
West Central	31
South	39
West	46

ARMY REJECTIONS

The army has been rejecting volunteers and draftees who have not been able to pass the physical examination because they have bad teeth. Do you think the army should accept these men for duty and fix their teeth before they begin training? (Mar. 18, '41—AIPO)

Yes	80%
No	13
DK	7

Do you think men who have a venereal disease that can be cured should be accepted by the army and placed in special camps until they are cured before starting training? (Mar. 18, '41—AIPO)

Yes	65%
No	25
DK	10

2. FOREIGN POLICY

SOUTH AMERICA

If Brazil, Argentina, Chile or any other Central or South American country is actually attacked by any European power, do you think the United States should fight to keep that European power out? (Feb. 20, '41—AIPO)

	Yes	No
Total*	86%	14%
Sept. '39	53	47
Mar. '38	33	67

* Undecided 8%

Which of the following statements best describes Central and South America? (Feb. 20, '41—AIPO)

Central and South America have very few natural resources, such as good farm land, oil, coal, silver, gold, water-power, etc., and will probably always be poor, weak and backward	8%
Central and South America have many natural resources and some time may be fairly wealthy and strong	33
Central and South America have many natural resources and probably will become very wealthy and powerful	48
Don't know	11

Do you think Germany will try to get control of Central and South American countries? (Feb. 20, '41—AIPO)	Yes	50%
	Germany is already trying	38
	No	7
	Don't know	5

Do you think it is important for the United States to keep Germany from getting more influence or control over Central and South American countries than she now has? (Feb. 20, '41—AIPO)	Yes	93%
	No	4
	No op.	3

Do you think the United States should lend money to Central and South American countries to help them build up their industries, railroads and defenses? (Feb. 20, '41—AIPO)	Yes	58%
	Qualified	12
	No	22
	No op.	8

JAPANESE EXPANSION

Do you think the interests of the United States would be threatened if Japan took Singapore and the Dutch East Indies? (Feb. 23, '41—AIPO)	Yes	60%
	No	20
	Undecided	20

Do you think the United States should try to keep Japan from seizing the Dutch East Indies and Singapore? (Feb. 23, '41—AIPO)	Yes	56%
	No	24
	Undecided	20

Do you think the United States should try to obtain permission from the British Government to use naval bases at Singapore, and in Australia and New Zealand? (Feb. 23, '41—AIPO)

Yes	55%
No	29
No op. or undecided	16

Do you think the United States should risk war with Japan, if necessary, in order to keep Japan from taking the Dutch East Indies and Singapore? (Feb. 23, '41—AIPO)

Yes	39%
No	46
Undecided	15

Same. (Mar. 13, '41—AIPO) Yes 40% No 39% Don't know 21%

NOTE

Because of space limitations, it has been necessary to exclude from the preceding tabulation the *Fortune* Forum of Executive Opinion, a special survey of opinions of business executives on taxation, which appeared in the February 1941 issue of *Fortune*.

BOOK REVIEWS

CORWIN, EDWARD S., *The President: Office and Powers*. New York: New York University Press, 1940. 476 pp. (\$5.00)

HERRING, PENDLETON, *Presidential Leadership*. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1940. 173 pp. (\$1.00)

The volumes of Professors Corwin and Herring are well timed in this period of ascendancy of the executive branch of government. A third book, by Harold J. Laski, on *The American Presidency* also appeared in 1940. The year 1941 marks a period in which a depression economy is rapidly disappearing and a military economy based on a rearmament effort is taking its place. The former powers of the President are undiminished and new authority is granted to place the presidency in its most dominant rôle in our constitutional history.

One would expect that Professor Corwin would emphasize constitutional law in his book on the President, but he has enriched this legal material with many of his own views on the chief executive as an American institution. Successive chapters deal with the historical concepts of the office, qualifications and elections, administrative functions, powers as chief executive and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, conduct of foreign relations, and position as a popular leader and legislator.

Corwin expresses little enthusiasm for the conversion of the constitutional system into a dictatorship in time of war. He admits that constitutional law becomes "highly malleable and that even the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights take on an unaccustomed flexibility," but the proposals to convert the United States into a totalitarian state the moment it entered a war "seem to me otherwise nonsensical and vicious. Why on earth should we *plan* on making a holocaust of our liberties unless and until we have to?"

The proposal to curtail the powers of the President and Congress in the evolution of the United States in war by the substitution of a popular referendum is viewed unfavorably by the author, and would not "afford much of a guarantee of peace if presidential prerogative is to be left otherwise untouched." The President as the chief of the armed forces and in his day-to-day conduct of foreign relations could create situations from which "escape except by the route of war" would be difficult or impossible. "Indeed, the recent decision of Congress to remain in session . . . is a greater contribution toward securing the kind of check just mentioned than a half dozen War Referendum amendments would be."

The student of public opinion will be most interested in the chapter on

the President as a "Popular Leader and Legislator." Corwin concentrates principally on the administrations of the two Roosevelts and Wilson. Of Franklin D. Roosevelt he says his "accomplishment as a legislator has surpassed all previous records. Yet the story of it . . . offers little novelty." The President has used the reinforcement of 'emergency,' the aid of public understanding of an announced program, the well-timed message to Congress, the recognition that leadership is subject to a law of ebb and flow, and the championship of groups of sizeable voting strength such as the farmers and labor.

Presidential leadership "has usually been the function of two highly variable factors, crisis and personality. It is therefore sporadic and discontinuous." To stabilize presidential leadership the author lends support to the proposal that the President should construct his cabinet, not from the heads of the executive departments, but from leading members of Congress. As a variation, he suggests that it might be wise to add to this group the Secretaries of State and Treasury and the Attorney General. Such an institutional solution would integrate the relationship between the executive and Congress and would serve as a check on presidential power which has become "dangerously personalized."

Contrasted with the work of Corwin, Herring has approached the problem on the basis of the political relations of Congress and the President. Much of the material is descriptive, but usually interwoven with the critical comments of the author. The conclusions of Herring are not too

different from those of Corwin. Perhaps Herring views the future with more equanimity and reassurance. He recognizes that in any discussion of the presidency the "intensely personal nature of the office must never be overlooked. To treat the office of the chief executive without reference to the individual incumbent is to ignore the chief determining factor."

Many students of government have conceded the presidential office a position of increased and continuous authority in guiding national policy. Herring is not quite willing to admit this. He states: "Leadership in the making of public policy is fixed neither in the President nor in Congress. At some times the legislative branch of government assumes major responsibility for charting the public course; at others the chief executive dominates the process." It might be queried as to whether we experience any great feeling of leadership if it is being exercised at the moment by the legislative branch, or perhaps the past eight years have blinded us to congressional potentialities. This observation might be made even if one agrees with Herring in his belief that "to state as an absolute canon of sound government the identity of national welfare and presidential responsibility is to substitute an idealistic desire for order and unity for a scientific acceptance of the inescapably relative nature of all institutions freely responsive to shifting human desires." That crisis government might justify strong presidential leadership is granted by the author.

Congressional organization differently established would strengthen

that body in handling its heavy responsibilities. Herring is critical particularly of the seniority rule which prevents placing Representatives, holding a fresh mandate from the voters, in the more important committee posts. The presence of blocs and sectional interests in Congress is also not conducive to effective execution of national policy. "Party responsibility can only be erected on a strong national party organization that actively aids in local elections. The presidential policies of the New Deal, we are now discovering, never permeated the Democratic Party as a whole. Conservative Democrats followed the President as a matter of expediency."

The reading of these two volumes by Corwin and Herring is assuring and comforting. Our democratic processes in the test tubes of these two distinguished experts stand the ordeal well. Even their scientific detachment does not prevent them, as well as the rest of us, from engaging in occasional flag-waving. It is this profound belief in our system of government by all Americans that will make our system an enduring one.

CHARLES C. ROHLFING
University of Pennsylvania

VAN KLEFFENS, EELCO NICOLAAS,
Juggernaut over Holland. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941. 195 pp. (\$2.00)

As the first account of Nazi *blitzkrieg* methods written by a high official of one of the states invaded by Hitler, this book is one of the prin-

cipal documents of the present war. It tells a story by now familiar—of fifth columnists and misguided zealots, recognition of neutrality and wanton invasion, duplicity in diplomacy, gross misrepresentation and pure invention of grievances, massing and deploying of troops along friendly frontiers, a ubiquitous espionage system, diversion of attention, and the rest of the battery of Nazi *nervenkrieg*.

Mr. van Kleffens, as Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, writes with authority. He presents a frank explanation of Holland's policy of strict neutrality, due largely to its geographic location "on the cross-roads of Western Europe," and describes the measures his government took to observe that neutrality. "But fate, as interpreted by Germany," he writes, "had decreed otherwise."

Like a bolt from the blue, to use van Kleffens' own words, Germany launched its attack on May 10, 1940, against "a peaceful neutral nation in its sleep, without even a pretense of an ultimatum, previous warning or attempt at negotiation." Only after the *Luftwaffe* had reached the Hague, did the German Minister present his government's explanation; it was "a document in the truest Nazi style: the threat was there, the intimidation, the alluring promise, and the false grounds."

After the flight of the Queen and her government to London, Mr. van Kleffens was able to piece together the whole picture of Nazi war tactics. The Germans leave nothing to chance. On the body of General von Sponeck, whose plane was shot

down, was found "a very accurate list of addresses where stocks of uniforms and arms for the Germans had been concealed, of places where information could be obtained, of inhabitants of the Hague who were to be arrested without delay. Everything was illustrated by very good maps and sketches." And while the onslaught was in progress, broadcasts from Berlin blared forth fabricated reports and accusations. "The radio is, after all," Mr. van Kleffens remarks pointedly, "an instrument admitting of no discussion, like the Nazi Government itself, which, in international relations, has a particular liking for action without previous negotiation."

Mr. van Kleffens' narrative is restrained and austere. It is at once a warning and an inspiration. "Lack of logic and consistency have never troubled German propaganda much," he says at one point, yet he is confident of the outcome:

"German ideologists, with their strange ways of abstruse reasoning, may think that the Low Countries can be coaxed or driven into accepting a place of dependence in the Third Reich. They are wrong, as they have always been wrong because, although they may understand German ways of thinking, they do not understand human nature. A nation which, for centuries, has been used to free institutions, never loses the taste of them—not in one, not in two, not in three generations. And so long as the true history of the Netherlands is whispered from ear to ear lest the Gestapo should hear it, the foundations are there on which, one glorious day, the independent State of the Netherlands will once again take its place among the free nations of the world. That no tyrant, no usurper can prevent."

Juggernaut over Holland has been referred to in some quarters as a "textbook of Hitlerite diplomacy and

treachery." In a sense that is an apt description, for like most textbooks, it contains little that is new. But the book commands serious attention as a first-hand, official account of what is probably the most systematized method of propaganda and warfare ever unleashed on the world.

IRVING ROSENTHAL
College of the City of New York

WAPLES, D., BERELSON, B., and BRADSHAW, F. R., *What Reading Does to People*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940. 222 pp. (\$2.00)

Since the early 1920's, studies on the reading habits of selected groups have been available in considerable number. A critical evaluation of most of these* and a theoretical framework on which to hang such a discussion can be found in *What Reading Does to People*. But a reasonably complete account of what reading does to our opinions and to those of the public in general, or even a first approximation of this, has yet to be written. In fact, the studies so far undertaken have been, all too often, on a crude descriptive level and rather narrow in scope.

The chief sections of the book deal with the preconditions, the distribution and the content of publications, and the readers' predispositions. Five typical effects of reading are identified by the authors. These are: the

* One of the better studies not available to the authors at the time of publication is that by J. V. Berreman, *Factors Affecting the Sale of Modern Books of Fiction: A Study in Social Psychology* (Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford University, 1940).

instrumental effect, e.g., reading to improve vocational efficiency; the prestige effect, e.g., housewives gain prestige by reading of housewifely virtues; the reinforcement effect, e.g., reading to reinforce one's own already-held views; the aesthetic effect; and the respite or distraction effect.

Many readers may decide that the book's greatest contribution is to be found in its detailed account of a three-year program of research to be undertaken by the authors. The projects will include: studies of "the readers' predispositions which block the influences of any publications they read which do not tell them what they want to be told"; the conditions underlying "the readers' refusal to read any publications which are likely to challenge their present attitudes"; "the relative inaccessibility of publications presenting views other than the views held by the readers"; and "the counterinfluences of conversation, radio, and film." When these tasks have been completed it is hoped that a second edition of the book will be published. This should tell us more precisely what reading does to John Public.

PAUL R. FARNSWORTH
Stanford University

MUMFORD, LEWIS, *Faith for Living*.
New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940.
333 pp. (\$2.00)

Mr. Mumford's book does not in any way pretend to be a work of scholarship as such. It is rather, as its title indicates, a diagnosis of the situation from the point of view of action, a confession of faith and a call to action in terms of it.

There are, however, many points at which its argument is of interest to the social scientists. As a diagnosis of the present critical situation in the western world it is somewhat difficult to assess. There can be no doubt that it is full of insights at many different points, and that Mr. Mumford has very thoroughly overcome the smug sense of security and self-satisfaction that was so prominent until very lately in the work even of very competent people. There can also be no doubt that this insistence upon these unpleasant truths is a necessary and a healthy thing in the present situation.

At the same time, one may be entitled to wonder whether he does not rather seriously distort his picture of contemporary society. To use the medical analogy, it may well be that National Socialism is closer to an acute infection than to a state of thorough-going pathological breakdown in many parts of the body at once. This is not to minimize the seriousness of the situation but has an important bearing upon the future if the crisis is once surmounted. It is perhaps neither a wholly specific threat nor a generally rotten social system which we have to face, but a society full of tensions with widespread disorganization in certain areas, yet with important elements of stability and powers of resistance.

It is perhaps significant that this book was written immediately under the impact of the fall of France, and without the full impression of Britain's resistance. Whether what this reviewer feels to be an exaggeration of the diseased state of society as a whole is nevertheless a healthy in-

fluence on the attitudes of its readers, is an extremely difficult question. It is probable that it is impossible to generalize. So far as it serves to puncture the illusions which still hang on in many quarters, it serves a useful purpose, but perhaps it also encourages the kind of despairing scepticism which is an obstacle to effective action.

It is only fair to note, however, that the author's own attitude is not one of despair, and this is important in its effect. Mr. Mumford makes a number of specific suggestions for social regeneration, with respect to the family, to the encouragement of regionalism, and to work-camps. The importance of these is again difficult to assess, but one has the general feeling that this part of the book is anti-climactic. If, collectively and individually, we can somehow re-establish a clear orientation and sense of national purpose, it would seem that most of the things which Mr. Mumford talks about would follow automatically. Whether or not such a proposal is desirable in itself, the reliance on such a minutely specific expedient as compulsory labor service, even though it does not stand alone, at least suggests a naïve belief in the almost magical efficacy of specific actions.

TALCOTT PARSONS
Harvard University

RILEY, NORMAN, *999 and All That*.
London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd.,
1940. 223 pp.

While the Royal Air Force and the *Luftwaffe* are fighting it out for su-

premacy in the skies of Europe, a moral struggle between two conflicting ideologies is being waged just as fiercely. The antagonists in this war of words are the British Ministry of Information and the German Ministry of Enlightenment and Propaganda.

Mr. Riley's book is a first-hand account of a journalist's impressions of the operation of the British Ministry of Information between September 1939 and January 1940. The author has for the past two or three years acted as deputy London news editor of one of the biggest and most influential chains of newspapers in the world.

The curious title of the book finds its origin in the fact that, in its troubled early days, the Ministry of Information was said to have 999 employees. Every Britisher knows that 999 is the telephone number of Scotland Yard. This mystic number stuck throughout several weeks of Parliamentary debate as a synonym of the Ministry. Says the author of his title:

"But there was too much evidence that the new Ministry was more fantastic than anything Lewis Carroll could have devised for an Alice in Blunderland. From being the number you dial to get Scotland Yard, '999' became in turn a statistic, a bad joke, a worse joke and an indelible mark on the debit side of our early war balance sheet."

The book's entire 223 pages is written in the hard-hitting style of an H. L. Mencken in his prime, or a Westbrook Pegler. The Ministry is called such names as "Mystery of Information," "Minnie," "Great White Elephant of Bloomsbury," "Ministry of Muddle," "Ministry of Malforma-

tion," and so on. Lord Macmillan is singled out for a good deal of invective, and, indeed, the author pulls no punches in dealing with any of the personnel. He has a few kind words for Sir Walter Monckton who has played such a vital rôle in the evolution of the Ministry.

Mr. Riley's work no doubt mirrors accurately the feelings of a large section of the press and the public alike toward the Ministry of Information in the early months of war. There was a dearth of war news and the public blamed the papers, while the fourth estate blamed the Ministry of Information. In the "war of nerves" a verbal flagellation of the Ministry acted as a sort of safety valve for the hard-pressed journalists, who had little to write about, or had a prime feature story censored.

Undoubtedly, as Mr. Riley repeatedly points out, one of the fundamental mistakes in building the Ministry was in overstaffing it with civil servants, and the lack of a large corps of seasoned journalists. Lord Macmillan, the first Minister, had little or no background in public relations, although he had rendered distinguished public services in other fields, notably in royal investigating commissions.

The book winds up on the expressed hope that the new Minister of Information, Sir John Reith, would salvage lost opportunities. Sir John was former head of the British Broadcasting Corporation, but his administration, which lasted from January to May 1940, was but little better than his predecessor's. The Ministry did not hit its stride until

Alfred Duff Cooper assumed leadership with the advent of the Churchill regime in May 1940. Under Duff Cooper the Ministry has really made a fairly good record, despite the handicap of innumerable journalistic peeves inherited from the Macmillan and Reith administrations. Duff Cooper, an eloquent, outspoken foe of appeasement, breathed new life into the Ministry and criticism of it gradually died out altogether.

Mr. Riley's book is a valuable document of the war and should be read in conjunction with Sidney Rogerson's *Propaganda in the Next War*. Riley's book suffers for lack of an index or footnotes, but there is not a dull sentence in the entire volume. The book cannot be readily obtained in the United States, but can be purchased at the larger book concerns in Toronto.

CEDRIC LARSON
Washington, D.C.

GALLUP, GEORGE and RAE, SAUL, *The Pulse of Democracy: The Public Opinion Poll and How It Works*. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1940. 335 pp. (\$2.50)
BEAN, LOUIS H., *Ballot Behavior: A Study of Presidential Elections*. Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940. 101 pp. (\$1.00)

It is not usual that a person can review a book as objectively as it is possible to review these two. They both are concerned with election predictions and the measuring of public opinion. Both attempted to apply

their methods to the 1940 elections. We now have an opportunity of testing the validity of their hypotheses and conclusions.

Bean bases his method on the analysis of trends and the relationship between trends in a given state and national trends. While he could use statistical formulas for this purpose, he scorns them and employs instead graphic methods for his solutions. He claims that he accurately predicted the 1936 election by relying upon the Maine September results, the *New York Daily News* poll of New York, and the *Baltimore Sun* poll of Maryland in order to get a rough estimate of the national trend. Assuming that this national trend was accurate, he read back on each of his state charts to see how that state would go.

His book was published in the late spring of 1940. Using the Gallup polls as to party strength as of that date (55 per cent Democratic) he estimated the electoral college vote as 316. This looks like a fair forecast but let us examine his case more closely. He could not have used his 1936 methods with any success in 1940. On page 23 he makes the statement, widely publicized in the press, that one should add 20 per cent to the Maine vote to get the national vote. Where would that get him in 1940? A national vote of 68 per cent Democratic! In his book he relied upon Gallup. Gallup's final poll was 52 per cent Democratic. Using Bean's formula such national percentage would have elected Willkie. The answer is that Bean's methods did not stand up very well in 1940. He

has not sufficiently refined the relationship of the Maine vote to the national vote, and he has no method for assessing national trends in a reliable fashion. One would have done better in 1940 to have relied upon Gallup's state-by-state figures than to have used Bean's formula and a national percentage of 52.

Gallup did better in 1940 than he did in 1936 and his book gives some of the reasons why. However, there are a few questions which remain unanswered and we can hope that Gallup and Rae will turn their attention to them at some future date.

While the authors touch upon the importance of the interview situation, they hardly do the subject justice. The very fact that college graduates are largely employed as interviewers shows that Gallup is not fully aware of the dangers of this procedure in lower income group distortion. Interviewees in the lowest income brackets are likely to conceal or misrepresent their views when interrogated by persons of superior economic status, especially if those views have been negatively propagandized.

Furthermore, the authors fail to give sufficient attention to the relationship of interviewee cooperation and the general level of excitement. It is likely that a rising affect-level increases lower income group distortion and concealment. The authors also fail to evaluate the so-called shifts in sentiment which the polls purport to give. Not enough attention is paid to the "don't knows." To what extent are apparent changes a function of the methods used to

bring information regarding the subject investigated to the focus of attention of the interviewees? Many questions are sprung upon the persons interviewed with little time for reflection. The authors have no idea as to how seriously the interviewees take the questions asked. My own experience has led me to believe that interviewees tend to give answers which they think will please the investigators and get rid of them.

These two books contain much information in addition to their discussion of polling techniques. Bean analyzes the relationship between economic and political trends, the influence of religion in 1928, and the relative "flexibility" of the different states. Gallup and Rae discuss the

relationship of the public opinion survey to democracy in general. They repeat an interpretation of Bryce, however, which seems to me to be questionable. They claim that in Louisiana their figures are better than the final election results, because the voters have no confidence in the honesty of the voting process in that state. Regarding the bandwagon theory, they maintain a position previously held that the polls do not create such a movement. In my opinion their case is very weak.

Both of these books should be on the indispensable list of those who are interested in public opinion and political parties.

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In each issue, THE PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY publishes a continuation of an annotated bibliography which appeared in 1935 in book form (Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey, and Bruce Lannes Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography*. Minneapolis: Published for the Social Science Research Council by University of Minnesota Press, 1935. 450 pp.)

PART I. PROPAGANDA STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUE

CHAKHOTIN, SERGEI. *Le viol des foules par la propagande politique*. Paris: Gallimard, 1939. 270 pp.
By well-known Russian reflexologist. Bibliography, pp. 265-67. U.S. edition: *The Rape of the Masses* (New York: Alliance, 1940. 310 pp.).

LASSWELL, HAROLD DWIGHT. *Democracy Through Public Opinion*. Menasha, Wis.: Banta, 1941. 176 pp.

Political scientist analyzes factors that may lead U.S. public opinion to exert democratic control over basic decisions. "The sacrifice of democracy is not a fundamental trend of the times. . . . Indeed, democracy is one of the long-run requirements of the skill society. . . . America, almost alone among the continents, can meet the needs of the time without giving up the rule of the majority."

Methods of Collective Management Closely Related to Propaganda

"Air Power," March 1941 issue of *Fortune*.

Issue devoted to "air power as world power." Its underlying theme is that air power may become the decisive element in world power; and the method of presenting the articles therefore reflects the two inseparable aspects of that power: the military and the commercial."

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College, and generally regarded as the leading exponent of Nazi military ideas. Includes lengthy passages on war psychology, together with careful analysis of the military geography of each of the European nations.

FOREMAN, CLARK; and RAUSHEN-BUSH, JOAN. *Total Defense*. New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1940. About 250 pp.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. *Europe's Trade: A Study of the Trade of European Countries with Each Other and with the Rest of the World* (League of Nations Publication 1941.II.A.I). Princeton, 1941. 116 pp.

NICKERSON, HOFFMAN. *The Armed Horde, 1793-1939: A Study of the Rise, Survival and Decline of the Mass Army*. New York: Putnam, 1941. 427 pp.

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SPROUT, HAROLD HANCE; and SPROUT, MARGARET. *Toward a New Order of Sea Power: American Naval Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922*. Princeton: Princeton University, 1940. 332 pp.

Companion-piece to *The Rise of American Naval Power*, which covered the development of U.S. naval policy from 1776-1918. The second deals primarily with the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 and bridges the period from 1918-22. A third book, now in preparation, is intended to bring the record up to date. Bibliographic footnotes.

GARBUTT, REGINALD. *Germany: The Truth*. London: Rich and Cowan, 1939. 256 pp.

Reginald Garbutt "for six years, was chief organizer of foreign propaganda and espionage under Himmler, chief of the Gestapo (Geheim [sic] Staats Polizei)," according to the title page.

HARGRAVE, JOHN. *Words Win Wars: Propaganda the Mightiest Weapon of All*. London: W. Gardner, Darton, 1940. 227 pp.

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"Nanking's Anti-American Propaganda Follows Nazi Pattern," *China Weekly Review*, 94:3-5 (September 7, 1940).

SALVEMINI, GAETANO. *Italian Fascist Activities in the United States.* Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940. 24 pp.

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WRIGHT, BASIL. "Ministry of Information Shorts," *Spectator*, 165:363 (October 11, 1940). Official British films.

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LLOYD, A. L.; and VINOGRADOFF, IGOR. *Shadow of the Swastika.* London: John Lane, 1940. 194 pp. "A radio-drama in six parts of the story of the German National Socialist Party, produced for broadcasting by Lawrence Gilliam for the BBC." Bibliography, p. 194.

MCHENRY, DEAN EUGENE. *His Majesty's Opposition: Structure and Problems of the British Labor Party, 1931-1938.* Berkeley: University of California, 1941. 320 pp. Bibliography at ends of chapters.

MERRIAM, CHARLES EDWARD; and GOSNELL, HAROLD FOOTE. *The American Party System*, third edition. New York: Macmillan, 1940. 476 pp. Standard text.

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Report of the 1939-40 Public Relations Committee, dealing with general principles of public relations from the standpoint of the trade association executive.

BRAUDE, WILLIAM G. *Jewish Proselytizing in the First Five Centuries of the Common Era.* Providence, R.I.: Brown University, 1940. 142 pp.

Deals with the first five centuries of the Common Era, the Age of the Tannaim and Amoraim (first through sixth centuries A.D.). Bibliography, pp. 139-42.

BREWSTER, ARTHUR JUDSON; and PALMER, HERBERT HALL. *Introduction to Advertising*, revised fourth edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941. 524 pp.

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BURT, F. ALLEN. *American Advertising Agencies: An Inquiry into their Origin, Growth, Functions, and Future.* New York: Harpers, 1940. 282 pp.

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EVANS, STEWART HOWARD. "How Cities Can Use the Radio," *Public Management*, 22:227-30 (August 1940).

FOLSOM, JOSEPH KIRK. *Youth, Family and Education.* Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941. 299 pp.

Report on the relation and integration of education and family living, prepared for the American Youth Commission. Has chapters on "Use of the Impersonal Media of Communication" and on programs of various agencies that attempt to influence family life. By Vassar sociologist. Includes bibliographies.

HISCOCK, IRA V.; and others. *Ways to Community Health Education.* New York: Commonwealth Fund, 1939. 306 pp.

KIRKPATRICK, E. L. *Guideposts for Rural Youth.* Washington, D.C.: Sims, Lewis B. "Social Scientists in the Federal Service," in *Public Policy* (first Yearbook of Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration, 1940, edited by Carl Joachim Friedrich and Edward S. Mason), pp. 280-97.

Job opportunities for social scientists, described by U.S. Census official. See also the author's "The Social Science Analyst Examinations," *American Political Science Review*, 33:441-50 (June 1939).

American Council on Education, 1940. 167 pp.

Nearly half of the twenty-one million Americans between 16 and 24 now live on farms or in small villages. Yet three of every five farm boys cannot get farm jobs and they have no better chance in the neighboring villages or cities, according to this survey for the American Youth Commission. Programs here described suggest what communities can do to improve the situation: finding jobs; vocational education; general education; recreation; religion; health; marriage, family, and home; youth organizations. The author, a rural sociologist, formerly at University of Wisconsin, has held several government posts.

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"Radio Used by Forty-six Cities in Reporting to Public," *Public Management*, 22:247 (September 1940).

**PART IV. THE SYMBOLS AND PRACTICES
OF WHICH PROPAGANDA MAKES USE**

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CARR, ALBERT H. Z. *America's Last Chance*. New York: Crowell, 1941. 328 pp.

A plan of U.S. policy. Recommends that the U.S. go to war with Nazi Germany; blockade Japan if she continues to demand a "New Order"; steel itself to the likelihood of an army of 4,000,000 after 1945; step up airplane production to 100,000 a year; use propaganda and economic pressure to swing South America into a defense scheme; use surplus food and gold to instigate European revolutions against the Nazis; revamp the educational system; conciliate industry and organized labor; abandon adherence to States' rights; recapture lost foreign trade; rewrite the Constitution; provide for a censorship which informs the home public without enlightening the enemy; form a strong national American Labor Party; abandon democratic processes; yet ultimately preserve democracy in the world. Bibliography, pp. 313-19.

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By Princeton political scientist.

DONOVAN, FRANK P., JR. *The Railroad in Literature*. Boston: The Railway and Locomotive Historical Society, Baker Library, 1940. 138 pp.

A survey of railroads as depicted in plays, prose and verse, with special reference to American literature.

DURANT, HENRY W. *The Problem of Leisure*. London: George Routledge and Sons, 1938. 276 pp.

Based on careful studies of problems of leisure that confronted different classes in English society: the aristocracy, the middle classes, the working class, and the unemployed. Includes sections on cinema, radio, and other communication channels. Bibliography, pp. 265-71.

ELLIS, ELMER. "Public Opinion and the Income Tax, 1860-1900," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 27:225-42 (September 1940).

GANKIN, OLGA HESS; and FISHER, HAROLD HENRY. *The Bolsheviks and the World War: The Origins of the Third International* (Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace, Publication No. 15). Stanford: Stanford University, 1940. 856 pp.

A collection of documents selected from the mass of material dealing with the international socialist movement of 1914-18, with special emphasis on the part played by the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party, precursor of the present Communist party of the U.S.S.R. Contains chronology, biographical notes which provide much information not easily obtainable from other sources, and a scholarly annotated bibliography. The story told in the present volume ends in the middle of 1918 and the next installment is promised in *The Bolsheviks and World Revolution: The Founding of the Third International*. Bibliography, pp. 729-70.

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By two U.S. political scientists, under auspices of Social Science Research Council's Committee on Public Administration. "Afforded unusual opportunities for observation within the Department both in Washington and the field, the authors

have written the first over-all account of its growth . . . [and of] the impact of the Department's work on state and local governments, and its relations to Land Grant Colleges and the [State] Extension Service."

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Current situation in Japan and China.

HARRISON, THOMAS HARTNETT. "What is Public Opinion?" *Political Quarterly*, 11:368-83 (October 1940).

KEENE, FRANCES, editor. *Neither Liberty Nor Bread: The Meaning and Tragedy of Fascism*. New York: Harpers, 1941. 388 pp.

History and analysis of fascism by forty-two exiled Italians, most of them professors, publicists, authors and scholars. Prof. Gaetano Salvemini contributes a survey of the attitudes of the four and a half million Americans of Italian origin and of the Fascist propaganda forces which are at work among them. He says that 50 per cent of the Italo-Americans are politically indifferent. Ten per cent are anti-Fascist. Five per cent, according to Prof. Salvemini, are out-and-out Fascists; and these may influence the remaining 35 per cent.

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Conclusions of a round table held at Princeton, New Jersey, June 1940. May be compared with *Fortune's* round table on "Peace Aims," *Fortune*, April 1941.

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History of diplomacy immediately before and during the present European war, by Williams College political scientist.

SHANNON, J. R.; and SHAW, MAXINE. "Education of Business and Professional Leaders," *American Sociological Review* 5:381-83 (June 1940).

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islamique de l'Allemagne (Centre d'études de politique étrangère. Section d'information Publication no.15—1939). Paris: Paul Hartmann, 1939. 117 pp. Bibliographic footnotes.

PART V. CHANNELS OF PROPAGANDA

Agents Who Specialize in Managing Propaganda

BEIN, ALEX. *Theodore Herzl: A Biography*. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1941. 545 pp.

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BILKEY, PAUL ERNEST. *Persons, Papers, and Things: Being the Casual Recollections of a Journalist*. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1940. Boston: Bruce Humphries, 1941. 235 pp.

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Biography of first head of Department of Political Economy, University of Chicago—an austere classicist. By economist, New York University. Bibliographic footnotes.

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Biography of a pioneer news cameraman, by a fellow journalist.

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Second volume of memoirs of Josephus Daniels, covering the period from Cleveland to Wilson. The first was entitled *Tar Heel Editor* (1940).

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GILSON, MARY BARNETT. *What's Past is Prologue: Reflections on My Industrial Experience*. New York: Harpers, 1941. 307 pp.

Autobiography of a retired member of the economics faculty, University of Chicago.

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Biography of a U.S. politician and reformer, son of Robert Owen, the celebrated British philosopher of "Universal Reform." By Harvard historian. Bibliography, pp. 417-40.

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Autobiography of English journalist. MCKELWAY, ST. CLAIR. *Gossip: The Life and Times of Walter Winchell*. New York: Viking Press, 1940. 150 pp.

Study of the Winchell phenomenon, its influence and significance.

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Life of Nikola Pashich, with special reference to the Union of the Yugoslavs. By anti-fascist Italian diplomat who is the author of many works on world politics.

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from box-office receipts, providing entertainment to over thirty million people in twenty-nine States, and giving approximately twelve hundred productions, exclusive of radio programs. The author was an administrator of the project. Bibliography, pp. 439-47.

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GUTHRIE, JOHN A. *The Newsprint Paper Industry: An Economic Analysis* (Harvard Economic Studies, no. 68). Cambridge: Harvard University, 1941. 274 pp.

A study of its development during the last two decades. Bibliography, pp. 253-65.

HEGGIE, B. A.; and O'MALLEY, J. J. "Fifty Per Cent," *New Yorker*, January 25, 1941.

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PART VI. MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF PROPAGANDA

BLANKENSHIP, ALBERT B. "Choice of Words in Poll Questions," *Sociology and Social Research*, 25:12-18 (September 1940).

CLARK, WESTON R. "Radio Listening Habits of Children," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 12:131-49 (August 1940).

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM. *How Radio Measures Its Audience: Four Discussions by Research Authorities*. New York: Radio Sales Division of CBS, 1941. 26 pp.

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STOLBERG, BENJAMIN. "Muddled Millions: Capitalist Angels of Left-Wing Propaganda," *Saturday Evening Post*, February 15, 1941.

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Akron, Ohio, was chosen under the auspices of the Institute for Applied Social Analysis for a test study of opinion centering upon attitudes toward corporate wealth. A representative sample of Akron's population, plus that of outlying communities on a small scale, was obtained. Each individual in the sample was then given the facts concerning seven specific economic situations: coal "bootlegging" in Pennsylvania, a stay-in strike in a Michigan power house, a threat made by an Akron rubber company to move its plant, a farm mortgage foreclosure averted by mob threat, use of tear gas to drive strikers out of a plant, the migration of a dress concern in breach of a union contract, mob action to prevent dispossession of a tenement family. An eighth question required the person interviewed to indicate the order in which he would assign the net profits of a corporation to the stockholders, bankers, employees, etc., under ten categories. The replies were believed to indicate the attitudes of those questioned toward "corporate property," as distinguished from other kinds of property.

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PART VII. PROPAGANDA AND CENSORSHIP

"Censorship in the Offing," *Time*, February 17, 1941, pp. 52-57.

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By a member of U.S. Supreme Court bar. Holding that "trial by newspaper is a shabby form of jury tampering," the author believes U.S. courts should cite newspapers for contempt, as in England. A long line of cases is analyzed. Contempts by radio, cinema and television are also discussed.